Griffin v. State

67 S.W.3d 582, 347 Ark. 788, 2002 Ark. LEXIS 128

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: February 28, 2002
• Docket: CR 00-1475
• Status: Published

Opinions

R AY THORNTON, Justice.

Appellant, David Griffin, entered .a conditional plea upon which he was convicted of drug-related offenses following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless late-night search of his residence near Jonesboro. Griffin argues three points for reversal. We agree with his first argument that the covert nighttime intrusion upon his property by four police officers violated the provisions of Article 2, Section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution, and we reverse and remand with instructions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful intrusion upon his property.

I. Principles of law

We note that the provisions of Article 2, Section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution are similar to those contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it may be that the late-night intrusion upon appellant’s property may have also violated the provisions of federal constitutional law. We have in many cases harmonized the protections afforded by Article 2, Section 15, of our state constitution with those provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark. 41, 938 S.W.2d 801 (1997); Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995). However, we base our analysis of this case upon our own state law as expressed by our state constitution, statutes, and cases, recognizing that while we lack authority to extend the protections of the Fourth Amendment beyond the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, we do have the authority to impose greater restrictions on police activities in our state based upon our own state law than those the Supreme Court holds to be necessary based upon federal constitutional standards. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).

In many states, the principle that a person should be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects was well-established before the 1786 Constitutional Convention adopted a similar restriction, the Fourth Amendment, forbidding the central government from issuing warrants without probable cause. Elisa Masterson White, Criminal Procedure — Good Faith, Big Brother, and You: The United States Supreme Court’s Latest Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), 18 UALR L.J. 533 (1996) (citing Jacob W Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretaion 30-48 (1966)). The 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was the first to use the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. (citing Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 13 (1937)). The public furor over the issuance by the King of writs of assistance granting customs officials unlimited power of search and seizure had fueled the spirit of independence of the colonies. Id. (citing Lasson, supra).

The principle that a man’s home is his castle, and that even the King is prohibited from unreasonably intruding upon that home, was particularly well-developed in the rough-and-ready culture of the frontier, and no less pronounced in the Arkansas Territory. In our 1836 Constitution, the people of our newly admitted state expressed this principle succinctly in the following language:

§ 9. That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that general warrants, whereby any officer may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named whose offenses are not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be granted.

Id. (emphasis added).

This principle is now articulated in Article 2, Section 15, of the present Arkansas Constitution, which provides that “the right of the people of this State to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” Id.

With reference to the protections contained in Arkansas’s own state laws against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court recently noted in Arkansas v. Sullivan, supra:

We reiterated in Hass [Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)] that while “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards,” it “may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.”

Arkansas v. Sullivan, supra (citation omitted). In State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000), we erred because we based our decision Hmiting police officers’ discretion to intrude on individual liberty and privacy upon principles of federal constitutional law. Arkansas v. Sullivan, supra.

In the case sub judice, we apply Arkansas law, while observing that our decision does not impose lesser restrictions upon police activity than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is also a principle of law in our state that the exclusionary rule commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation of search and seizure protections, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant. See Yancey v. State, 345 Ark. 103, 44 S.W.3d 315 (2001).

In Arkansas, there are rigorous standards to be followed in obtaining a search warrant, especially for a nighttime search. We note that nighttime searches with a warrant must be based upon exigent circumstances. Arkansas law allows for search warrants to be executed at night in three circumstances: (1) the place to be searched is difficult of speedy access; (2) the objects to be seized are in danger of imminent removal; or (3) the warrant can only be safely or successfully executed at night or under circumstances the occurrence of which is difficult to predict with accuracy. Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c).

In Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992), we cited with approval the following:

We find the United States Supreme Court case of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed.2d 732 (1984), to be instructive. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless, nighttime entry into a home to arrest an individual for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated:

It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as “a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law,” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.

Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the Court decided in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 [100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 639 (1980)] (1980), that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. . . . Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are “few in number and carefully delineated,” when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

Butler, supra. We have also held that, in order to enter a residence or private dwelling without violation of prohibitions against unreasonable searches, both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be present. Mitchell v. State, 294 Ark. 264, 742 S.W.2d 895 (1988).

Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.1, an officer may conduct searches and make seizures without a search warrant or other color of authority if consent is given to the search and seizure. Id. The consent for a warrandess search of an individual’s home must be given freely and voluntarily, and the burden rests upon the State to prove such consent by clear and positive evidence, and this burden is not met by showing only acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Holmes v. State, 347 Ark. 530, 65 S.W.3d 860 (2002).

As a general rule, where consent is freely and voluntarily given, the “knock and talk” procedure has been upheld as a consensual encounter and a valid means to request consent to search a house. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1110-09 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 909 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511-12 (11th Cir.1991); Cruz, 838 F. Supp. at 543; State v. Green, 598 So. 2d 624, 626 (La. Ct. App.1992); State v. Land, 106 Or. App. 131, 806 P.2d 1156, 1157-59 (1991).

We believe that this “knock and talk” procedure has been well-defined in Davis v. United States, 327 F. 2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964), where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s “castle” with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.

Id.

In some other jurisdictions, a police officer conducting a “knock and talk” must inform a person that he may refuse consent, revoke consent, or limit the scope of consent. See State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998). Other jurisdictions require a knowledgeable waiver. See Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858 (Miss. 1997).

II. Facts

Informed by these principles of law, we consider the following factual circumstances. Griffin was an optician with his office on Flighway 49 near Jonesboro. The offices are near the highway, and a two-story residence belonging to Griffin’s parents is located a couple of hundred yards behind the office, accessible by a private drive. Griffin’s parents own the house and occupy the main part of the house. Their residence is accessible through a front door. Griffin’s residence is in the basement or lower floor, accessible by a sliding glass door. This apartment residence has a sitting room into which the sliding glass door opens, and two small bedrooms are adjacent to the sitting room. Separate from the residence and the office are a shed and several other out buildings, which are some distance from the house and the office. Some two weeks before August 25, 1999, Griffin encountered Officer Bobbie Johnson walking across the property from the back fence toward the road during daylight hours. There is no indication that Griffin gave consent to this intrusion upon his property.

Officer Johnson testified that during daylight hours on August 25, 1999, he received an anonymous tip through another officer that Griffin was selling drugs from his office or home, and Johnson testified that the circumstances of the tip did not constitute probable cause upon which a search warrant could be issued.

Notwithstanding the lack of probable cause, Officer Johnson recruited Deputy Wes Baxter and auxiliary deputies Bobby Phillips and Rod Abernathy, and the four officers went to the premises at about 10:10 p.m. that night. According to their testimony, it was pitch black, and they parked their vehicles fifteen to twenty yards from the house where they could not be seen from the sliding glass door that opened into Griffin’s basement apartment. They made an inspection of one of the parked vehicles between the police cars and the house when they discovered the doors of the vehicle were open. No contraband was discovered in the vehicle. All four of the officers were carrying flashlights.

One of Griffin’s guests, Karen Horton, testified that she was in the living room of Griffin’s basement residence when she saw a bunch of flashlights out in the vicinity of the shed coming through the woods. She advised Griffin, who was in a back room on the telephone with his daughter, that four or five men were approaching the house. Horton testified that the officers told her not to move, and then ordered her to open the door. As she moved forward to open the door, Griffin emerged from the back room where he had been on the telephone with his daughter, and he stepped to the door to meet the officers.

Officer Johnson testified that the patrol cars were not visible from the house, that the officers looked in the parked car because it had an open door, and confirmed that the officers had walked around the premises before talking with Griffin. Johnson then stated he believed they first knocked, then walked around because nobody came to the door, and then returned to knock again, at which time Griffin answered the door. He then asserts, contrary to his earlier testimony, that the search did not begin until consent was given.

It is undisputed that no consent to search was signed, no advice was given that Griffin could re&se to consent to search, and no Miranda rights were read before the search began. It is disputed whether Griffin imposed limitations upon his consent to a search, or whether he later revoked his consent and demanded that the officers obtain a search warrant. The officers found a sealed container containing methamphetamine in a locked cabinet in Griffin’s bedroom. They also discovered drug paraphernalia and a firearm.

III. Standard of review

In reviewing a ruling denying a defendant’s motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. We reverse only if the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997); Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997). We defer to the trial court in assessing witness credibility. E.g., Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999); Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998); Tabor v. State, 333 Ark. 429, 971 S.W.2d 227 (1998).

The trial court denied Griffin’s motion to suppress evidence obtained by means of an illegal search and seizure, and accepted Griffin’s conditional guilty plea and sentenced him to an aggregate of twenty-five years’ imprisonment on the charges of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm with an additional ten years suspended on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant does not raise an issue of insufficient evidence.

IV Analysis

For his first point on appeal, Griffin argues that the initial entry upon his premises constituted a prohibited search under Article 2, Section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution. He contends that the law enforcement officers made an unlawful intrusion onto his property late at night without a search warrant or probable cause to obtain a warrant. He argues that the search was not the result of a freely and voluntarily given consent to the search.

The State urges that the protections of Article 2, Section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution are not applicable because there was a consent to the search. The trial court’s findings on this point relate in large part to an evaluation of Griffin’s conduct after he answered his door, and began a conversation with the police officers seeking permission to come in and look for a methamphetamine lab. However, we must first address the threshold question of whether an illegal search had commenced before the police officers engaged Griffin in conversation at the sliding glass door.

Accordingly, we address the issue whether an illegal search had already begun before Griffin answered his door. The trial court’s only finding relating to this threshold issue was that the officers did not violate Griffin’s right to privacy by merely knocking on the door and requesting permission to enter his home. This finding might be appropriate to circumstances like those described in Davis, supra, where it is declared that there is no invasion of privacy “for anyone open and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof. . . [.]” Id.

However, those factual circumstances are not found in this case. The facts in this case bear little resemblance to those described in Davis, supra. With regard to whether the initial approach by officer Johnson was with an' honest intent of asking questions, we note that Officer Johnson freely testified that the officers lacked probable cause to get a warrant, thereby giving rise to the warrant-less “knock and talk” tactic. On cross-examination of Officer Johnson, the following colloquy occurred:

Q: And you received this information from Officer Etter, Gary Etter?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Now at that point, what information did you have besides Mister Etter’s statement?

A: None.

Q: At that point, did you think you could stop and get a search warrant?

A: No. But I’ve heard in the past where he was selling’ drugs at his optical place down at Valley View.

Q: Well, based on that hearsay or rumor, could you have gone and got a search warrant.

A: No sir.

Q: Okay. In fact, did ya’ll even discuss getting a search warrant?

A: No sir.

Q: Did you attempt in any way to find out the basis for Officer Etter’s statement to you that day or the day before?

A: No sir.

Q: Did he offer you any explanation as to where that information came from?

A: No. People call in and tell us, and we go and check. And if they wanna let us in we do. Eighty percent of ‘em let us come in and look.

Q: Eighty percent of them?

A: Well, I’d say fifty to eighty percent. I mean you ask ‘em if you can come in and look, and they just say come in.

Officer Johnson admitted on cross-examination that any attempt to obtain a search warrant would have been futile because no probable cause existed to support a search warrant. The only information that the officers had was a tip from a fellow officer, and Officer Johnson admits that this information was not enough to obtain a warrant. According to Officer Johnson’s testimony, the officers received the tip earlier in the day, but decided to act on the tip at 10:10 in the evening. This evidence supports a conclusion that the nighttime approach was an effort to search Griffin’s premises without a warrant and without probable cause.

With regard to the issue as to when the search actually began, the predominance of the evidence clearly shows that the four law enforcement officers approached the sliding-glass door of Griffin’s basement residence through the woods from the vicinity of a shed, carrying flashlights so they could see in the pitch-black darkness. We do not consider that these actions conform to the Davis, supra test “for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the door of any man’s castle. . . Id. Not only did the actions of the officers not meet the standards related in Davis, supra, the predominance of the evidence clearly shows that an unlawful search had begun before Griffin was summoned to the door.

The officers employed stealth, parking their vehicles where they could not be seen from the entry of Griffin’s residence. They then inspected a parked car because the door was open, and then, either before or after an initial knock, checked out a shed and walked around the premises. Whether the walk around of the shed was before or after an initial knock is of little consequence. We know of no authority for a “knock and search” doctrine holding that after knocking, it is permissible to begin a warrantless search before anyone comes to the door.

Based upon an independent determination of the totality of the circumstances under Burris, supra, we conclude that an illegal search prohibited by Article 2, Section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution had begun before Griffin was summoned to his door and asked for consent to search.

Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for the suppression of evidence obtained by the illegal search. Because this resolves the issue of suppression of the evidence, we need not address the other issues raised by appellant.

Reversed and remanded.

Corbin, Brown, and Hannah JJ., concur. IMBER, J., not participating.