PRESENT: All the Justices
LEVIN GRIMES OPINION BY v. Record No. 131847 CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER OCTOBER 31, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The defendant, Levin Grimes, appeals his conviction of
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91.
Specifically, Grimes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his conviction, asserting that the Commonwealth
proved only that he went into a "crawl space" underneath a
dwelling house and failed to prove that he broke and entered
into the actual dwelling house. Because the crawl space was
structurally part of the dwelling house, we will affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding the
conviction.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The crawl space at issue in this appeal is situated
underneath a one-story, brick house located in the City of
Newport News. Built into the lower, exterior back wall of the
house, a small, square door opens into an area containing
plumbing, wiring, insulation, and ductwork. This space is
enclosed within the structure of the house, under the same roof,
but contains no direct access to any other portion of the house. Entry to this space is gained only through the small door
located in the exterior wall of the house.
On June 18, 2012, two neighbors standing behind the house
heard noises underneath it and noticed that the door leading to
the crawl space was opened slightly. The neighbors observed
Grimes and another man emerge from the crawl space covered in
wet mud and sand and carrying several pieces of copper pipe
under their arms. A police officer subsequently apprehended
Grimes and found copper pipe, a flashlight, and three cutting
tools upon his person. Additional police officers discovered
identical copper pipe scattered throughout the house's yard and
inside the crawl space. Police officers observed that the lock
on the door to the crawl space had been cut and the door was
open.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence during a
bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News,
Grimes moved to strike the statutory burglary charge, arguing
that his conduct did not satisfy the requirements for statutory
burglary because he "didn't actually go into the house," but
rather, "went underneath the house." The circuit court denied
the motion. Grimes presented no evidence but renewed his motion
to strike. The circuit court found Grimes guilty of statutory
burglary and other charges not relevant to this appeal. Grimes
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
2 Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court with regard
to the statutory burglary conviction, 1 concluding that because
"the crawl space of the house is enclosed within the walls of
the house" and because "[a]ccess to the crawl space is through a
separate exterior door that is built into the lower part of one
of the exterior walls of the dwelling house," the crawl space
"thus physically constitutes part of the 'dwelling
house.'" Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 480, 749
S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013). We awarded Grimes this appeal.
ANALYSIS
The elements of statutory burglary for which Grimes was
convicted are set forth in Code § 18.2-91. In pertinent part,
the statute states that "[i]f any person commits any of the acts
mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to commit larceny . . . he
shall be guilty of statutory burglary." Code § 18.2-90 includes
the act of breaking and entering into a dwelling house in the
daytime.
This statute, like all burglary laws, is "based primarily
upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by
the usual burglary situation – the danger that the intruder will
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended
1 The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment with regard to some of Grimes' other convictions and remanded for a new trial. Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 481, 749 S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013).
3 crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in
anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inciting
more violence." Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 140, 410
S.E.2d 254, 266 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Compton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 55, 55
S.E.2d 446, 449 (1949) (holding that "[b]urglary [is] primarily
an offense against the security of the habitation"). Indeed, we
have defined a "dwelling house" for purposes of the burglary
statutes as "a house that one uses for habitation, as opposed to
another purpose." Giles v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 369, 375, 672
S.E.2d 879, 883 (2009); see also Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 736, 740, 324 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1985) (holding that defendant
did not commit statutory burglary because "the structures broken
and entered into were trailers," and "there was no proof that
the trailers were used as dwellings or places of human
habitation").
Grimes does not dispute that the portion of the structure
situated above the crawl space is a dwelling house. Thus, the
question in this appeal is whether the crawl space also
constitutes part of the dwelling house for purposes of Code §
18.2-91.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party at trial, in this case the Commonwealth,
4 and accord to it all inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence. Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d
26, 28 (2005). We will not set aside a trial court's judgment
unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Code § 8.01-680; Viney, 269 Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28.
To the extent that the issue before us involves statutory
interpretation, it is a question of law reviewed de novo on
appeal. Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634
S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). Although penal statutes are to be
strictly construed against the Commonwealth, Turner v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983), we
give the term "dwelling house" its ordinary and plain meaning,
considering the context in which it is used. See Southern Ry.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 114, 116-19, 135 S.E.2d 160, 164-66
(1964). A defendant is not "entitled to a favorable result
based upon an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of [a]
statute." Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d
760, 761 (1979).
Grimes contends that because there is no access between the
crawl space and the remaining portion of the structure above it,
and because the crawl space itself is not suitable for
habitation, it does not constitute part of the dwelling house.
The crawl space, however, is structurally part of the house. It
is physically contained within the four exterior walls, i.e.,
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PRESENT: All the Justices
LEVIN GRIMES OPINION BY v. Record No. 131847 CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER OCTOBER 31, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The defendant, Levin Grimes, appeals his conviction of
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91.
Specifically, Grimes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his conviction, asserting that the Commonwealth
proved only that he went into a "crawl space" underneath a
dwelling house and failed to prove that he broke and entered
into the actual dwelling house. Because the crawl space was
structurally part of the dwelling house, we will affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding the
conviction.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The crawl space at issue in this appeal is situated
underneath a one-story, brick house located in the City of
Newport News. Built into the lower, exterior back wall of the
house, a small, square door opens into an area containing
plumbing, wiring, insulation, and ductwork. This space is
enclosed within the structure of the house, under the same roof,
but contains no direct access to any other portion of the house. Entry to this space is gained only through the small door
located in the exterior wall of the house.
On June 18, 2012, two neighbors standing behind the house
heard noises underneath it and noticed that the door leading to
the crawl space was opened slightly. The neighbors observed
Grimes and another man emerge from the crawl space covered in
wet mud and sand and carrying several pieces of copper pipe
under their arms. A police officer subsequently apprehended
Grimes and found copper pipe, a flashlight, and three cutting
tools upon his person. Additional police officers discovered
identical copper pipe scattered throughout the house's yard and
inside the crawl space. Police officers observed that the lock
on the door to the crawl space had been cut and the door was
open.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence during a
bench trial in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News,
Grimes moved to strike the statutory burglary charge, arguing
that his conduct did not satisfy the requirements for statutory
burglary because he "didn't actually go into the house," but
rather, "went underneath the house." The circuit court denied
the motion. Grimes presented no evidence but renewed his motion
to strike. The circuit court found Grimes guilty of statutory
burglary and other charges not relevant to this appeal. Grimes
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
2 Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court with regard
to the statutory burglary conviction, 1 concluding that because
"the crawl space of the house is enclosed within the walls of
the house" and because "[a]ccess to the crawl space is through a
separate exterior door that is built into the lower part of one
of the exterior walls of the dwelling house," the crawl space
"thus physically constitutes part of the 'dwelling
house.'" Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 480, 749
S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013). We awarded Grimes this appeal.
ANALYSIS
The elements of statutory burglary for which Grimes was
convicted are set forth in Code § 18.2-91. In pertinent part,
the statute states that "[i]f any person commits any of the acts
mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to commit larceny . . . he
shall be guilty of statutory burglary." Code § 18.2-90 includes
the act of breaking and entering into a dwelling house in the
daytime.
This statute, like all burglary laws, is "based primarily
upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by
the usual burglary situation – the danger that the intruder will
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended
1 The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment with regard to some of Grimes' other convictions and remanded for a new trial. Grimes v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 470, 481, 749 S.E.2d 218, 223 (2013).
3 crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in
anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inciting
more violence." Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 140, 410
S.E.2d 254, 266 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Compton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 48, 55, 55
S.E.2d 446, 449 (1949) (holding that "[b]urglary [is] primarily
an offense against the security of the habitation"). Indeed, we
have defined a "dwelling house" for purposes of the burglary
statutes as "a house that one uses for habitation, as opposed to
another purpose." Giles v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 369, 375, 672
S.E.2d 879, 883 (2009); see also Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 736, 740, 324 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1985) (holding that defendant
did not commit statutory burglary because "the structures broken
and entered into were trailers," and "there was no proof that
the trailers were used as dwellings or places of human
habitation").
Grimes does not dispute that the portion of the structure
situated above the crawl space is a dwelling house. Thus, the
question in this appeal is whether the crawl space also
constitutes part of the dwelling house for purposes of Code §
18.2-91.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party at trial, in this case the Commonwealth,
4 and accord to it all inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence. Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d
26, 28 (2005). We will not set aside a trial court's judgment
unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Code § 8.01-680; Viney, 269 Va. at 299, 609 S.E.2d at 28.
To the extent that the issue before us involves statutory
interpretation, it is a question of law reviewed de novo on
appeal. Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634
S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). Although penal statutes are to be
strictly construed against the Commonwealth, Turner v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983), we
give the term "dwelling house" its ordinary and plain meaning,
considering the context in which it is used. See Southern Ry.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 114, 116-19, 135 S.E.2d 160, 164-66
(1964). A defendant is not "entitled to a favorable result
based upon an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of [a]
statute." Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d
760, 761 (1979).
Grimes contends that because there is no access between the
crawl space and the remaining portion of the structure above it,
and because the crawl space itself is not suitable for
habitation, it does not constitute part of the dwelling house.
The crawl space, however, is structurally part of the house. It
is physically contained within the four exterior walls, i.e.,
5 the vertical plane, of the house; it is under the same roof; and
it contains integral utilities, such as plumbing and ductwork,
that are needed in a dwelling house. As other courts have
explained, when an area of a house is "functionally
interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions
of the house," it constitutes part of the dwelling
house. Burgett v. State, 314 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App.
1974); accord People v. Moreno, 204 Cal. Rptr. 17, 19 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Moran, 324 P.3d 808, 812 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014). See also Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 209, 209-10
(Ky. 1889) (holding that a cellar located under a dwelling
constituted part of the dwelling, despite "no means of internal
communication between them," because the cellar "is under the
same roof [and] is . . . part and parcel of the habitation").
Based on the facts here, the crawl space falls within the plain
meaning of the term "dwelling house." 2
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude, like the Court of Appeals,
that the crawl space in this case constitutes part of the
dwelling house. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Grimes' conviction of statutory burglary. We will therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
2 As the Court of Appeals noted, the evidence also showed a breaking and entering into the crawl space by Grimes. Grimes, 62 Va. App. at 480, 749 S.E.2d at 223.
6 Affirmed.