STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss. LOCATION: Caribou Docket No. CARSC-CV-2020-077
Neal J. Griffeth, ) Plaintiff ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S v. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY ) JUDGMENT Gagnon' s Rental Properties, LLC, ) Defendant )
Currently pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment related to his
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Defendant has filed an objection to the motion
with additional facts. Plaintiff thereafter filed a reply statement to the additional facts
submitted by Defendant. After review of the motion, objection and reply, the court enters
the following order:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant are the owners of adjacent parcels of real estate situated in
Caribou, Maine, generally at the intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Route 89. Defendant is
the successor in interest and assignee of E.H.S. Enterprises, Ltd., which granted a certain
right-of-way easement (hereinafter "the Right-of-Way") described in the Warranty Deed
dated July 31, 1989 and recorded in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2201, Page 298. The Right-of-Way connects the aforementioned parcels of real estate and
provides Plaintiff access to Route 89.
The circumstances by which the Right-of-Way may be terminated, as described in
Book 2201, Page 298, require 60 days notice to Plaintiff as well as the "construction and
completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the parcel of land conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed dated July 2, 1988
and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2100, Page 214."
This being the same premises conveyed to Plaintiff as described in Paragraph 3 of the
Complaint.
The ultimate determination in this case turns on whether or not there has been
"construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the
parcel of land conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed
dated July 2, 1988 and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2100, Page 214." If so, Defendant is permitted to terminate the Right-of-Way. If not,
Defendant does not have authority to terminate the Right-of-Way.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the record reflects that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ,r 6, 750 A.2d 573. "'A material fact is one that could
potentially affect the outcome of the suit,' and '[a] genuine issue of material fact exists
when the evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the
truth.' Farrington s Owners Ass n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ,r 9,878 A.2d 1 1 1
504.'" Scott v. Fall Line Condo. Ass 1n, 2019 ME 50, PS. The facts must be considered in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mahar v. StoneWood Transport, 2003 ME 63
if8, 823 A.2d 540. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, any factual disputes must be resolved against the movant. Material Facts in Dispute
The central fact in dispute in this case is whether or not a there has been the
"construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the
parcel of land" in question. Upon this central fact, there is a dispute between the parties.
Plaintiff contends that "[n]o public road has ever been constructed and completed from
U.S. Route One through or along Plaintiff's parcel of land." P.S .M.F. at 6. Defendant
contends that "[a] public road has been constructed and completed by Plaintiff and the
City of Caribou which provides public town way to Plaintiff's property from U.S. Route
One." D.R.S.M.F. at 2.
As there are genuine issues of material fact, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby DENIED. Clerk to set this matter for one day bench trial at the first
available date that is mutually acceptable to the parties.
The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the Docket by notation, incorporating
it be reference.
Dated: Justice, Maine Superior Court STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss. LOCATION: Caribou Docket No. CARSC-CV-2020-077
Neal J. Griffeth, ) Plaintiff ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S v. ) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY ) INJUNCTION Gagnon's Rental Properties, LLC, ) Defendant )
Currently pending is Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. The hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was
held in Caribou on September 28, 2020. Plaintiff was present, represented by Dan
Umphrey, Esq. and Scott Hunter, Esq. Defendant was present, represented by Richard
Currier, Esq. After hearing and based upon the record presented, the court makes the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and resulting order.
Plaintiff and Defendant are the owners of adjacent parcels of real estate situated in
Caribou, Maine, generally at the intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Route 89. Defendant is
the successor in interest and assignee of E.H.S. Enterprises, Ltd., which granted a certain
right-of-way easement (hereinafter "the Easement'') described in the Warranty Deed
dated July 31, 1989 and recorded in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2201, Page 298 on August 2, 1989 at 8:29 a.m. The Easement runs from Route 89 through
Defendant's property to the property of Plaintiff. The instrument granting the Easement
contains the following provision: "Grantor, its successors and assigns, shall have the right to terminate the
roadway/right of way easement upon Sixty (60) days notice upon the construction and
completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the parcel of land
conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed dated July 2, 1988
and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2100, Page 214.
The utility easement conveyed herein shall be perpetual and shall run with the land."
SARO, V. 2201, P. 298-299(emphasis added).
Plaintiff operates an automobile dealership and repair shop on his property.
Customers for service primarily access Plaintiff's business by way of the Easement.
Plaintiff has installed a gravel road from the base of operations on his property to a parcel
of real estate owned by the City of Caribou described in the deeds recorded in the
Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2561, Page 266, and Volume 2561, Page
268. A curb cut was constructed by the City of Caribou on its property which provides
practical access to U.S. Route 1 over Plaintiff's gravel road and the City of Caribou's
property.
On May 21, 2020, Defendant recorded an instrument entitled "60-Day Notice
Terminating Right-of-Way Easement" in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in
Volume 6014, Page 103. Defendant has indicated that it will be taking steps to prevent or
hinder access by way of the Easement to Plaintiff's property.
This case at its core is not about whether Plaintiff has legal access to his property.
The parcel has considerable frontage on U.S. Route 1 and did at the time the Easement
was granted. The ultimate determination in this case turns on whether or not there has been construction and completion of a public road from U.S.
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss. LOCATION: Caribou Docket No. CARSC-CV-2020-077
Neal J. Griffeth, ) Plaintiff ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S v. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY ) JUDGMENT Gagnon' s Rental Properties, LLC, ) Defendant )
Currently pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment related to his
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Defendant has filed an objection to the motion
with additional facts. Plaintiff thereafter filed a reply statement to the additional facts
submitted by Defendant. After review of the motion, objection and reply, the court enters
the following order:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant are the owners of adjacent parcels of real estate situated in
Caribou, Maine, generally at the intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Route 89. Defendant is
the successor in interest and assignee of E.H.S. Enterprises, Ltd., which granted a certain
right-of-way easement (hereinafter "the Right-of-Way") described in the Warranty Deed
dated July 31, 1989 and recorded in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2201, Page 298. The Right-of-Way connects the aforementioned parcels of real estate and
provides Plaintiff access to Route 89.
The circumstances by which the Right-of-Way may be terminated, as described in
Book 2201, Page 298, require 60 days notice to Plaintiff as well as the "construction and
completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the parcel of land conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed dated July 2, 1988
and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2100, Page 214."
This being the same premises conveyed to Plaintiff as described in Paragraph 3 of the
Complaint.
The ultimate determination in this case turns on whether or not there has been
"construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the
parcel of land conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed
dated July 2, 1988 and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2100, Page 214." If so, Defendant is permitted to terminate the Right-of-Way. If not,
Defendant does not have authority to terminate the Right-of-Way.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the record reflects that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ,r 6, 750 A.2d 573. "'A material fact is one that could
potentially affect the outcome of the suit,' and '[a] genuine issue of material fact exists
when the evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the
truth.' Farrington s Owners Ass n v. Conway Lake Resorts, Inc., 2005 ME 93, ,r 9,878 A.2d 1 1 1
504.'" Scott v. Fall Line Condo. Ass 1n, 2019 ME 50, PS. The facts must be considered in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mahar v. StoneWood Transport, 2003 ME 63
if8, 823 A.2d 540. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, any factual disputes must be resolved against the movant. Material Facts in Dispute
The central fact in dispute in this case is whether or not a there has been the
"construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the
parcel of land" in question. Upon this central fact, there is a dispute between the parties.
Plaintiff contends that "[n]o public road has ever been constructed and completed from
U.S. Route One through or along Plaintiff's parcel of land." P.S .M.F. at 6. Defendant
contends that "[a] public road has been constructed and completed by Plaintiff and the
City of Caribou which provides public town way to Plaintiff's property from U.S. Route
One." D.R.S.M.F. at 2.
As there are genuine issues of material fact, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby DENIED. Clerk to set this matter for one day bench trial at the first
available date that is mutually acceptable to the parties.
The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the Docket by notation, incorporating
it be reference.
Dated: Justice, Maine Superior Court STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT AROOSTOOK, ss. LOCATION: Caribou Docket No. CARSC-CV-2020-077
Neal J. Griffeth, ) Plaintiff ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S v. ) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY ) INJUNCTION Gagnon's Rental Properties, LLC, ) Defendant )
Currently pending is Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. The hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction was
held in Caribou on September 28, 2020. Plaintiff was present, represented by Dan
Umphrey, Esq. and Scott Hunter, Esq. Defendant was present, represented by Richard
Currier, Esq. After hearing and based upon the record presented, the court makes the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and resulting order.
Plaintiff and Defendant are the owners of adjacent parcels of real estate situated in
Caribou, Maine, generally at the intersection of U.S. Route 1 and Route 89. Defendant is
the successor in interest and assignee of E.H.S. Enterprises, Ltd., which granted a certain
right-of-way easement (hereinafter "the Easement'') described in the Warranty Deed
dated July 31, 1989 and recorded in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume
2201, Page 298 on August 2, 1989 at 8:29 a.m. The Easement runs from Route 89 through
Defendant's property to the property of Plaintiff. The instrument granting the Easement
contains the following provision: "Grantor, its successors and assigns, shall have the right to terminate the
roadway/right of way easement upon Sixty (60) days notice upon the construction and
completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the parcel of land
conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty Deed dated July 2, 1988
and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2100, Page 214.
The utility easement conveyed herein shall be perpetual and shall run with the land."
SARO, V. 2201, P. 298-299(emphasis added).
Plaintiff operates an automobile dealership and repair shop on his property.
Customers for service primarily access Plaintiff's business by way of the Easement.
Plaintiff has installed a gravel road from the base of operations on his property to a parcel
of real estate owned by the City of Caribou described in the deeds recorded in the
Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in Volume 2561, Page 266, and Volume 2561, Page
268. A curb cut was constructed by the City of Caribou on its property which provides
practical access to U.S. Route 1 over Plaintiff's gravel road and the City of Caribou's
property.
On May 21, 2020, Defendant recorded an instrument entitled "60-Day Notice
Terminating Right-of-Way Easement" in the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in
Volume 6014, Page 103. Defendant has indicated that it will be taking steps to prevent or
hinder access by way of the Easement to Plaintiff's property.
This case at its core is not about whether Plaintiff has legal access to his property.
The parcel has considerable frontage on U.S. Route 1 and did at the time the Easement
was granted. The ultimate determination in this case turns on whether or not there has been construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or II
along the parcel of land conveyed by Stanley F. Brescia to Bruce P. Pelletier by Warranty
Deed dated July 2, 1988 and recorded at the Southern Aroostook Registry of Deeds in
Volume 2100, Page 214." If so, Defendant is permitted to terminate the Easement. If not,
Defendant does not have authority to terminate the Easement.
Plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo as this
matter makes its way through litigation. A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief
must demonstrate that (1) it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted;
(2) such injury outweighs any harm that the grant of injunctive relief would inflict on the
other party; (3) the party seeking the injunction has a likelihood of success on the merits
(at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility); and (4) the public interest will
not be adverse! y affected by granting the injunction. See Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep •t
ofAgric., Food & Rural Resources, 2003 ME 140, 19, 837 A.2d 129, 132, citing Dep' t of Envtl.
Prat. v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 768 (Me. 1989); Ingraham v. Univ. of Maine at Orono, 441
A.2d 691,693 (Me. 1982). If a party fails to satisfy any one or more of the four injunction
criteria, injunctive relief will be denied. Id. The Law Court has noted that the criteria
11 are not to be applied woodenly or in isolation from each other; rather, the court of equity
should weigh all of these factors together in determining whether injunctive relief is
proper in the specific circumstances of each case." Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Emerson, 563
A.2d 762,768 (Me. 1989)(citing, Developments in the Law- -Injunctions, 78 Harv.L.Rev.994,
1056 (1965)("Clear evidence of irreparable injury should result in a less stringent requirement of certainty of victory; greater certainty of victory should result in a less
stringent requirement of proof of irreparable injury.")
A. Irreparable Injury
"Irreparable injury 11 is defined as "injury for which there is no adequate remedy at
law. 11 Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep 1 t ofAgric., Food & Rural Res., 2003 ME 140, PlO, 837
A.2d 129, 133 (citing, Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 79 (Me.
1980)). The typical remedy at law would be money damages. An injunction may issue
if money damages would not fairly compensate Plaintiff for the injury suffered. Within
the categories of situations in which the legal remedy may be inadequate and an equitable
remedy such as an injunction may be appropriate is the situation when the plaintiff is
entitled to damages, but those damages cannot be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Horton & McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies§ 5.3-1, at 5-6 to 5-7(1988).
Interference with the primary access easement involving a business would cause
damage to sales or customer service that is difficult to accurately quantify, as the injured
party may not have an adequate mechanism to measure the loss, as opposed to a physical
injury to property that can be accurately quantified.
For Plaintiff's business, 65% to 75% of all of its customers utilize the Easement to
access the business. Although some of those customers may travel the additional
distance to access the business by the secondary access, Plaintiff has shown that shutting
off the Easement will clearly have a negative economic impact to his business, damages
for which may be difficult to accurately quantify. B. Balancing of Harms
Plaintiff asserts that there will be no harm to the Defendant as the granting of the
preliminary injunction maintains the status quo that has existed for many years between
the parties. Defendant contends that it has a need to utilize the space occupied by the
easement for additional parking due to a new lease with a tenant with greater parking
needs than his property can currently accommodate. Although the Easement does
occupy a portion of the property of Defendant, there remains additional property free of
any easement restriction that Defendant is free to utilize for parking. Defendant may
develop and pave the remainder of its lot for parking, provided the Easement is not
restricted. The harm to Plaintiff outweighs the inconvenience to Defendant.
C. Likelihood of Success
A "likelihood of success on the merits" is "at most, a probability; at least a
substantial possibility." Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural Res.,
2003 ME 140, P9, 837 A.2d 129,132. Construction of a deed or instrument of conveyance
is a question of law. River Dale Association v. Bloss, 2006 ME 86, ,r6, 901 A.2d 809,811. In
this matter, the language of the deed is unambiguous. Defendant has the right "to
terminate the roadway/ right of way easement upon Sixty (60) days notice upon the
construction and completion of a public road from U.S. Route One through or along the
parcel of land" now owned by Plaintiff.
Since the grant of the Easement, there has been no public road constructed and
completed from U.S. Route One through or along with parcel of land owned by Plaintiff.
Although Plaintiff has constructed a road from U.S. Route One to his business, the road he constructed goes through a parcel of land that is owned by the City of Caribou. The
City does not maintain any portion of Plaintiff's road and the road is not a public road.
As noted by Defendant in his testimony, he was aware of a plan being discussed
for the development of a road to provide public access to the industrial park adjacent to
the lot of the Plaintiff and that it has "been in the works, but nothing has been done yet."
In this matter, Plaintiff has shown that there is a least a substantial possibility that Plaintiff
will succeed on the merits.
D. Public Interest
The interests at issue in this matter are solely the business interests of the
respective parties. Therefore, the public interest will not be adversely affected by
granting the injunction.
Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED. Pending this
Court's ruling on the Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, the Defendant, its
officers, agents, servants and employees or others acting on its behalf, are hereby enjoined
from engaging in any act that would interfere with Plaintiff's easement right-of-way over
and upon the property of the Defendant; to include, but not limited to, blocking,
barricading, or altering the right-of-way.
The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the Docket by notation, incorporating
Dated: / L' ' fe. /:(e;;io Justice, Maine Superior Court