Griffin v. United States

129 Ct. Cl. 244, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 83, 1954 WL 6079
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 8, 1954
DocketNo. 49742
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 129 Ct. Cl. 244 (Griffin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 244, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 83, 1954 WL 6079 (cc 1954).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

From March 6, 1945, to May 13, 1949, plaintiff was in the Security Courier Service, Army Postal Service Branch, Adjutant General’s Office of the United States Army. His duties required him to safeguard and convey top secret, secret and confidential matter, between points in the United States and various foreign countries, including Bermuda, Puei'to Bico, the Canal Zone, British Guiana, Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, the Azores, France, Germany, and Trieste.

From November 15,1945, to June 27,1946, he was assigned to the State Department as a diplomatic courier, and from June 28, 1946 to August 12, 1946, he was assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Army as a courier. During both of these periods he participated regularly and frequently in aerial flights pursuant to Army Special Orders No. 256, dated October 26,1945. For this period he has been paid extra compensation at the rate of $720 per annum.

From October 8, 1948, to May 13, 1949, when he was released to inactive duty, he participated regularly and frequently in aerial flights pursuant to an order dated October 7, 1948, and for this period he has been paid extra compensation at the rate of $720 per annum. During this time he was the officer-in-charge of this courier service.

He sues for extra compensation at the rate of $720 per annum for the periods March 6, 1945 to October 25, 1945, and January 1, 1947 to October 6, 1948, for which he has not been paid. During the first period he was a courier with the Army Postal Service, and during the latter period he was the officer-in-charge of the courier service.

During the first period he performed 6 flights in April; 18 in July; and 28 in October 1945. In the latter period he [246]*246performed 6 flights in March 1947; 12 in April; 24 in May; 4 in June; 7 in July; 14 in August; 26 in September; 27 in October; 6 in November; and 9 in December; 18 in January 1948; 15 in February; 18 in March; 14 in April; 5 in May; 5 in June; 11 in July; 2 in August; and 10 in September.

His right to recover depends on these statutes: first, section 18 of the Act of June 16,1942 (56 Stat. 359,368), and, second, the Act of June 28,1944 (58 Stat. 573, 575).

His right to any extra compensation for participating in aerial flights depends upon the first Act. It reads:

Officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men of any of the services mentioned in the title of this Act and members of the Reserve forces of such services, and the National Guard shall receive an increase of 50 per centum of their pay when by orders of competent authority they are required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, and when in consequence of such orders they do participate in regular and frequent flights as defined by such Executive orders as have heretofore been, or may hereafter be, promulgated by the President: * * *.

Except for this Act, no officer was entitled to extra compensation for participating in aerial flights. Under it any officer who did participate in such flights regularly and frequently pursuant to orders of competent authority was entitled to 50 percent extra pay.

But the second Act, which was the Appropriation Act of June 28, 1944 (58 Stat. 573), making appropriations for the military establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, placed a limitation on this right to extra pay in the case of nonflying officers. Such a limitation has been contained in subsequent appropriation acts; and prior appropriation acts also contained a limitation on the extra pay of such officers. The Act of June 28,1944, reads in part:

* * * That the appropriations contained in this Act shall not be available for increased pay for making aerial flights by nonflying officers at a rate in excess of $720 per annum, which shall be the legal maximum rate as to such officers, and such nonflying officers shall be entitled to such rate of increase by performing three or more flights within each ninety-day period, pursuant to orders of competent authority, without regard to the duration of [247]*247such flight or flights: Provided further, That, during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof, a flying officer as defined under existing law shall include flight surgeons, and commissioned officers or warrant officers while undergoing flying training: * * *.

The proof leaves no doubt that plaintiff participated in the number of flights specified in the appropriation act. He submitted a written statement showing the number of flights he participated in and he testified that the schedule was correct. This proof was not contradicted.

The Commissioner was in error in excluding this statement. It will be received in evidence.

Plaintiff was a nonflying officer. Plying officers were originally defined as pilots; then this was extended by the Act of July 2, 1926 (44 Stat. 781) to include an observer. It was further extended by the Act of October 4,1940 (54 Stat. 963), to include any other member of a combat crew; and by the Act of July 2,1942 (56 Stat. 611, 612), to include flight surgeons, and officers undergoing flight training. The Act of June 16, 1942, swpra, provided additional pay to officers on parachute duty.

Plaintiff came within none of these classifications. He was not a flying officer; hence, necessarily, he was a nonflying officer. As such he was entitled to extra compensation at the rate of $720 per annum if he performed three or more flights within each 90-day period “pursuant to orders of competent authority.”

He was paid for the flights he made pursuant to orders dated October 26, 1945 and October 7, 1948, but the flights made before the first order and from January 1,1947 to the date of the second order are said to have been made without orders requiring him to do so.

This is the only genuine issue in the case: Did he participate in these flights pursuant to orders of competent authority requiring him to do so?

In the first place, it is conceded that his duties during the periods for which he has not been paid were the same as in the periods for which he has been paid.

All the orders for the first period for which he has not been paid were of the same tenor. They directed plaintiff [248]*248to. travel by air in the performance of his duties “when certified by the Director, Army Postal Service, as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. * * * A high priority is established for any air travel that is necessary owing to the urgency and security of this mission. * * *” Fifty-two flights were made during this period of approximately 8 months. It is fair to assume that they were certified as necessary by the Director, especially considering the urgent nature of plaintiff’s duties.

Typical of the orders for the second period is the following:

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 4b (4), Alt 35-4890, 12 March 1947, the following-named officers, Army Security Courier Office, Security Courier Service Section, Army Postal Service Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, will proceed at such time and such order and frequency as may be required during the period 1 January 1949, to 30 June 1949, inclusive, from Washington, D.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
129 Ct. Cl. 244, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 83, 1954 WL 6079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-united-states-cc-1954.