Grisham v. Wray-Dickinson Co.

1 La. App. 56, 1924 La. App. LEXIS 33
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 31, 1924
DocketNo. 2112
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 1 La. App. 56 (Grisham v. Wray-Dickinson Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grisham v. Wray-Dickinson Co., 1 La. App. 56, 1924 La. App. LEXIS 33 (La. Ct. App. 1924).

Opinion

CROW, J.

Plaintiff, an automobile mechanic of several years’ experience, was employed by defendant in its garage and repair plant in the City of Shreveport on May 7, 1921. On some day in August, 1921, while performing services arising out of and in course of his said employment, plaintiff claims to have sustained an injury to his right side, which, in his testimony, he described substantially as follows.

' He and others were unloading a sedan body, weighing from 300 to 500 pounds, and while carrying it one of the other co-laborers stumbled and let the body down on the side, and plaintiff could not turn it loose and let it down, whereupon the body slipped down on him and hurt his side, making him so sick he had to go off and sit down. He said “felt like it tore something loose inside.” He either was sent by defendant, or went of his own accord to Drs. Willis, Knighton, Garrett and Willis, and was told by Dr. Willis, Jr., that he would have to be operated on as soon as he rested up. Later he returned and was operated on by Dr. Garrett, who said plaintiff had a small hernia and adhesion of the intestines in the region of the appendix.

After the above operation, plaintiff went back to work for defendant in about three months from the operation, and worked until he was again injured, in June, 1922, and again in August, 1922, by cranking a Ford car. The latter time plaintiff was “knocked out”, so to speak, and was carried in an unconscious condition to a sanitarium. Pie was then examined by Dr. Pirkle, who advised that an X-ray picture be made of plaintiff’s stomach and intestines. Accordingly, Dr. Barrow, an X-ray specialist, made an X-ray photo of plaintiff’s stomach and intestines which, according to Dr. Barrow’s interpretation, showed the stomach and small intestine normal, and showed in the large bowel (ascending colon) “a point of adhesion bound across the lower end of the cecum,” the “beginning of the large bowel”.

After the making of an interpretation of the X-ray photo by Dr. Barrow, plaintiff was operated on by Dr. Pirkle, who, in his testimony, says:

Q. “What condition did you find?”
A. “I found that he had been previously operated upon. Had a scar in his right side.
* * * I found an adhesion across the lower end of the large intestine — might say the upper end on the right side a little from the upper end or beginning, and I also found the omentum adherent to this spot.”
Q> “What — in the language of the ordinary layman — what do you mean by the omentum?”
[58]*58A. “It is an apron or divide, something like that apron which hangs down over the intestines. It is really a protection or sheet of fat that protects the intestines and ordinarily it is attached to one side and one side is free and floats around at liberty; but in this particular case the lower end of this was adherent to this side of the old operation.”

Plaintiff was out for about three months from the latter operation, and then returned to defendant, where he was given light work, such as inspecting cars and seeing them properly assembled, until about March 20, (or 30,) 1923, when he was relieved of his job, and compensation which defendant had been paying him stopped. On June 18 1923, this suit was filed for compensation as for permanent total disability; that is, for compensation at’ the rate of ¡¡¡18.00 per week for and during a period of 400 weeks He also sued for $250.00 additional for medical and hospital expenses incurred by reason of said accidents and resulting injuries.

Plaintiff alleged, and defendant admitted in its answer, that defendant had paid plaintiff compensation in sums of $153.50 on May 22, 1922, and $35.64 on July 29, 1922.

Defendant’s answer is a general denial except certain admissions pertaining to plaintiff’s employment, the payments above indicated, etc. There was no special defense set up in the answer. In this Court defendant has filed a plea of prescription of one year in bar of plaintiff’s right of action.

The case was tried in the District Court, and thére was judgment rejecting the demands of plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed to this Court.

OPINION

The plea of prescription cannot avail defendant, since • defendant admitted in its answer that it had made a payment to plaintiff on his claim for compensation on July 22, 1922, and this suit was filed on June 18, 1923, less than a year after the said payment was made. Section 31 of-Act 20 of 1914, provides that limitations under the Act shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment, the plea of prescription is therefore over-ruled.

We are at a loss to see how the Judge of the lower court rejected the demands of plaintiff entirely, since it is plain, from the evidence as a whole, that plaintiff’s injuries were caused either entirely by the accidents complaine.d of by, him and which happened while he was performing services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his employer’s business, or else any dormant diseased condition he may have had was most certainly augmented and accelerated by those accidents, which were the direct and proximate cause of his disability.

The Supreme Court of this State, in the case of Behan vs. John B. Honor Co., Ltd., reported in the 143 La. 348, 78 South. 589, and in Craft vs. Gulf Lbr. Co., 151 La. 281, 91 South. 736, among other things, said:

“The fact that an employee, injured in performing services arising out of or incidental to his employment in the course of his employer’s occupation, was already afflicted with a dormant disease that might some day have produced physical disability, is no reason. why the employee should not be allowed compensation, under the employer’s Liability Statute, for the injury which, added to the disease, superinduced physical disability.”

And again, in the case of Hicks vs. Meridian Lbr. Co., 152 La. 975, 94 South. 903, the Supreme Court of this state said:

“Where the accident is the immediate cause of death, it is immaterial under the workmen’s Compensation Act, whether or not the employee be or be not peculiarly subject to have such accident befall him, or to suffer therefrom more than another [59]*59differently situated; the sole question being whether the accident was the immediate cause of the injury.” Pox vs. United Chemical & Organic Products Co., 147 La. 865, 86 South. 311.

In the case of Hicks vs. Meridian Lbr. Co., 152 La. 975, 94 South. 903, cited supra, a case very similar to the one at bar, and which was followed by this court recently in the case of Tullier vs. Phaneuf, No. 1971 on the docket of said later court, the Supreme Court, inter alia, said:

“(1) It is quite immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the alleged strain brought on the aneurism, or merely hastened the inevitable rupture; for this court would allow compensation in either ease.”
“In Craft vs. Lumber Co., 151 La. 281, 285, 91 South. 736, 737, we allowed compensation although we were strongly persuaded from the evidence that at the time the plaintiff received the blow in the lower part of the abdomen, he had a hernia in process of development, which was quickened and greatly accelerated by the blow he received.” .

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Related

Ford v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co.
196 So. 403 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1940)

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Bluebook (online)
1 La. App. 56, 1924 La. App. LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grisham-v-wray-dickinson-co-lactapp-1924.