Griffith v. City of Wichita

169 P. 546, 102 Kan. 23, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 211
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedDecember 8, 1917
DocketNo. 20,968
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 169 P. 546 (Griffith v. City of Wichita) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffith v. City of Wichita, 169 P. 546, 102 Kan. 23, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 211 (kan 1917).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

West, J.:

The plaintiff sued the railway company, the terminal company and the city of Wichita for obstructing the ingress to and egress from his two wholesale houses fronting on Fifth avenue and recovered a judgment for $4,000 against the two companies, the verdict being in favor of the city.

Douglas avenue is intersected by Fifth avenue near the union [25]*25station, and the plaintiff’s buildings are located on four lots, each 25 feet wide, the southern line of which tract is about 300 feet north of Douglas avenue. In.the construction of the Douglas avenue subway as a part of the union station enterprise, a depression was made which the jury found would have prevented teams and vehicles from passing from Fifth street upon Douglas avenue or from the latter upon the former. The depression was about a foot in depth, and there was a concrete curb put in from the south edge of the sidewalk to the street bed. But the jury also found that but for a certain wall across the south end of Fifth avenue,“It would have been practicable for teams, wagons and other vehicles to pass from Douglas avenue into Fifth avenue and from Fifth avenue into Douglas avenue.”

This wall was of cement, about 19 feet long, one foot thick and five or six feet high and was located against the north side of the sidewalk along the north line of Douglas avenue. Certain railroad tracks along Fifth avenue were rearranged to accommodate the condition brought about by the construction of the union station. The statement of facts in Campbell v. City of Wichita, 101 Kan. 817, is referred to for the general features of the situation.

The petition alleged:

“That the said property was accessible from the east by Fifth avenue, and from the west by an alley in the rear of said building; that on the 4th day of April, 1914, these defendants and each of them did entirely close up Fifth avenue and did erect at a point'where the same intersects Douglas avenue a large blockade, to wit: a cement wall several feet high, and'entirely close the said street and render useless the same as a street or highway,, . . . and that by the erection of the said barricade as aforesaid the same wholly impaired and destroyed said Fifth avenue and rendered it wholly, useless as a public highway and by said-obstruction the plaintiff has been deprived of all means of ingress and egress to and from his said premises from the east end thereof. . . . That by reason of the action of the said defendants and each of them in closing up and permitting the closing of said street, this plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars. Plaintiff further alleges that ... he filed with the said clerk of the city of Wichita . . . - a claim against said city of Wichita to the specific injury aforesaid.....”

One of the instructions requested by. the plaintiff was:

“The jury are instructed that if you believe from the evidence in this case that the property of the plaintiff described in the petition has been [26]*26depreciated in value by reason of the erection and construction of the wall or bulwark in question, then you are instructed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of the depreciation in value so sustained by it to the property aforesaid as shown by the evidence and you will assess such sum as will compensate plaintiff for the depreciation in value so sustained.”

Yet the court below, over the persistent objections of the defendants, permitted the plaintiff to introduce a large volume of testimony as to the damage claimed to have been caused by the rearrangement of the tracks, and this feature is prominent also in the instructions and in the special findings.

In answer to this assignment of error it is suggested, among other things, that the claim filed with the city clerk was set out and made a part of the petition and contained the averment,

“and the street has been entirely filled by said railway companies and the street is entirely blocked, and claimant is entirely shut off from using said property .for said purposes.”

But the entire pleading is susceptible to the one contruction only — that the plaintiff relied on the wall as the sole ground of recovery. It was error therefore to receive the testimony and not to omit the instructions and findings touching the rearrangement of the tracks as an element of damage, for the all-sufficient reason that the plaintiff had not pleaded it. The jury, however, were asked to and did separate the amount of their verdict into $2,500 on' account of the wall and $1,500 for the rearrangement of the tracks, and the error as to that part of the judgment might have been rendered harmless by elimination.

It is complained that the court permitted damages to be proven on the basis of the plaintiff’s right to occupy a part of Fifth avenue with his dock, but by the instructions this was eliminated and the error,- if error it was, thereby lost its sting.

The court is criticised for submitting of its own motion certain special findings concerning which it is said there was no testimony. But if there was no direct evidence there were physical facts from which certain inferences as to the wall (about which most of these questions were asked) might be drawn, and no error in this respect is disclosed.

The terminal company urges, that as the jury found that the tracks were rearranged by the Santa Fe, this of necessity relieved the other company from liability therefor. But they [27]*27also found that this rearrangement was part of the general scheme of elevation. Hence, no error.

In the motions for new trial each of the defendant companies complained that the special findings were inconsistent with one another. One of the nineteen assignments of error is the overruling of the motions for a new trial. It cannot be possible that the depression in Douglas avenue, as already described, did'and at the same time did not prevent the passage of teams and vehicles from one street into the other, and yet the jury deliberately found both ways on this point. One of two results must inevitably follow: Either the erection of the wall did not destroy the plaintiff’s ingress and egress because they had already been destroyed, or else the two defendants are required to pay $4,000'because they did, although they did not, obstruct the plaintiff’s ingress and egress by the erection of the wall. This sort of Janus-faced findings will not do.

The plaintiff himself testified that for fifteen years before the construction of the wall Fifth avenue was like any other street in Wichita, except that the Santa Fe had one or two tracks extending down the street to a certain point and then veering to the southeast toward the old depot, making the street clear of tracks south of the Potts warehouses and that—

“There was a cement wall built across Fifth avenue at the intersection of Douglas avenue, shutting off all traffic by teams on Fifth avenue.”
“Tracks were set very closely together and extended directly down to Douglas avenue,', cutting out this slant that I have previously described, thereby closing the street entirely.”

In another place, on cross-examination, he testified, when asked as to the depreciated value of his property:

“I think the concrete wall was the last straw. That is what did the business.

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Related

Root v. City of Topeka
139 P.2d 393 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1943)
Case v. State Highway Commission
131 P.2d 696 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1942)
Green v. Hutson
32 P.2d 490 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 P. 546, 102 Kan. 23, 1917 Kan. LEXIS 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffith-v-city-of-wichita-kan-1917.