Griffin v. Wilkinson

195 So. 35, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 306
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 6, 1940
DocketNo. 6012.
StatusPublished

This text of 195 So. 35 (Griffin v. Wilkinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. Wilkinson, 195 So. 35, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 306 (La. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

DREW, Judge.

Plaintiff instituted this suit seeking to recover from J. V. Wilkinson the amount of $200, with legal interest thereon from judicial demand, together with ten per centum attorney’s fees. For a cause of action he alleged that defendant was during the year 1938 a duly licensed real estate broker, under the provisions of Act No. 236 of 1920, as amended by Act No. 175 of 1936, and that he gave bond, as required by law of real estate brokers, with Henry G. Caldwell as surety thereon, which bond was duly recorded in the Mortgage Records of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, and was conditioned as required by law.

Plaintiff further alleged that he consulted with the said defendant as a real estate broker and entered into an oral contract with him for the purchase of Lots 7 and 8, Block 25 of Fairfield Heights Subdivision of Shreveport, Louisiana, for a consideration of $1,100 This agreement was made on March 1, 1938, and plaintiff agreed to pay $100 per month. He paid $100 on March 30th and another $100 on May 2nd; and that immediately after making the last payment he found out that defendant had no authority or right to sell the property so he refused to make other payments and demanded the return of the money he 'had paid.

Plaintiff further alleged that the property he agreed to purchase had been subsequently sold by the owners to other persons and that it was impossible for defendant to have sold said property to him. On August 31, 1938, plaintiff made written demand on defendant and his surety on his bond for the return of the money paid and that more than thirty days have elapsed without payment being made to him and that he was therefore entitled to receive an additional amount of ten per cent as attorney’s fees.

Defendant in answer admitted he was a duly licensed real estate broker and that he furnished bond as alleged. He admitted the agreement alleged to have been made with plaintiff and the receipt of the two payments of $100 each. He also alleged he had entered into a contract to purchase the lots from # the then owners and was dealing with plaintiff as owner and not as a real estate broker. Defendant denied all the other allegations of the petition.

The lower court awarded plaintiff judgment as prayed for and defendant prosecutes this appeal. Plaintiff has answered the appeal praying for ten per cent damages for frivolous appeal.

A number of issues in the case which might have been controversial were disposed of by agreement and stipulation filed in the record. We quote from the first stipulation and agreement:

“Whereas the said H. O. Griffin, plaintiff, intends to sue the said J. V. Wilkinson and Henry G. Caldwell, the surety on the Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond of the said J. V. Wilkinson; and
“Whereas the said J. V. Wilkinson, the defendant, desires to avoid a suit being filed against the said Henry G. Caldwell, the surety on the Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond, to which the said J. O. Griffin is agreeable, so long as his rights to recover the said amount, with interest and penalties, are protected, and none of his rights or remedies are waived, and the said J. V. Wilkinson, the defendant, desires to make a cash deposit to secure the payment of any judgment as may be obtained by the plaintiff in this case, in lieu of and substitution of a suit being filed *37 against the said surety on his Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond;
“Now, Therefore, it is stipulated and agreed that in order to avoid the filing of a suit against the said Henry G. Caldwell, the surety on the Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond of the said J. V. Wilkinson, the said J. V. Wilkinson has and does hereby deposit with his attorney, Frank E. Murphy, the sum of $235.00, which said amount shall be paid by the said Frank E. Murphy for the payment of any final judgment as may be obtained herein by the plaintiff, J. 0. Griffin, against the defendant, J. V. Wilkinson, and for and in the consideration of the said cash deposit being made, the plaintiff, J. 0. Griffin, agrees to file and maintain this suit against the said J. V. Wilkinson, only, and agrees not to bring or prosecute this suit against the said Henry G. Caldwell, the surety on the said Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond of the said J. V. Wilkinson.
“It is specially stipulated, however, that by bringing and filing this suit, the rights of the plaintiff, J. O. Griffin, to sue for and recover the penalties, as are provided by Act No. 225 of 1918, are especially maintained, and are in no manner waived, and it is agreed and stipulated that the court shall, in the event a judgment is rendered against the defendant, J. V. Wilkinson, and considers that the penalties or attorney’s fees, as provided for by sraid Act No. 225 of 1918, are allowable, or would be allowed, had the said Henry G. Caldwell been a party to this suit, and sued as the surety on the said Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond, that the Court shall and is hereby authorized to render judgment for the said penalties or attorney’s fees, it being especially stipulated that this suit shall be considered as if filed against both principal and surety on the said Real Estate Agent or Broker’s Bond.
“The said Frank B. Murphy, attorney for J. V. Wilkinson, hereby agrees that the said cash deposit, as made with him, or as much thereof as is necessary for the payment of the said judgment, will be immediately paid to the plaintiff through his attorneys upon any judgment as rendered herein becoming final and executory, and that it shall not be necessary for the said plaintiff to issue executions.”

In a supplemental stipulation, we find the following:

“That the letter dated Shreveport, Louisiana, June 27, 1938, and addressed to Mr. Louis Lyons, Bossier City, Louisiana, and signed by J. V. Wilkinson, and which is identified as D-l, in connection with the testimony as given by the said J. V. Wilkinson upon the trial of this said cause, be filed with this stipulation and considered the same as if filed as a part of the evidence adduced on the trial of this cause.
“It is further stipulated that if placed on the witness stand, Mr. Louis Lyons would testify that he does not recall having received the letter marked D-l for identification, written by J. V. Wilkinson to him under date of June 27, 1938,, and that not recalling having received the letter, he did not communicate the letter to Mr. J. O. Griffin and did not advise or discuss with Mr. J. O. Griffin the contents of said letter.
“That if the plaintiff, J. O. Griffin, was recalled to the witness stand to testify in reference to the said letter, he would testify to the fact that he had no knowledge of such letter and that such letter or the contents of the same was never communicated to him or discussed with him in any manner by Mr. Louis Lyons.
“That this stipulation, as to the filing of the letter as a part of the evidence adduced on the trial of this cause, and as to the testimony as would be given by Mr. Louis Lyons and Mr. J. O. Griffin, were they replaced on the witness stand, shall be had and received by the court, and given the same consideration, had such testimony or statements of the witnesses been given in open court by them, or adduced fully in the evidence or trial of this cause.”

The letter attached is as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
195 So. 35, 1940 La. App. LEXIS 306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-wilkinson-lactapp-1940.