Grimes v. Oceanside City Municipal

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: October 2, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-02076
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 3:23-cv-02076-RBM-MSB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 14 OCEANSIDE CITY MUNICIPAL, MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 15 Defendant. PAUPERIS

16 (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT 17 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) AND 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915A(b)

19 (3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 20 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 21 [Doc. 2] 22

24 25 On November 9, 2023, Pro Se Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes (“Plaintiff”) filed a Civil 26 Complaint and Jury Demand (“Complaint”) against Oceanside City Municipal. (Doc. 1.) 27 In his Complaint, Plaintiff seems to allege that various officers and agents of the Oceanside 28 Police Department towed his automobile, rendering Plaintiff temporarily homeless. (Id. at 1 7, 9.) Plaintiff also appears to assert claims of racial discrimination in violation of his civil 2 rights. (Id. at 2, 4, 8.) In support of his claims, Plaintiff attaches a citation he received 3 from the City of Oceanside Parking Enforcement for two violations: (1) expired 4 registration and (2) no license plate. (Id. at 15.) 5 The same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District Court with 6 Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”). (Doc. 2.) In his IFP Application, Plaintiff 7 declares that he has no income and that he has 17 cents in his “B of A” checking account. 8 (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff also declares that he has total monthly expenses of $1,100. (Id. at 5.) 9 I. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A motion to proceed IFP presents two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, the 11 Court must determine whether an applicant properly shows an inability to pay the 12 $4051 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). To that 13 end, an applicant must provide the Court with a signed affidavit “that includes a statement 14 of all assets[,] which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” Civ. L.R. 3.2(a). 15 Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s complaint 16 sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 17 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to 18 dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). The Court addresses each issue in 19 turn. 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application 22 An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately 23 prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 24

25 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 26 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); United States Courts, District Court Miscellaneous 27 Fee Schedule § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.uscourts.gov/services- forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule. The additional $55 administrative 28 1 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 2 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 3 Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 4 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (an adequate affidavit should state supporting facts “with some 5 particularity, definiteness and certainty”) (citation omitted). No exact formula is “set forth 6 by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP 7 status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on 8 a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of 9 “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 10 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based 11 upon available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 12 506 U.S. 194 (1993); Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The 13 granting or denial of leave to proceed [IFP] in civil cases is within the sound discretion of 14 the district court.”). 15 Here, Plaintiff has declared that he has no income and that he has $1,100 in monthly 16 expenses. (Doc. 2 at 2, 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that he is temporarily homeless. (Doc. 1 17 at 9.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff “cannot pay the court costs and still afford 18 the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Plaintiff’s IFP Application is 19 GRANTED. 20 B. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 21 As discussed above, every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to mandatory screening by the Court under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). 23 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under this provision, the Court must dismiss complaints that are 24 (1) frivolous or malicious, (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) 25 seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 26 1915(e)(2)(B). 27 28 1 1. Frivolity 2 “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 3 suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 4 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “A complaint ... is frivolous where it lacks an 5 arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). The 6 definition of frivolousness “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the 7 fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). When 8 determining whether to dismiss a complaint as “frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 9 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the court has “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s 10 factual allegations,” meaning that the court “is not bound, as it usually is when making a 11 determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the 12 plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Frivolous claims include “claims 13 describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are 14 all too familiar.” Id. “An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed ... simply 15 because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely.” Id. at 33. But “a finding of 16 factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational 17 or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to 18 contradict them.” Id. Frivolous litigation “is not limited to cases in which a legal claim is 19 entirely without merit .... [A] person with a measured legitimate claim may cross the line 20 into frivolous litigation by asserting facts that are grossly exaggerated or totally false.” 21 Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 Here, Plaintiff’s claims revolve around the wrongful towing of his automobile, 23 which rendered him temporarily homeless, and racial discrimination by the Oceanside 24 Police Department. The Court finds that both allegations are frivolous. First, Plaintiff’s 25 own exhibit contradicts his allegations regarding the wrongful towing of his automobile. 26 Plaintiff attaches a citation showing that Plaintiff’s automobile’s registration was expired 27 and that it had no license plate. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Second, Plaintiff’s claims appear fantastical, 28 delusional, irrational, and incredible. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33. On one hand, 1 Plaintiff claims that he is a “B.A., & MBA, & PhD Doctoral Graduate Student at CU” 2 residing in Louisiana (see Doc. 1 at 2, 4), but, on the other hand, Plaintiff claims to be 3 homeless in or around Oceanside, California (see id. at 9). Plaintiff also alleges that the 4 Oceanside police have been tormenting his “spirit and soul” and that they have “covert 5 plots to sabotage Plaintiff’s rights to PhD graduate school without economic espionage act 6 violations[.]” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also includes allegations about “Personal Bodily 7 Fluids/Urinals & Spit Cups” (id. at 4) and “An Nur/Theology/Trinity” (id. at 9). The Court 8 finds these claims are frivolous and call into question the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s 9 Complaint more broadly. 10 Additionally, because Plaintiff’s allegations are fanciful and delusional, “‘it is 11 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” 12 Sandoval v. Castillo, No. 08cv1622-WQH-NLS, 2008 WL 4790521, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13 3, 2008) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984)). Based on 14 the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend. 15 2. Failure to State a Claim—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 16 “‘Frivolousness’ under § 1915(e) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are 17 distinct concepts.” Austin v. Chesney, Case No. 22-cv-02506-LB, 2022 WL 3205201, at 18 *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2022). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed 19 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as 20 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison 21 v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to 22 “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 23 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 While the Court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil 25 rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of 26 any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. 27 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements 28 1 of claims that were not initially pled[,]” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 2 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 3 As stated above, Plaintiff’s claims revolve around the wrongful towing of his 4 automobile, which rendered him temporarily homeless, and racial discrimination by the 5 Oceanside Police Department. However, Plaintiff’s own exhibit contradicts his allegations 6 regarding the wrongful towing of his automobile, and Plaintiff’s conclusory claims of racial 7 discrimination are unsupported by specific factual allegations. Plaintiff also does not 8 enumerate specific causes of action.2 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to 9 state any claims, and Plaintiff’s Complaint must be DISMISSED. 10 3. Immunity 11 To the extent that Plaintiff intends to pursue a claim against the Oceanside Police 12 Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see Doc. 1 at 7 (“At all relevant times, [the Oceanside 13 Police Department Defendant was] acting under color of law ….”); see id. at 3, 5, 8 14 (discussing the Oceanside Police Department’s “vicarious liability”)), such a claim also 15 fails because “§ 1983 does not employ a theory of respondeat superior liability; a municipal 16 entity cannot he held liable for the actions of its agents or employees alone.” Wainscott v. 17 Cnty. of San Diego, Case No. 3:20-cv-1359-GPC-WVG, 2020 WL 5747389, at *3 (S.D. 18 Cal. Sept. 25, 2020) (citations omitted). “[T]o demonstrate liability [against a municipal 19 entity], § 1983 compels a Plaintiff to allege some municipal policy or custom affected the 20 alleged civil rights violation as opposed to the individual actions of those employed by the 21 entity.” Id. However, Plaintiff does not include any allegations regarding the policies or 22 customs of the Oceanside Police Department in his Complaint. Therefore, as alleged, the 23 24 25 26 2 While Plaintiff states, “[t]his action is brought pursuant to Title VI of the Educational 27 Amendments of the Federal School Code pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., and California law” (Doc. 1 at 5), Plaintiff does not allege facts 28 1 ||Oceanside Police Department is immune from liability for any alleged violation of 42 2 ||U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff?s must be DISMISSED. 3 HI. CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's IFP Application is GRANTED, but Plaintiffs 5 || Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend. See Sandoval, 2008 WL 4790521, at 6 ||*1. The Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 DATE: October 2, 2024 9 Kath Baerrredn, Wf atansps 10 ON. RUTH BERMBDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28