An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-806
Filed 20 May 2026
Mecklenburg County, No. 22CVD007750-590
DANIEL GRIFFIN, Plaintiff/Father/Husband,
v.
ANABEL GRIFFIN, Defendant/Mother/Wife.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 11 February 2025 by Judge Paige B.
McThenia in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23
April 2026.
Sodoma Law, P.C., by Rebecca K. Watts, for plaintiff-appellant.
Rech Law, P.C., by Kate A. Rech and Alaina T. Prevatte, for defendant-appellee.
DILLON, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Daniel Griffin (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s Order on
alimony, permanent child support, and attorney’s fees. Husband challenges the trial
court’s classification of him as a supporting spouse, the alimony award, and its failure
to differentiate on attorney’s fees awarded between work spent on the alimony issue
and the permanent child support issue. GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Husband and Defendant Anabel Griffin (“Wife”) married in 2012, separated in
2022, and are now divorced. The parties have two minor children.
In May 2022, Husband initiated this lawsuit seeking custody, attorney’s fees,
and equitable distribution.
The next day, Wife initiated a second lawsuit, filing a complaint seeking
custody, temporary and permanent child support, postseparation support, alimony,
The trial court consolidated Wife’s lawsuit with this action.
In October 2022, the trial court entered a temporary custody order. In March
2023, the trial court entered a temporary child support order. About nine months
later, in December 2023 the trial court resolved the issues of permanent child custody
and equitable distribution; and heard the issues of permanent child support, alimony,
and attorney’s fees.
Fourteen months later, on 11 February 2025, the trial court entered an Order,
directing Husband to pay Wife $2,000.00 per month in alimony and $10,000.00 in
attorney’s fees. Husband appealed.
II. Analysis
Husband raises three issues on appeal which we address in turn.
A. Alimony
A spouse seeking alimony must prove (1) there is a dependent spouse; (2) there
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is a supporting spouse; and (3) the “award of alimony is equitable considering all
relevant factors[.]” N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(a).
The standard of review for a bench trial is “whether there was competent
evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of
law were proper in light of such facts.” Oakley v. Oakley, 165 N.C. App. 859, 861
(2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If there is competent evidence
supporting the findings of fact the findings are “conclusive on appeal, even if there is
contrary evidence.” Collins v. Collins, 243 N.C. App. 696, 699 (2015) (citing Scott v.
Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291 (1994)).
1. Entitlement
We review a trial court’s determination of a party’s entitlement to alimony de
novo. Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379 (1972) (citations omitted).
Husband does not challenge Wife’s classification as a dependent spouse.
Rather, Husband challenges his classification as a supporting spouse. Our Supreme
Court has stated that “evidence one spouse is dependent does not necessarily infer
[imply] the other spouse is supporting.” Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 186
(1980).
A supporting spouse is defined as a “husband or wife, upon whom the other
spouse is actually substantially dependent for maintenance and support or from
whom such spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support.” N.C.G.S. §
50-16.1A(5). Generally, a spouse is a supporting spouse when his or her income
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exceeds expenses. N.C.G.S. § 50-16.2A(b); see, e.g., Williams, 299 N.C. at 187.
In this case, the core issue is whether Husband’s income exceeds his expenses
to support the trial court’s classification of him as a supporting spouse and thus Wife’s
entitlement to alimony as a dependent spouse. Before we reach this issue, however,
we must address whether Husband conceded his status in his reply brief to Wife’s
alimony complaint. “A party is bound by his pleadings and, unless withdrawn,
amended, or otherwise altered, the allegations contained in all pleadings ordinarily
are conclusive as against the pleader. He cannot subsequently take a position
contradictory to his pleadings.” Davis v. Rigsby, 261 N.C. 684, 686 (1964).
Applying the same principle from Davis in the alimony context, this Court, in
Allport v. Allport, concluded a husband conceded his wife was a dependent spouse
where he admitted so in pleadings before the trial court and failed to properly
challenge the relevant findings and conclusions supporting the wife’s dependent
status on appeal. 924 S.E.2d 376, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025). We reasoned “[e]ven if
we were to overlook [h]usband’s admission of [w]ife’s status as a dependent spouse,
the unchallenged findings of fact abundantly support the trial court’s conclusion that
[w]ife is a dependent spouse.” Id.
Here, in Husband’s responsive pleading to Wife’s alimony complaint, he
concedes his supporting spouse status “as defined by [G.S.] §§ 50-16A(2) and (5).”
Thus, the trial court properly classified Husband as a supporting spouse; there is no
need to examine whether Husband’s income exceeds his expenses.
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2. Award
Husband alternatively argues that even if he is a supporting spouse (i.e., Wife
is entitled to alimony), he has no ability to pay the $2,000.00 monthly award and thus
the trial court abused its discretion in so awarding. Because the trial court committed
various mathematical errors, we remand for correction on the alimony award.
This Court reviews a trial court’s award of alimony for an abuse of discretion.
Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453 (1982) (citation omitted). There is an abuse of
discretion when the trial court’s decision is “manifestly unsupported by reason or one
so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Briley v.
Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547 (1998) (citations omitted). An alimony award is
determined on broad statutory factors at the trial court’s discretion. See N.C.G.S. §§
50-16.3A(a), (b). The statutory factors generally refer to the dependent spouse’s need
and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay. See id.; Alvarez v. Alvarez, 134 N.C. App.
321, 323 (1999) (discussing the 1995 need-based update to the alimony statute).
Both parties agree the trial court made multiple errors in calculating both
Wife’s and Husband’s expenses. For example, the trial court determined Husband
had $2,096.20 in “reasonable monthly individual expenses.” However, when the
individual calculations within this section are added together along with the trial
court’s edits as to what is reasonable for certain categories, the correct total value for
Husband’s reasonable monthly individual expenses is $1,846.86. Other calculation
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-806
Filed 20 May 2026
Mecklenburg County, No. 22CVD007750-590
DANIEL GRIFFIN, Plaintiff/Father/Husband,
v.
ANABEL GRIFFIN, Defendant/Mother/Wife.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 11 February 2025 by Judge Paige B.
McThenia in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23
April 2026.
Sodoma Law, P.C., by Rebecca K. Watts, for plaintiff-appellant.
Rech Law, P.C., by Kate A. Rech and Alaina T. Prevatte, for defendant-appellee.
DILLON, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Daniel Griffin (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s Order on
alimony, permanent child support, and attorney’s fees. Husband challenges the trial
court’s classification of him as a supporting spouse, the alimony award, and its failure
to differentiate on attorney’s fees awarded between work spent on the alimony issue
and the permanent child support issue. GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Husband and Defendant Anabel Griffin (“Wife”) married in 2012, separated in
2022, and are now divorced. The parties have two minor children.
In May 2022, Husband initiated this lawsuit seeking custody, attorney’s fees,
and equitable distribution.
The next day, Wife initiated a second lawsuit, filing a complaint seeking
custody, temporary and permanent child support, postseparation support, alimony,
The trial court consolidated Wife’s lawsuit with this action.
In October 2022, the trial court entered a temporary custody order. In March
2023, the trial court entered a temporary child support order. About nine months
later, in December 2023 the trial court resolved the issues of permanent child custody
and equitable distribution; and heard the issues of permanent child support, alimony,
and attorney’s fees.
Fourteen months later, on 11 February 2025, the trial court entered an Order,
directing Husband to pay Wife $2,000.00 per month in alimony and $10,000.00 in
attorney’s fees. Husband appealed.
II. Analysis
Husband raises three issues on appeal which we address in turn.
A. Alimony
A spouse seeking alimony must prove (1) there is a dependent spouse; (2) there
-2- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
is a supporting spouse; and (3) the “award of alimony is equitable considering all
relevant factors[.]” N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3A(a).
The standard of review for a bench trial is “whether there was competent
evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of
law were proper in light of such facts.” Oakley v. Oakley, 165 N.C. App. 859, 861
(2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If there is competent evidence
supporting the findings of fact the findings are “conclusive on appeal, even if there is
contrary evidence.” Collins v. Collins, 243 N.C. App. 696, 699 (2015) (citing Scott v.
Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291 (1994)).
1. Entitlement
We review a trial court’s determination of a party’s entitlement to alimony de
novo. Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379 (1972) (citations omitted).
Husband does not challenge Wife’s classification as a dependent spouse.
Rather, Husband challenges his classification as a supporting spouse. Our Supreme
Court has stated that “evidence one spouse is dependent does not necessarily infer
[imply] the other spouse is supporting.” Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 186
(1980).
A supporting spouse is defined as a “husband or wife, upon whom the other
spouse is actually substantially dependent for maintenance and support or from
whom such spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support.” N.C.G.S. §
50-16.1A(5). Generally, a spouse is a supporting spouse when his or her income
-3- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
exceeds expenses. N.C.G.S. § 50-16.2A(b); see, e.g., Williams, 299 N.C. at 187.
In this case, the core issue is whether Husband’s income exceeds his expenses
to support the trial court’s classification of him as a supporting spouse and thus Wife’s
entitlement to alimony as a dependent spouse. Before we reach this issue, however,
we must address whether Husband conceded his status in his reply brief to Wife’s
alimony complaint. “A party is bound by his pleadings and, unless withdrawn,
amended, or otherwise altered, the allegations contained in all pleadings ordinarily
are conclusive as against the pleader. He cannot subsequently take a position
contradictory to his pleadings.” Davis v. Rigsby, 261 N.C. 684, 686 (1964).
Applying the same principle from Davis in the alimony context, this Court, in
Allport v. Allport, concluded a husband conceded his wife was a dependent spouse
where he admitted so in pleadings before the trial court and failed to properly
challenge the relevant findings and conclusions supporting the wife’s dependent
status on appeal. 924 S.E.2d 376, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025). We reasoned “[e]ven if
we were to overlook [h]usband’s admission of [w]ife’s status as a dependent spouse,
the unchallenged findings of fact abundantly support the trial court’s conclusion that
[w]ife is a dependent spouse.” Id.
Here, in Husband’s responsive pleading to Wife’s alimony complaint, he
concedes his supporting spouse status “as defined by [G.S.] §§ 50-16A(2) and (5).”
Thus, the trial court properly classified Husband as a supporting spouse; there is no
need to examine whether Husband’s income exceeds his expenses.
-4- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
2. Award
Husband alternatively argues that even if he is a supporting spouse (i.e., Wife
is entitled to alimony), he has no ability to pay the $2,000.00 monthly award and thus
the trial court abused its discretion in so awarding. Because the trial court committed
various mathematical errors, we remand for correction on the alimony award.
This Court reviews a trial court’s award of alimony for an abuse of discretion.
Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453 (1982) (citation omitted). There is an abuse of
discretion when the trial court’s decision is “manifestly unsupported by reason or one
so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Briley v.
Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547 (1998) (citations omitted). An alimony award is
determined on broad statutory factors at the trial court’s discretion. See N.C.G.S. §§
50-16.3A(a), (b). The statutory factors generally refer to the dependent spouse’s need
and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay. See id.; Alvarez v. Alvarez, 134 N.C. App.
321, 323 (1999) (discussing the 1995 need-based update to the alimony statute).
Both parties agree the trial court made multiple errors in calculating both
Wife’s and Husband’s expenses. For example, the trial court determined Husband
had $2,096.20 in “reasonable monthly individual expenses.” However, when the
individual calculations within this section are added together along with the trial
court’s edits as to what is reasonable for certain categories, the correct total value for
Husband’s reasonable monthly individual expenses is $1,846.86. Other calculation
errors appear throughout the Order for both Wife’s and Husband’s expenses. We are,
-5- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
therefore, unable to discern whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
$2,000.00 per month in alimony as a result because these errors impact Wife’s need
and Husband’s ability to pay. See Edwards v. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 710–11
(1991) (stating a trial court’s miscalculations affecting “[husband’s] expenses relative
to his monthly income” are prejudicial requiring the trial court to address the errors).
Additionally, it is unclear from the Order whether it included Husband’s work-related
childcare and child support payment obligations in calculating the alimony award.
See Brady v. Brady, 282 N.C. App. 420, 428–29 (2022) (vacating and remanding in
part the alimony order because it was unclear whether the trial court considered the
husband’s child support obligations in its calculation).
We cannot “rely on speculation” as to why the court awarded the amount of
alimony it did. Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 750 (2019). Thus, we must vacate
the portion of the order awarding alimony and remand for further findings.
B. Attorney Fees
Determination of entitlement to attorney’s fees is reviewed de novo. Rickert,
282 N.C. at 379. Once entitlement is determined, we review the amount of attorney’s
fees for an abuse of discretion. Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 382 (1966).
If on appeal, however, the trial court’s finding of one of the elements for
alimony is vacated, the award of attorney’s fees must also be vacated. Fink v. Fink,
120 N.C. App. 412, 425 (1995); see In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384 (1989).
-6- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
We, however, want to briefly address Husband’s argument as it contains some
merit. Husband challenges the Order on attorney’s fees because it fails to
differentiate which portion of the award is for alimony and which portion is for
permanent child support.
The statute authorizing attorney’s fees for alimony claims is different from the
statute authorizing attorney’s fees for child support claims. Specifically, G.S. 50-16.4
permits attorney’s fees “[a]t any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to
alimony[.]” However, a party seeking attorney’s fees in an alimony case must show
she is (1) entitled to alimony; (2) a dependent spouse; and (3) without sufficient
means to defray the litigation costs. Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 135–36 (1980).
General Statute 50-13.6 authorizes “reasonable attorney’s fees” for child
support claims for “[a] party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray
the expense of the suit[ ]” and requires the trial court to “find as a fact that the party
ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support . . . under the circumstances
existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding[.]” N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.6; Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 473 (1980) (“The facts required by the statute
must be alleged and proved to support an order for attorney’s fees.”); see, e.g., Hill v.
Hill, 261 N.C. App. 600, 629 (2018) (citing our Supreme Court stating the trial court’s
failure to render findings on the husband’s “refus[al] to provide support . . . at the
-7- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
time of the institution of the action” element of G.S. 15-13.6 warrants reversal
because the trial court did not find all required facts (quoting N.C.G.S. §50-13.6)).1
The trial court found, based on an affidavit from Wife’s attorney, Wife incurred
fees relating to her “temporary child support claim totaling $16,949.25” and that Wife
made this claim in good faith and lacked sufficient means to defray the costs of
litigation. Wife’s attorney’s fees affidavit, however, considered only the issues of
permanent child support and alimony and estimated the fees incurred for those
matters to be the same—$16,949.25.
The Order is problematic because it awards attorney’s fees for temporary child
support without finding Husband “refused to provide support” under G.S. 15-13.6 or
absent Wife requesting attorney’s fees for temporary child support.
We must vacate under Fink, however, to allow the trial court to make the
required statutory findings concerning attorney’s fees for an alimony claim and for a
permanent child support claim.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the portion of the Order entitling Wife to alimony. However, based
on the numerous mathematical errors in the Order, we vacate the alimony award and
remand for further findings and conclusions and to make an award, if it determines
1 In Hill, we interpreted this required finding in two parts. There, we concluded the trial court
did make a finding as to the husband’s refusal to provide support adequate under the circumstances but did not have a finding on whether this refusal was “at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding[.]” 261 N.C. App. at 629.
-8- GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN
any to be appropriate, based on those new findings. We vacate the attorney’s fees
award and remand for additional findings, including findings differentiating between
attorney’s fees for the alimony and attorney’s fees for the permanent child support.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Judges STROUD and MURRY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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