Grimes v. Dowling

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Grimes v. Dowling

225 A.D.2d 1024, 639 N.Y.2d 622, 639 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2839

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 8, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 225 A.D.2d 1024 (Grimes v. Dowling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Grimes v. Dowling, 225 A.D.2d 1024, 639 N.Y.2d 622, 639 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2839 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

Memorandum: We reject the argument of petitioner that, in enacting Social Ser[1025]*1025vices Law § 131-w, the Legislature intended to supersede 18 NYCRR 370.3 (b) (2) by making the requirement concerning an applicant’s individual or household income level applicable only to applicants seeking Emergency Home Relief (EHR) assistance for mortgage, rent or property tax arrears. Rather, Social Services Law § 131-w is a cost-saving measure enacted to institute a repayment requirement for recipients of EHR assistance for mortgage, rent or property tax arrears (see, Matter of Kelly v Bane, 192 AD2d 236, 239); it is not intended to impose the income cap on applicants for assistance only in those areas. We reject the alternative argument advanced by petitioner that her emergency need was "the result of a fire, flood or other like catastrophe”, entitling her to EHR assistance even though her income exceeded 125% of the Federal income official poverty line (18 NYCRR 370.3 [b] [2]). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Flaherty, J. — CPLR art 78.) Present — Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Memorandum: We reject the argument of petitioner that, in enacting Social Ser[1025]*1025vices Law § 131-w, the Legislature intended to supersede 18 NYCRR 370.3 (b) (2) by making the requirement concerning an applicant’s individual or household income level applicable only to applicants seeking Emergency Home Relief (EHR) assistance for mortgage, rent or property tax arrears. Rather, Social Services Law § 131-w is a cost-saving measure enacted to institute a repayment requirement for recipients of EHR assistance for mortgage, rent or property tax arrears (see, Matter of Kelly v Bane, 192 AD2d 236, 239); it is not intended to impose the income cap on applicants for assistance only in those areas. We reject the alternative argument advanced by petitioner that her emergency need was "the result of a fire, flood or other like catastrophe”, entitling her to EHR assistance even though her income exceeded 125% of the Federal income official poverty line (18 NYCRR 370.3 [b] [2]). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Flaherty, J. — CPLR art 78.) Present — Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

225 A.D.2d 1024, 639 N.Y.2d 622, 639 N.Y.S.2d 622, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-dowling-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack