Grochowski v. Ardes

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Grochowski v. Ardes

168 A.2d 327, 402 Pa. 614, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 402

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedMarch 13, 1961

DocketAppeal, No. 43

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 168 A.2d 327 (Grochowski v. Ardes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Grochowski v. Ardes, 168 A.2d 327, 402 Pa. 614, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 402 (Pa. 1961).

Pincite

Opinion

Opinion by

Mb. Chief Justice Jones,

The complaint in this action of trespass sought damages for the death of the plaintiff’s decedent as a result of his being struck by an automobile owned and operated by the defendant. The action was instituted by the deceased’s personal representative who claims damages under both the Wrongful Death Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, as amended, 12 PS §1602, and the Survival Act (Section 603 of the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, 20 PS §320.603).

At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which, after argument before the court en banc, was granted in an opinion by the trial judge who conceded harmful error in the charge to the jury in respect of alleged contributory negligence. The defendant has appealed the new trial order.

[616]*616Our examination of the record confirms that the court below exercised a sound discretion in awarding a new trial. The plaintiff had submitted timely a point for charge which correctly set forth the law with respect to the burden of proving contributory negligence. However, the trial judge refused the request with the statement that “Point Number 2 [i.e., the pertinent request] has already been covered by the charge and I see no reason for repeating it; exception.” Nowhere in the charge had the court actually placed the burden upon the defendant of proving that the deceased had been contributorily negligent. In fact, the trial judge’s instructions in effect conveyed an opposite impression, as the opinion for the court below expressly so recognizes. Such being the situation, the court en banc very properly declared that “In the instant case, the jury should have received clear instructions concerning the burden of proof regarding plaintiff’s possible contributory negligence. Failure to so instruct requires that a new trial be granted.” That is particularly so since the court had been specifically requested to give cognate instruction to the jury and had failed to do so.

Order affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Opinion by

Mb. Chief Justice Jones,

The complaint in this action of trespass sought damages for the death of the plaintiff’s decedent as a result of his being struck by an automobile owned and operated by the defendant. The action was instituted by the deceased’s personal representative who claims damages under both the Wrongful Death Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, as amended, 12 PS §1602, and the Survival Act (Section 603 of the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, 20 PS §320.603).

At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which, after argument before the court en banc, was granted in an opinion by the trial judge who conceded harmful error in the charge to the jury in respect of alleged contributory negligence. The defendant has appealed the new trial order.

[616]*616Our examination of the record confirms that the court below exercised a sound discretion in awarding a new trial. The plaintiff had submitted timely a point for charge which correctly set forth the law with respect to the burden of proving contributory negligence. However, the trial judge refused the request with the statement that “Point Number 2 [i.e., the pertinent request] has already been covered by the charge and I see no reason for repeating it; exception.” Nowhere in the charge had the court actually placed the burden upon the defendant of proving that the deceased had been contributorily negligent. In fact, the trial judge’s instructions in effect conveyed an opposite impression, as the opinion for the court below expressly so recognizes. Such being the situation, the court en banc very properly declared that “In the instant case, the jury should have received clear instructions concerning the burden of proof regarding plaintiff’s possible contributory negligence. Failure to so instruct requires that a new trial be granted.” That is particularly so since the court had been specifically requested to give cognate instruction to the jury and had failed to do so.

Order affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

168 A.2d 327, 402 Pa. 614, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grochowski-v-ardes-pa-1961.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack