Grish v. O'Malley

District Court, E.D. Washington·Decided March 13, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-00297·Unknown

Opinion

FILED IN THE EASTERU N. S D. I SD TI RS IT CR TI C OT F C WO AU SR HT I NGTON Mar 13, 2024

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

HEATHER G.,1 No. 2:23-cv-00297-EFS

Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING THE ALJ’S v. DENIAL OF BENEFITS

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,2 Defendant.

1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 2 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), he is hereby substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit.

Due to degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, hepatitis, a right-hand injury, and alcohol and marijuana abuse, Plaintiff Heather G. claims that she is unable to

work fulltime and applied for supplemental security income benefits. She appeals the denial of benefits by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the grounds that the ALJ improperly analyzed the opinions of Steven Golub, MD, and Joyce Everhart, PhD; failed to consider whether Plaintiff’s condition equaled listing 1.15; and improperly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility. As is explained below, Plaintiff has not established any consequential error. The ALJ’s denial of benefits is affirmed.

I. Background In March 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits under Title 16, claiming disability beginning January 1, 2018, based on the physical and mental impairments noted above.3 Plaintiff’s claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels.4 After the agency denied Plaintiff benefits, ALJ Lori Freund held a telephone hearing in July 2022, at which Plaintiff appeared with her representative.5

Plaintiff, a medical expert, and a vocational expert testified.6

3 AR 321-335, 356. 4 AR 133, 145. 5 AR 60-93. 6 Id. After the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits.7 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and the other evidence.8 As to medical opinions, the ALJ found:

• The opinions of medical expert Steven Golub, MD, with the exception of his opinion regarding fine finger manipulation, to be persuasive. • The opinions of medical expert Steven Golub, MD, regarding fine finger manipulation to be not persuasive. • The opinions of Shana Colt, PA-C, to be neither persuasive nor probative because they did not relate to the relevant period.

• The opinions of consultative examiner Joyce Everhart, PhD, that Plaintiff suffered from unspecified anxiety disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and PTSD to be persuasive.9 • The opinions of state agency evaluators Dan Donahue, PhD; Debra Baylor, MD; Carla Van Dam, PhD; and Jay Shaw, MD, to be generally persuasive.10

7 AR 31-53. Per 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation determines whether a claimant is disabled. 8 AR 40-46. 9 The parties concede that the ALJ did not find the other findings in Dr. Everhardt’s consultative examination report to constitute a “medical opinion.” 10 AR 43-46. As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 26, 2019, the date of her application.

• Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, unspecified depressive disorder, unspecified anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the

listed impairments, and the ALJ specifically considered Listings 1.15, 1.16, 12.04, 12.05, and 12.15. • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with the following exceptions: [Plaintiff] can lift up to twenty pounds occasionally and lift and carry up to ten pounds frequently. She can stand and walk for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can sit for at least six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, extreme cold, and excessive vibration. She is limited to simple and repetitive tasks with occasional changes in the work setting. She can have occasional interaction with the general public and coworkers.

• Step four: Plaintiff has no past relevant work. • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a housekeeper (DOT 323.687-014), outside deliverer (DOT 230.663-010), and mailing clerk (DOT 209.587-034).11

Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council and now this Court.12 II. Standard of Review The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error,”13 and such error impacted the nondisability determination.14 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”15

11 AR 36-47. 12 AR 315. 13 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 14 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 15 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that III. Analysis Plaintiff seeks relief from the denial of disability on three grounds. She argues the ALJ erred when evaluating the medical opinions and when evaluating

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and in failing to properly consider whether she equaled a listing.16 As is explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to establish the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, the listings, or Plaintiff’s symptom reports. A. Medical Opinion: Plaintiff fails to establish consequential error. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical opinions.17

Specifically, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding the opinions of medical advisor Stephen Golub, MD, to be persuasive because he did not consider

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