Grier v. Dehan

10 Del. 401

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: July 5, 1877
• Status: Published

Opinion

The Court,

Comegys, C. J.,

charged the jury: In actions of deceit, to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must prove that the defendant made a false and fraudulent representation of facts, and that he so made it with the intent to deceive the plaintiff. They were then first to inquire whether the plaintiff was induced to enter into the lease and to proceed to take possession of the property rented by reason of the representations made to him by the defendant, and if so, then whether they were false and known by the defendant to be so when they were made, and were made with the intent to deceive him. If they were satisfied from the evidence before them that such was the case, then their verdict should be for the plaintiff. But they would not be justified in rendering any verdict for him unless all those requisites to a recovery had been proved by the. evidence in the case.

With respect to the damages in case their verdict should be for the plaintiff, the only ground laid or alleged for damages seemed to be the expenses of the journey of himself and family and of the transportation of his goods and chattels to Wisconsin and back, and also his loss of wages in the meantime on the Brandy- wine, the plaintiff averring that he gave up his employment there by reason of the same misrepresentations, and as to the amounts of which proof had been submitted to them in the progress of the trial for their consideration; and while we say to you that these would afford legitimate grounds for damages in the suit in case the jury should be of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to' a verdict, we must at the same time say to you that he is only entitled to a verdict for such an amount of damages as he has proved that he actually sustained in the case. Recurring again to the requisites of the action before stated, and particularly with respect to the intent to deceive, we say to you that it was not necessary that it should appear by the testimony of witnesses that the defendant declared his purpose to deceive the plaintiff, or by any other kind of direct and positive evidence. Fraud is a conclusion of law upon facts proved, and while it is perfectly true that it is not to be presumed merely in any case, yet it may be inferred or concluded from facts proved, as well as any other fact involved in the trial of a cause. If, therefore, in this case, the representation of the quality and condition of the premises made by the defendant to the plaintiff induced him to rent them and to go to Wisconsin with his family and goods to take possession of them, and that representation was fraudulent because of the defendant’s knowledge to the contrary, and they should be so satisfied from all the evidence in the case, then they would be justified in drawing from it the conclusion that the intent of the defendant in making them was to deceive the plaintiff.

But the jury should also be satisfied from all the evidence in the case, and under all the facts and circumstances proved in it, that "the plaintiff was justified in relying on the representation of the defendant as true, and that he believed it to be true and acted upon it as true. And on that point they should take into consideration the testimony of the witnesses, Dugan, and the son of the defendant, from which it appeared that the defendant had informed the plaintiff previous to the renting that he had never been in Wisconsin, and referred him to a neighbor of his on the Brandywine, Dugan, who had seen the farm, for information in regard to it, and who says the plaintiff did come to see him about it, and that he communicated that knowledge to him, except with respect to the state of the buildings upon it. They were also to give such weight to the testimony of the son of the defendant as they might consider it justly entitled to, and who stated that the letter produced on the trial and translated before you was read as translated here by his father to the plaintiff in his presence before he left for Wisconsin, and from which it would appear that he supplied him with information, material and important to some extent at least. And in addition to that, you have the testimony of the draughtsman of the lease that the defendant urged the plaintiff not to ■ depend on the information which he could give him in regard to the farm, but to go to a man on the Brandywine who had seen it and could tell him all about it. If the damage sustained and complained of by the plaintiff was caused by false and fraudulent representations made to him by the defendant in regard to the state and condition of the premises, then their verdict should be for the plaintiff, with such damages as he had before stated to them; but if not, then their verdict should be for the defendant.