Griffin v. Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC

562 F. Supp. 2d 775, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1748, 2008 WL 2216262
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 9, 2008
DocketCivil Action 07-1188
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 562 F. Supp. 2d 775 (Griffin v. Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, 562 F. Supp. 2d 775, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1748, 2008 WL 2216262 (W.D. La. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

DONALD E. WALTER, District Judge.

For the reasons assigned in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein, and after having thoroughly reviewed the record, including the written objections filed herein, and concurring with the findings of the Magistrate Judge under the applicable law;

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand be and is hereby DENIED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALONZO P. WILSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

On June 15, 2007 Major E. Griffin (“Griffin”) filed the instant suit in the 14th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana. Made defendants were Georgia Gulf Lake Charles L.L.C. (“Georgia Gulf’). Griffin alleges that he was injured by exposure to toxic chemicals released by Georgia Gulf when a cracking furnace they owned and operated failed and leaked ethylene dichloride. Griffin claims damages for respiratory illnesses, pulmonary disease, neurological deficits and gastrointestinal problems, “past and future emotional and physical pain and suffering, severe emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life ... past medical, hospital, pharmacy and related expenses,” as well as future medical expenses, and possible loss of earning capacity. Petition for Damages ¶ 6-7 [doc. # 1-2].

On July 17, 2007, Georgia Gulf removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 & 1441, claiming complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. Notice of Removal ¶ 4 [doc. # 1]. On August 16, 2007, Griffin filed the instant motion to remand claiming that the requisite threshold amount for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is lacking, as he stated in his original petition for damages and its accompanying stipulation. Griffin filed a second affidavit with his Motion to Remand in which he “declares, avers, stipulates and confesses that his damages in the above captioned and numbered case are below $75,000 and that any award in their [sic] favor shall be limited to less than $75,000.” Motion to Remand, Affidavit, Binding Stipulation and Confession of Judgment [doc. # 8-1].

The matter is now before the court. 1

In cases removed to federal court on the basis of diversity, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. “The defendant *778 may make this showing in either of two ways: (1) by demonstrating that it is ‘facially apparent’ that the claims are likely above $75,000, or (2) ‘by setting forth facts in controversy — preferably in the removal petition, but sometimes by affidavit — that support a finding of the requisite amount.’ ” Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 850 (5th Cir.1999) (citing, Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.1999)).

Once the defendant has shown that the jurisdictional minimum is in controversy, the burden falls on the plaintiff seeking to defeat diversity jurisdiction to establish to a “legal certainty” that his claims are actually for less than the jurisdictional amount. Allen v. R. & H. Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir.1995); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir.1995), cert. den. 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 180, 133 L.Ed.2d 119(1995). Plaintiffs can do so either by showing that a state law prohibits recovery in excess of the jurisdictional amount, or by filing a binding stipulation or affidavit with the complaint prior to removal stating that they do not seek and will not accept any award in excess of $75,000, as in this way they can prove that it is legally certain that they cannot recover at least the jurisdictional amount. See, e.g., Allen v. R. & H. Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir.1995); De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir.1995). Such a stipulation will limit the amount in controversy in their case in an unambiguous manner. However, if the plaintiff does not so stipulate, and the amount in controversy is ambiguous at the time of removal, the Court may consider a post-removal stipulation to clarify the ambiguity by determining the amount that was in controversy as of the date of removal. See Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.2000); Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Quimica de Colombia S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir.1993). When, on the other hand, the amount in controversy is clear from the face of the complaint, post-removal stipulations purporting to reduce the amount of damages plaintiffs seek cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883.

In the instant case, the Plaintiff alleged in the body of his petition that his damages are insufficient for federal jurisdiction, and he swore in an accompanying verification that his claims are for less than $75,000 and therefore do not rise to the minimum either for a jury trial 2 or for federal jurisdiction. 3 The Plaintiffs allegation that his damages are insufficient to satisfy the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction is presumptively correct. De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412. This presumption, however, can be rebutted by the defendant showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000.

Georgia Gulf alleges that it “reasonably believes ... that the amount in controversy ... exceeds the jurisdictional amount” because the “Plaintiffs allegations are nearly identical to the allegations which this Court concluded make it facially ap *779 parent that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied in related litigation pending in this Court.” Notice of Removal ¶ 8-9 [doc. # 1]. Furthermore, the Defendant argues that Griffin’s verification is not legally binding, as it may be rescinded at any time prior to the trial, and that the statement in Griffin’s complaint may similarly be withdrawn by amendment. Opposition Brief to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand [doc.# 15].

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
562 F. Supp. 2d 775, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1748, 2008 WL 2216262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-georgia-gulf-lake-charles-llc-lawd-2008.