Griselda Sanchez v. FCA US LLC

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 19, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-00083
StatusUnknown

This text of Griselda Sanchez v. FCA US LLC (Griselda Sanchez v. FCA US LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griselda Sanchez v. FCA US LLC, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Gnited States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 Western Dibision 11 12] GRISELDA SANCHEZ, ED CV 20-00083 TJH (SPx) 13 Plaintiff, 14 Vv. FCA US LLC, ef al., Order 16 Defendants. □□□ 17 18 The Court has considered Plaintiff Griselda Sanchez’s motion to remand, and 19 || Defendant FCA US LLC’s [“Fiat Chrysler”] motion to dismiss, together with the 20 |] moving and opposing papers. 21 On August 10, 2014, Sanchez purchased a 2014 Dodge Grand Caravan ["the 22 || Caravan"] from Perris Valley Auto Center [“PVAC”]. Shortly thereafter, the Caravan, 23 || allegedly, had mechanical problems, which impaired its use and safety. Fiat Chrysler, 24 |! allegedly, failed to repair the Caravan within a reasonable number of attempts. On 25 || August 28, 2019, Sanchez requested that Fiat Chrysler repurchase or replace the 26 || Caravan. Fiat Chrysler refused. 27 On December 13, 2019, Sanchez filed this action against Fiat Chrysler in the 28 || Riverside County Superior Court, alleging various violations of the California

Order — Page 1 of 3

1 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790, et seq. 2 ["Song-Beverly"]. On January 13, 2019, Fiat Chrysler removed based on diversity. 3 Fiat Chrysler's answer was filed, effectively, on January 13, 2020. On January 23, 4 2020, Sanchez filed a First Amended Complaint, which joined PVAC as an additional 5 defendant. Sanchez alleged a single claim against PVAC for breach of the implied 6 warranty of merchantability under Song-Beverly. 7 Fiat Chrysler, now, moves to dismiss PVAC as a sham defendant, and Sanchez 8 moves to remand. 9 If the Court permits the post-removal joinder of a defendant, and complete 10 diversity is thereby destroyed, the Court must, then, remand the case. 28 U.S.C. § 11 1447(e). Here, Sanchez was entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right, as 12 it was done within twenty-one days after the filing of FCA's answer. See Fed. R. Civ. 13 P. 15(a)(1)(B). 14 FCA argued that PVAC is not a necessary party because Song-Beverly requires 15 manufacturers to indemnify retailers. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1790. However, 16 automobile manufacturers and retailers owe different obligations to purchasers, with 17 potential damages stemming from each of their actions. Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. 18 Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 24, 33 (2011). Moreover, PVAC's statutory right 19 to indemnification from FCA does not preclude its liability to Sanchez. See Tiffin 20 Motorhomes, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th at 33. 21 Finally, FCA argued that the implied warranty of merchantability claim against 22 PVAC is time barred. The Caravan was delivered to Sanchez on August 14, 2014, 23 more than five years before Sanchez filed this action on December 13, 2019. 24 Every vehicle sold in California comes with an implied warranty of 25 merchantability which runs coextensively with the manufacturers express warranty, but 26 the implied warranty’s duration cannot exceed one year from the date of delivery. Cal. 27 Civ. Code § 1791.1(c). Thus, the Caravan must have been unmerchantable at the time 28 of delivery or within one year after Sanchez took delivery of it. See Mexia v. Rinker 1 || Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1308 (2009). Once Sanchez discovered that her 2 || Caravan was unmerchantable during the implied warranty period, even if the date of 3 || discovery was beyond the one year implied warranty period, she had four years from 4 || the date of discovery to file suit. See Mexia. 5 In her complaint, Sanchez alleged that her Caravan had defects within the one 6 || year implied warranty period that made the vehicle unmerchantable. However, Sanchez 7 || did not allege when she discovered those defects. In considering a motion to dismiss 8 | under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint 9 || as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. 10 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, at this time, it cannot be determined whether 11 || Sanchez's claim against PVAC is time barred. Consequently, the claim against PVAC 12 || cannot be dismissed. 13 Because PVAC’s joinder destroyed diversity, this case must be remanded 14 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 15 16 Accordingly, 17 18 At is Ordsered that the motion to dismiss be, and hereby is, Denied. 19 20 It is further Ordyered that the motion to remand be, and hereby is, Granted. 21 Date: August 19, 2020 _ 24 hv J. Hatter, 6 25 Senior Cnited States District Judge 26 27 28

Order — Page 3 of 3

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc.
174 Cal. App. 4th 1297 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)
Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Superior Court
202 Cal. App. 4th 24 (California Court of Appeal, 2011)
Ketchum v. Davis
13 P. 15 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1887)

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Bluebook (online)
Griselda Sanchez v. FCA US LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griselda-sanchez-v-fca-us-llc-cacd-2020.