Grijalva v. Grijalva

310 S.E.2d 193, 172 W. Va. 676, 1983 W. Va. LEXIS 612
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 13, 1983
Docket15845
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 310 S.E.2d 193 (Grijalva v. Grijalva) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grijalva v. Grijalva, 310 S.E.2d 193, 172 W. Va. 676, 1983 W. Va. LEXIS 612 (W. Va. 1983).

Opinion

NEELY, Justice:

Dr. Galo E. Grijalva and his wife Bea-trize were divorced by a Kanawha County Circuit Court decree on 15 September 1981. The terms of their divorce were controlled by an earlier separation agreement that was adopted by the circuit court in its final order. That agreement which was both skillfully drafted and comprehensive in its provisions is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix to this opinion. Under that agreement Dr. Grijalva was required to pay his wife $500 a month in child support until the youngest child attained the age of eighteen, unless Mrs. Grijalva remarried, in which case the child support was to be increased to $1,000 per month. Furthermore, Dr. Grijalva agreed to transfer to his wife his 1979 Oldsmobile automobile, to purchase for her a new car of similar quality every five years, and to provide her with a major oil company credit card with which to pay for gas, oil, maintenance, repairs and upkeep on the car.

On 6 January 1982 Mrs. Grijalva petitioned the circuit court for a decretal judgment against Dr. Grijalva for money owed to her under the settlement agreement and *678 subsequent court decree. Dr. Grijalva replied to that petition and filed a counter-petition asking for a modification of both his alimony and child support obligations. After a hearing, the circuit court ordered that Dr. Grijalva no longer be required to provide new vehicles and the major oil company credit card, and that child support be reduced from $500 to $400 per month. Mrs. Grijalva then appealed to this Court on the grounds that the contractual agreement between the parties precluded subsequent court modification of the divorce decree under In Re Estate of Hereford, 162 W.Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978). We agree with Mrs. Grijalva’s position and reverse.

I

The law that controls this case is found in Syllabus Point 4 of In Re Estate of Hereford, supra, which provides as follows:

In all domestic relations cases where the final order is entered after 1 February 1979, if at the time of entry of the final order, the court finds the terms of a property settlement agreement fair and reasonable, such property settlement agreement may specifically provide that periodic payments (alimony) shall never be changed by the circuit court; that the remedy for failure to make such periodic payments shall be by contract action and not by contempt; that the periodic payments shall be enforceable by contempt if the payor is able to pay, but that the court shall not have power to increase or decrease the award; that no periodic payments shall ever be paid, but that a lump sum settlement in lieu of such payments shall constitute a final settlement of the rights of the parties; or, any other terms acceptable to the court to which the parties may agree. However, in order to have a periodic payment treated as anything but alimony or alimony and child support, the parties must express themselves in clear, unambiguous language in the property settlement agreement and the agreement must be confirmed by the court in some obvious way.

The property settlement agreement entered into by Dr. and Mrs. Grijalva made very specific provisions concerning every matter relevant to their divorce. The parties agreed concerning the effect of the contract in the section called “General Provisions” which provides in pertinent part:

a. If either party shall hereafter obtain a decree of divorce against the other, this agreement and the provisions hereof shall, by reference or otherwise, be incorporated in and become part of said decree, and the party obtaining such decree of divorce shall not incorporate, attempt to incorporate or cause to be incorporated any provision in such decree contrary to, or at variance with, the terms of this agreement, nor will either party attempt to enforce any decree or judgment which is contrary to, or at variance with, the provisions hereof.
b. This agreement shall be binding and obligatory upon the parties, notwithstanding any judgment recovered by either of them against the other in any action for divorce or any decree made therein in the State of West Virginia or elsewhere, and each and every paragraph and provision hereof shall survive any such judgment or decree, notwithstanding that such judgment or decree may incorporate only a portion or part of this agreement and notwithstanding that the parties may subsequently in any such action enter into a stipulation embodying or incorporating only a part or portion of this agreement.

Dr. Grijalva was not treated gently by the separation agreement. Nonetheless, the provisions of the agreement could not be more clear and it is a contract to which he assented freely and voluntarily. 1 The *679 record discloses that between the time of the divorce decree and the proceedings that gave rise to this appeal Dr. Grijalva’s income declined substantially. The trial court, relying upon our language in Hereford, supra, 162 W.Va. at 489, 250 S.E.2d at 52, that “[cjhild support, of course, is always subject to continuing judicial modification,” held that both the provisions concerning the automobile and the $500 per month child support were within the continuing jurisdiction of the court.

After reading the settlement agreement in its entirety we find absolutely no basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the provisions concerning the automobile were child support. The obligation to provide a new automobile every five years and a major oil company credit card was in no way linked to the presence or absence of minor children and a plain reading of the document demonstrates that the obligation to provide an automobile is to continue for so long as the wife is entitled to alimony. Although the provision concerning the automobile in the contract may have been a very bad bargain for Dr. Grijalva, under Syllabus Point 4 of Hereford, supra, the circuit court was not entitled to modify the parties’ contract after it was confirmed by the trial court at the time the divorce was awarded.

II

The aspect of this case that presents a question of first impression concerns the extent of a court’s right to modify contractually determined child support when the reasons for modification do not concern the welfare of the child. Both child support and alimony create a fund for support during the children’s minority and Hereford, supra, was quite explicit in establishing a policy favoring the literal enforcement of contractual settlements in domestic matters. The exact allocation of money between alimony and child support may be affected by numerous considerations unrelated to an actuarial calculation of the exact cost of maintaining a minor child or children. For example, tax considerations may lead a divorcing couple to denominate a disproportionately high percentage of total payments as child support so that the spouse with higher income will get a needed deduction. Consequently the clear implication of Hereford, supra,

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Bluebook (online)
310 S.E.2d 193, 172 W. Va. 676, 1983 W. Va. LEXIS 612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grijalva-v-grijalva-wva-1983.