Grizzly Corp. v. United States

70 Cust. Ct. 251, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3398
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJune 28, 1973
DocketC.D. 4460; Court Nos. 71-10-01252 and 71-12-02023 Port of Chicago
StatusPublished

This text of 70 Cust. Ct. 251 (Grizzly Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grizzly Corp. v. United States, 70 Cust. Ct. 251, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3398 (cusc 1973).

Opinion

Maletz, Judge:

The problem in these actions is to determine the proper dutiable status of certain tractor tire chains that were manufactured in Norway and entered at the port of Chicago, Illinois, in 1969 and 1970. The importations were classified by the government under item 652.35 of the tariff schedules, as modified, T.D. 68-9, and assessed with duty at the rate of 15 percent or 13 percent ad valorem depending upon the date of entry. Plaintiff challenges these assessments and claims that the importations are properly dutiable under item 652.30, as modified, T.D. 68-9, at the rate of 0.4 cent per pound or 0.3 cent per pound depending upon the date of entry.

The tariff provisions involved are as follows:

Chain and chains, and parts thereof, all the foregoing of base metal not coated or plated with precious metal:
Of iron or steel:
$ ‡ ‡ $
[252]*252Chain, or chains (except the foregoing) the links of which are of stock essentially round in cross section, and parts thereof:
* ❖ * $ ❖ * *
652.30 % inch or more but under % inch in diameter_1
>jí íjí sjí Hí # ❖ #
652.35 Other, including parts_2

At the outset, it is to be observed that the parties have agreed in the pleadings that the imports are chains, the links of which are essentially round in cross section; that all the links in the chains (not including certain ringlike cleated objects sometimes hereafter referred to as “shoes”) are of stock which is % inch or more but under % inch in diameter; and that the tire chains in question are of iron or steel.

In this setting, the principal issue in the case is whether the “shoes” which constitute the center portion of the chains in question 'and are of stock that measures in excess of % inch in diameter constitute “links” within the meaning of the superior heading to item 652.30 quoted above. If, as argued by the defendant, the “shoes” constitute links, then because their diameter is of stock that exceeds % of an inch, the chains manifestly would not come within the purview of item 652.30 but rather would have been correctly classified by the government under item 652.35. On the other hand, if the “shoes” do not constitute links, as plaintiff insists, then the imported chains would be properly classifiable under item 652.30.

Considering the imported article in greater detail, examination of a “shoe”3 shows that it is in the form of a ring which measures approximately 714 inches across. Welded to its circumference are four cleats (usually referred to as “lugs”) that are equidistant from each other, with each lug measuring about 1% inches in length and 1*4 inches in width. Also welded to the circumference of the “shoe”, adjacent to each lug, are four small ringlike loops. Interlocked to these loops are a series of various conventional chain links and accessories, such as small rings, screw pin shackles and hooks. The chains are connected in such a manner as to form cross chains and side chains which in turn can be mounted on the tractor tires. The “shoes”, it is to be added, are not connected to each other but are connected to the links of the chain.

[253]*253According to the testimony of the witnesses,4 the imported chains are used primarily by the logging industry ag traction-producing devices on the tires of a type of tractor called a skidder — which is a four-wheel drive machine that skids or drags logs out of the woods. The center portion of the chains, i.e., the “shoes” — fitted as they are with cleats which dig into the ground — are the primary traction-producing portion of the tire chains, and the function of the balance of the assemblies comprising the tire chains in issue is to hold the “shoes” in place on the tractor tire. In addition, the chain portions provide a very small incidental amount of tractive power.

The “shoes” have not been referred to as links by anyone to whom the witnesses have spoken. Rather, such “shoes” are referred to as “shoes”, “ring cleats”, “rings” or “grousers”. Thus, corresponding-portions of similar chains produced by a Maine chain manufacturer are referred to by that company as “rings”. Further, tire chains that incorporate “shoes”, “cleats” or similar traction devices are referred to, known as, and advertised as “ring type” chains, while tire chains utilizing only link-type cross chains for traction are referred to, known as, and advertised as “link type” chains. This distinction between “ring type” tire chains and “link type” tire chains extends to the public as well as the trade.

The welded chain on the imported article is made by an automated process on chain-making machinery which forms the links from wire, interlocks the links, and welds them shut. On the other hand, the “rings” or “shoes” on the tire chains in question are not made on chain-making machinery but rather are made by rolling round bar stock of steel onto a mandril, forming a spiral which is then sawed. The resulting pieces of steel are then welded together to form completed circles of steel. The lugs and loops are then welded onto these rings, thus completing the “shoes”.

We consider now the meaning to be accorded to the term “links”. Since no question of commercial designation is involved here, the common meaning of the term will control in the absence of a demonstrated contrary legislative intent. Marshall Field & Co. v. United States, 45 CCPA 72, C.A.D. 676 (1958); United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora, et al., 43 CCPA 111, C.A.D. 617 (1956). The common meaning of a tariff term is, of course, a question of law for the court and in determining that meaning, the court may receive testimony of witnesses, which is advisory only, and consult lexicons and other relevant authorities. E.g., Trans-Atlantic Company v. United States, [254]*25460 CCPA 100, C.A.D. 1088 (1973); United States v. National Carloading Corp., et al., 48 CCPA 70, C.A.D. 767 (1961); United States v. O. Brager-Larsen, 36 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 388 (1948).

The term “link” has been defined as follows:

Britannica World Language Dictionary (1963 ed.) :
link — n. 1. One of the loops of which a chain is made; hence, something which connects separate things; a tie. * * * 3. A single constituent part of a continuous series. * * *
Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition (Unabridged, 1960) :
link — n. * * * 1. A single ring or division of a chain * * *. *******
3. Anything analogous to a link of a chain in form, function, or arrangement * * *.
4. Something which binds together or connects things.
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ $
Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1941 ed.) :
link — 1. One of the rings or loops of which a chain is made; anything doubled or closed together like such a link; hence, something which connects separate things; a bond; a tie. * * *

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Border Brokerage Co. v. United States
64 Cust. Ct. 458 (U.S. Customs Court, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
70 Cust. Ct. 251, 1973 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3398, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grizzly-corp-v-united-states-cusc-1973.