Grimmage v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Grimmage v. State

427 So. 2d 338, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18774

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 1, 1983

DocketNo. AK-404

StatusPublished

This text of 427 So. 2d 338 (Grimmage v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Grimmage v. State, 427 So. 2d 338, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18774 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

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Opinion

MILLS, Judge.

Grimmage appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1981), contending that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal and that the jury was erroneously instructed by the trial court. We disagree with each of his contentions and affirm.

We need not delve into a lengthy recitation of the facts. Suffice it to say that we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether the bag of marijuana thrown into the automobile by Grimmage was the same bag recovered by police officers and later introduced at trial.

We further hold that the trial court did not err in giving the standard jury instruction for Section 893.13(l)(c) even though that instruction does not contain language on intent to deliver. “[Wjhere a Statute denounces the doing of an act as criminal without specifically requiring criminal intent, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the commission of such act was accompanied by criminal intent.” State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla.1973); State v. Ryan, 413 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.

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MILLS, Judge.

Grimmage appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1981), contending that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal and that the jury was erroneously instructed by the trial court. We disagree with each of his contentions and affirm.

We need not delve into a lengthy recitation of the facts. Suffice it to say that we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether the bag of marijuana thrown into the automobile by Grimmage was the same bag recovered by police officers and later introduced at trial.

We further hold that the trial court did not err in giving the standard jury instruction for Section 893.13(l)(c) even though that instruction does not contain language on intent to deliver. “[Wjhere a Statute denounces the doing of an act as criminal without specifically requiring criminal intent, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the commission of such act was accompanied by criminal intent.” State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla.1973); State v. Ryan, 413 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.

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427 So. 2d 338, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18774, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimmage-v-state-fladistctapp-1983.

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