Grooms v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: May 5, 2020
• Docket: 330, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MICHAEL GROOMS, § § No. 330, 2019 Defendant Below, § Appellant § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID: N1810008467A STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: April 1, 2020 Decided: May 5, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

This 5th day of May, 2020, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the

record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In his direct appeal, Michael Grooms seeks to overturn his conviction

in the Superior Court of carrying a concealed deadly weapon (“CCDW”).

(2) On October 15, 2018, Grooms was at a gathering, smoking and drinking

with friends. Michael’s brother Kevin and a friend named Andrew Jones were also

there. At one point in the evening, Grooms offered to drive to the store to purchase

additional cigars and snacks for the group. As Grooms was leaving the gathering,

he agreed to give Jones a ride home. According to Grooms, Jones was carrying a

1 zipped Coors Light cooler bag when he entered the car. Grooms stated that he

“didn’t pay too much attention to it” and that he “didn’t have [a] reason to look at

the bag.”1 As Grooms was driving Jones home, he was pulled over by Corporal

Dmeza of the Wilmington Police Department because one of Grooms’s headlights

was out.

(3) Upon Corporal Dmeza’s request, Grooms obtained his insurance and

registration from the glove compartment. Grooms then reached towards the back

seat, according to Grooms’s testimony, to retrieve a temporary driver’s license—

issued to Grooms in connection with a recent driving-under-the influence arrest—

that Grooms thought was in a manila envelope in a pocket behind the front passenger

seat. Corporal Dmeza acknowledged at trial that Grooms said that, when he reached

into the back seat, he was “looking for a manila envelope which contained his

license.”2 But Corporal Dmeza told Grooms to keep his hands where he could see

them, and Grooms complied. At trial, Grooms testified, consistently with what he

had told Corporal Dmeza, that he was reaching towards the pocket on the back of

the passenger seat to retrieve the envelope.

(4) Neither Grooms nor Jones had a valid license at the time of the stop, so

as a result, Corporal Dmeza ordered them both to exit the car. Once outside the

1 App. to Opening Br. at A77. 2 Id. at A26. 2 vehicle, Grooms admitted to Corporal Dmeza that he had marijuana in his pocket

and gave Corporal Dmeza permission to search the car. Upon searching the vehicle,

Corporal Dmeza’s partner discovered the Coors Light cooler bag on the rear

passenger floorboard. The bag was unzipped, partially underneath the front

passenger seat, and contained a sawed-off rifle. Additionally, officers found more

marijuana in the center console armrest of the car. Lastly, the pocket on the back of

the passenger seat was empty, and the envelope that Grooms mentioned was not

found inside the car.

(5) A grand jury indicted Grooms on the following counts: (1) possession

or control of a firearm by a person prohibited; (2) possession or control of

ammunition by a person prohibited; (3) possession of a firearm by a person in

possession of marijuana; (4) carrying a concealed deadly weapon (“CCDW”); (5)

possession of marijuana; (6) driving a vehicle while license is suspended or revoked;

and (7) an equipment (headlight) violation. Grooms successfully moved to sever the

person-prohibited counts, and the State entered a nolle prosequi on the count

charging Grooms with possession of a firearm by a person in possession of

marijuana. The remaining counts were tried before a jury, which found Grooms

guilty on all counts. At the subsequent bench trial, the court found Grooms not guilty

of possession or control of a firearm and ammunition by a person prohibited. The

Superior Court then sentenced Grooms for CCDW to eight years of Level 5

3 incarceration suspended after two years with decreasing levels of probation and 30

days at Level 5 for driving-while-suspended conviction. The Superior Court also

imposed fines and costs.

(6) On appeal, Grooms argues that the Superior Court erred when it denied

his motion for judgment of acquittal on the CCDW charge. Further, Grooms argues

that the Superior Court abused its discretion when, as a sanction for Grooms’s

violation of his discovery obligations under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, it

prohibited the introduction of the manila envelope—according to Grooms, the

envelope for which he was reaching during the vehicle stop—that contained

documents pertaining to Grooms’s DUI.

(7) We review an appeal from a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal

de novo.3 In particular, we consider “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.”4 We review evidentiary rulings

for an abuse of discretion.5 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge

‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has so ignored

recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”6

3 Clay v. State, 164 A.3d 907, 913 (Del. 2017). 4 Id. 5 Burns v. State, 968 A2d 1012, 1022 (Del. 2009). 6 State v. Wright, 131 A.3d 310, 320 (Del. 2016). 4 (8) 11 Del. C. § 1442 provides that “[a] person is guilty of carrying a

concealed deadly weapon when the person carries concealed a deadly weapon upon

or about the person without a license to do so as provided by § 1441 of this title.”

When determining whether a weapon transported in a car is sufficiently accessible

to the driver to be “carried,” we consider three non-exclusive factors:

(1) Would the [driver] have to appreciably change his position in order to reach the weapon? (2) Could the [driver] reach the weapon while driving? (3) How long would it take for the [driver] to reach the weapon, if the defendant were provoked?7

(9) Grooms concedes that the firearm was located underneath the passenger

seat of his car and that “the State made a prima facie showing that the firearm could

be considered by a rational juror to be on or about [his] person.”8 Grooms argues,

however, that a rational juror could not conclude that he knew that the Coors Light

cooler bag contained the gun.

(10) It is well established—and Grooms concedes—that knowledge of the

presence of a concealed weapon may be proved by circumstantial evidence.9 Here,

the sawed-off rifle was found in an unzipped cooler bag underneath the front

passenger seat with the butt end nearest the driver’s side of the vehicle. The State

7 Buchanan v. State, 981 A.2d 1098, 1104 (Del. 2009) (quoting Dubin v. State, 397 A.2d 132, 135 (Del 1979)). 8 Opening Br. at 9. 9 Smith v. State, 2015 WL 1422427, at *2 (Del. March 26, 2015) (citing Ross v. State, 232 A.2d 97, 98, (Del. 1967)). 5 introduced photographs that depicted how very close the cooler bag was to Grooms

as he sat behind the wheel. And when Corporal Dmeza began to address Grooms

during the traffic stop, Grooms reached “in the back towards the rear passenger side

seat towards the ground”10—that is, precisely in the direction of the cooler bag. And

though Grooms claimed that he was reaching for a manila envelope from which he

hoped to retrieve his temporary driver’s license, the police found no such envelope

when they searched Grooms’s car.

(11) Grooms seems to argue that the jury was bound to accept his

explanation for reaching toward the floor behind the front passenger seat. We

disagree. Given the manila envelope’s absence, a rational juror could conclude that

Grooms’s explanation was not credible and that Grooms was reaching toward the

cooler bag with the intent to ensure that it was concealed from the officer’s view.

(12) In a similar vein, Grooms argues that “[e]vidence adduced at trial

showed that the front seat passenger [Jones] placed the Coors Light cooler bag in the

car immediately behind where he sat . . . [and that there was] [n]o evidence . . . [that]

showed that [Jones] ever informed . . . Grooms of the contents of the cooler bag.”11

And to be sure, Grooms and another witness—Grooms’s brother Kevin—testified

that Jones came out of the house carrying a Coors Light bag, which he put in the

10 App. to Opening Br. at A26. 11 Opening Br. at 10. 6 back of Grooms’s car. But Jones himself did not testify, nor was there any evidence

showing that Jones had claimed responsibility for the presence of the cooler bag and

rifle in Grooms’s car. We have previously noted that “[t]he fact finder is free to reject

all or part of any witness’s testimony. The fact finder need not believe even

uncontroverted testimony. We will not substitute our judgment for the fact finder’s

assessments in these areas.”12 Likewise here, the jury was not required to accept

Grooms’s or his brother’s testimony, even if uncontroverted.

(13) In reaching our conclusion on this issue, we recognize that the evidence

that Grooms knew of the presence of the weapon was not overwhelming. But

viewing this evidence as outlined above in a light most favorable to the State, which

our standard of review requires us to do, we are satisfied that a rational trier of fact

could find that Grooms knew that the weapon was in the cooler bag and,

consequently, was guilty of CCDW beyond a reasonable doubt.

(14) Grooms also claims that the Superior Court erroneously prohibited him

from introducing the manila envelope, which he claimed to have been reaching for

as discussed above. According to Grooms, the envelope contained DUI related

paperwork, vehicle registration, insurance information, the DUI ticket, and a

temporary driver’s license. During his direct examination, Grooms sought to

introduce the manila envelope with its contents because, in his view, it would

12 Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005). 7 corroborate his testimony that he was reaching for the envelope and not for a gun

that he did not know was there.

(15) The State opposed the introduction of the evidence because Grooms had

not produced the envelope or any of its contents in response to the State’s pretrial

reciprocal discovery request. Grooms’s counsel confirmed that he had received the

State’s discovery request, but that Grooms had just provided the envelope and

documents that morning. As a result, Grooms’s production of the documents came

after the State had rested its case. Pointing to the unfairness to the State, the court

prohibited Grooms from introducing the envelope and its contents. Grooms now

claims that this ruling was an abuse of discretion.

(16) Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(b) provides that, if a defendant

requests disclosure, and the State complies, “then the defendant must permit the

government, upon request, to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, [or]

documents . . . (i) if the item is within the defendant’s possession, custody, or control;

and (ii) the defendant intends to use them in the defendant’s case-in-chief at trial.”13

When a party fails to comply with Rule 16, “the court may order such party to permit

the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from

13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(b)(1)(A). 8 introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just

under the circumstances.”14

(17) In Doran v. State,15 we held that “[i]n determining the proper sanction

for a discovery violation, the trial court must weigh all relevant factors,” including

the reasons for the noncomplying party’s delay in providing the required discovery,

the extent of prejudice, if any, suffered by the requesting party, and “the feasibility

of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance or, if the jury has been sworn and

the trial has begun, a recess.”16 “After weighing the facts and circumstances of the

case before it, the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation is addressed to the

sound discretion of the trial judge.”17

(18) In this case, Grooms offered no reason for his delay in producing the

manila envelope. And the trial judge noted the inherent unfairness that attended

Grooms’s production of the evidence “moments before [he was] going to testify”18

and after the State had rested. And though the court did not expressly weigh the

feasibility of recessing the trial to mitigate the unfairness, neither did Grooms

suggest that alternative. All things considered, including that Grooms was on the

stand near the end of the second day of a two-day trial (excluding the charge to the

14 Doran v. State, 606 A.2d 743, 745 (Del. 1992). 15 Id. at 746 (Del. 1992) (citing United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. (1985)). 16 Id. at n.5. 17 Id. 18 App. to Opening Br. at A81. 9 jury, the jury deliberations and verdict), we conclude that the trial judge’s decision

to forgo a recess and to exclude the envelope—an item of seemingly marginal

evidentiary value—was not an abuse of discretion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice