Grimes v. Walker
This text of 243 So. 2d 664 (Grimes v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The question presented by this appeal is whether the conduct of the trial judge in admonishing appellants’ attorney during an exchange between him and the attorney in the presence of prospective jurors was so prejudicial that a new trial should be granted.
Appellants are father and son. The son sued for personal injuries and the father sued for loss of services, property damage and for sums he would be required to spend in the treatment of his son’s injuries, the alleged causes of action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by the son and an automobile driven by appellee. The trial jury returned a verdict for the appellee. Appellants’ motion for a new trial was denied.
All of appellants’ assignments of error pertain to events occurring during the preliminary examination of the jury touching their interest and competency to serve.
Basically, appellants argue only those assignments which claim the lower court erred in not granting their motion for a mistrial because of admonishments directed at their attorney by the trial judge in the presence of prospective jurors.
In order to show what transpired we set out in the footnote much of the transcript of the proceedings.1
[558]*558The general rule of law governing the conduct of attorneys and judges is well stated in Dennison v. State, 17 Ala.App. 674, 88 So. 211 (1921), in which decision the Court of Appeals said:
“* * * An attorney at law is an officer of the court, and as such is under the duty to deport himself with dignity and circumspection, and upon all occasions to manifest and exhibit a marked respect for the court in which he practices, and for the judge thereof, as well as for all officers of court, parties and their witnesses, and for the juries in attendance. The statutory requirement in this connection is that an attorney must maintain due respect to courts of justice and judicial officers. Code 1907, § 2985, subd. 2. In return, he is entitled to similar treatment from the trial judge, and most certainly to the extent that the interests of his client will not be prejudiced.
“The trial judge, as a natural consequence of his position and the many duties devolving upon him, is necessarily vested with much discretion in the conduct of the trial of causes, and, unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of this discretion, appellate courts will not interfere to control such discretion, but will presume that one occupying so important a position as that of circuit judge will accord to all litigants in his court the fair and impartial trial provided for in the Constitution of this state. That a trial judge wields a great influence upon the jury cannot be questioned, for it is their duty to follow his instructions as to the law. So, whenever he expresses an opinion on any disputed fact, or of the character of a witness, or compliments one attorney at the expense of another, or uses language which tends to bring an attorney into contempt before the jury, or uses any language or makes any intimation which tends to prejudice them, he commits an error of law, which would, of necessity, effect a reversal of the judgment and a remandment of the cause. * * *”
Of course, a proper admonition, censure or rebuke by the presiding judge directed at an attorney who is guilty of impropriety or misconduct ordinarily is not prejudicial where not couched in intemperate language; however, the judge should [559]*559be careful in so doing not to influence the jury toward one side or the other.
Appellants rely strongly on Dennison, supra, to support their argument for reversal. In Dennison, the Court of Appeals noted that the alleged injurious language of the court addressed to appellant’s counsel in that case was not of the character to prejudice the attorney before the jury or to injuriously affect the substantial rights of the defendant. We examined the original court record in Dennison and find that the facts and circumstances in that case would indicate that the holding in Dennison is supportive of the trial court’s action here rather than being authority for reversal of the trial court.
We are unwilling to say that the trial court committed reversible error in the instant case because of the statements made to counsel for the appellants in the presence of prospective jurors. From the record it appears that the attorney did not obtain permission to leave the courtroom after the trial court had overruled his motion to recess for thirty minutes.
Apparently, appellants’ counsel was seeking to get the citation of the case which he mentioned to the trial court. The case to which counsel referred appears to be Vickers v. Howard, 281 Ala. 691, 208 So.2d 72 (1968). While we discussed the proposition of waiving a right by failure to ask a question of a prospective juror in that case we did not hold that the question appellants’ attorney asked Juror Deason was proper.
The trial judge instructed the prospective jurors not to allow the exchange between him and appellants’ counsel to affect them in any way.
Having considered all of appellants’ argued assignments of the error, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
243 So. 2d 664, 286 Ala. 555, 1971 Ala. LEXIS 837, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-walker-ala-1971.