Grimes v. Hoffman-Laroche

District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided September 28, 1995·No. CV-92-54-B·Published

Opinion

Grimes v. Hoffman-Laroche CV-92-54-B 09/28/95 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Rhonda Grimes v. Civil No. 92-cv-54-B

Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. and Dr. Pierre G. Labrecque

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Rhonda Grimes sued Hoffmann-LaRoche ("Hoffmann") and her doctor, Pierre G. Labrecque, after developing cataracts which she claims were caused by taking Accutane, a prescription drug manufactured by Hoffmann. She contends that Dr. Labrecque negligently failed to warn her that Accutane could cause cataracts and negligently failed to use less obtrusive treatments before prescribing Accutane. She claims that Hoffmann is strictly liable for defectively designing Accutane and failing to warn her adequately of Accutane's side effects. She also claims that Hoffmann is liable based on a negligent failure-to-warn theory. Both defendants deny that Accutane caused Grimes' cataracts.

Grimes attempts to prove causation through the testimony of Dr. Sidney Herman, an ophthalmologist with a recognized expertise

in evaluating photochemical effects on the eye. Defendants have moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 7 02 to exclude Dr. Lerman's testimony on the ground that it is unreliable when judged by the standard established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. C t . 2786, 2796 (1993). Anticipating success with this motion, defendants also move for summary judgment, claiming that Grimes cannot prove causation without Dr. Lerman's testimony. For the reasons that follow, I grant both motions.

DISCUSSION

I. MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

A. The Legal Standard After Daubert, expert testimony must satisfy three reguirements in order to survive a Rule 702 objection: first, the expert must be gualified; second, the expert's testimony must be reliable; and third, it must "fit" the facts of the case. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, (1st Cir. 1995). Qualifications alone are insufficient to satisfy the rule's reguirements if the expert's testimony is based on unreliable methodology or if it cannot reliably be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d

1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (expert's qualifications, conclusions, and assurances of reliability are not enough to satisfy requirements), petition for cert, filed (Aug. 1, 1995); Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 (S.D. Ind. 1992), a f f 'd , 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993) ("expert is a conduit of facts and not merely a subjective speculator relying on stature alone").

Rule 7 0 2 's reliability requirement demands that "the expert's opinion be based on the 'methods and procedures of science1 rather than on 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation1; the expert must have 'good grounds' for his or her belief." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litiq., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Daubert, 113 S. C t . at 2795) . Among the factors that a court should consider in determining the reliability of scientific testimony are: (1) whether the opinion can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique on which the opinion is based has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the technique's known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the

technique's operations; and (5) "general acceptance."1 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2 1 9 6 - 9 1 ; In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. In evaluating these factors, the focus "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Daubert, 113 S. C t . at 2797.

The rule's "fit" requirement refers to the necessity of a connection between the expert's testimony and the facts of the case. Daubert, 113 S. C t . at 2795-96. For example, if a plaintiff offers scientific testimony that a particular chemical causes cancer in rats in order to prove that the chemical also causes cancer in humans, the testimony will not fit the facts of the case and must be excluded unless the plaintiff also establishes that the expert can reliably extrapolate from rats to humans. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743. Thus, the results of a scientifically reliable experiment or study will fail Daubert's fit requirement and be excluded unless the results can be linked

1 The concept of general acceptance was first applied to expert testimony in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). There, the court stated that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." I d . at 1014.

through scientifically reliable means to the expert opinion it purports to support. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743, 744-45 n.12, 745 (Daubert's reliability requirement applies to each step in the expert's analysis) .

I begin my review of defendants' challenge to the admissibility of Dr. Lerman's testimony by describing his opinion on causation and the methodology he used in reaching that opinion. I then review his methodology in light of Rule 7 0 2 's requirements. In doing so, I am mindful that the burden lies with Grimes to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule's requirements have been met. Daubert, 113 S. C t . at 2796 n.10. B. Dr. Lerman's Testimony Dr. Lerman proposes to testify that Accutane "played a role"

in the development of Grimes' cataracts. In reaching this ultimate conclusion. Dr. Lerman necessarily must also conclude that therapeutic doses of Accutane will cause cataracts in certain humans under certain conditions. Stated differently. Dr. Lerman's conclusion that Accutane was the specific cause of Grimes' cataracts is necessarily based, in part, upon his opinion that Accutane is a general cause of cataracts when it is taken in therapeutic doses. See, e.g., Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., 874

F. Supp. 1441, 1448 (D.V.I. 1994) (discussing concepts of specific and general causation), aff'd without op., 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).

Rather than relying on epidemiological data. Dr. Lerman bases his general causation opinion primarily on scientific theory, an in vitro experiment, and what he considers certain "generally accepted" scientific facts.2 Simply stated, his theory is that: (1) Accutane is a "photosensitive" drug; (2) that gets into the lens when taken in therapeutic doses; (3) becomes "photobound" to normally transparent lens protein after being exposed to normal levels of ultraviolet radiation; and (4) alters the lens protein in such a way as to produce opacities in the lens, otherwise known as cataracts. Dr. Lerman defines a photosensitive drug as "a compound whose chemical structure endows it with the ability to absorb optical radiation (UV and visible) and undergo a primary photochemical reaction resulting in the generation of highly reactive and relatively long-lived

2 Dr. Lerman also bases his opinion in part on the fact that there have been anecdotal reports of cataracts in patients who have taken Accutane. However, no epidemiological studies have been done which establish any relationship between Accutane and cataracts and Dr. Lerman does not contend that causation can be proved by anecdotal evidence alone.

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Related

United States v. Shay
57 F.3d 126 (First Circuit, 1995)
In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation
35 F.3d 717 (Third Circuit, 1994)
Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc.
791 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D. Indiana, 1992)
LeFavor v. Ford
604 A.2d 570 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1992)
Frye v. United States
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Circuit, 1923)