Griepsma v. Andersen

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES DAVID GRIEPSMA, No. 25-2353 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:21-cv-00302-JCC v. MEMORANDUM* CHRISTIAN J. ANDERSEN; JACKSON STRAMLER; GUILLERMO GARCIA; BRANDON WEBB; CAMERON BANAS; DANIEL W. WHITE; DOUGLAS FADDIS; JACOB GRILLO; JOAN PALMER; JOHN DOES, 1, 2, 3; JONATHAN SCOTT; MICKEY ALVIS; VITALIY BOYCHENKO,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 31, 2026**

Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). James David Griepsma brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

several Skagit County Sheriff’s deputies (“County defendants”) and several

Washington State Department of Corrections employees (“DOC defendants”). His

claims relate to an incident following his sentencing hearing and to events while he

was incarcerated. He appeals from the judgment entered on the jury verdict in

favor of the County defendants. Although the notice of appeal does not identify

the district court’s summary judgment rulings, we have jurisdiction to consider

those rulings. See Munoz v. Small Bus. Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.

1981) (explaining that “an appeal from the final judgment draws in question all

earlier non-final orders and all rulings which produced the judgment”). We may

affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Campidoglio

LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co., 870 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 2017).

1. Griepsma forfeited appellate review of his claims related to the jury

trial and judgment against County defendants Christian Andersen and Jackson

Stramler. Griepsma asserts that Andersen forcefully obtained his fingerprints, but

he fails to identify any issue related to the jury trial or to provide any arguments in

support of his assertions. We are not required to “manufacture arguments” for

Griepsma or consider “a bare assertion” that was “not actually argued in

appellant’s opening brief.” Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th

645, 673 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). Because Griepsma’s contention is

2 25-2353 unaccompanied by any argument, we consider it forfeited. See Fed. R. App. P.

28(a)(8)(A).

Even if we construe Griepsma’s brief as challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence in support of the verdict, he forfeited this claim by failing to move for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule

50(b). Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007)

(explaining that “to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the verdict in a civil case, a party must . . . file a post-verdict

motion . . . under Rule 50(b)”).

2. To the extent that Griepsma intended to challenge the district court’s

order granting summary judgment to the other County defendants, we do not

consider any issues related to this ruling because no such claims were identified or

argued in the opening brief. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d

925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually

argued in appellant’s opening brief.”); see also Nev. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Greene, 648

F.3d 1014, 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (deeming issues not supported by argument

in pro se appellant’s briefing waived).

3. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the DOC

defendants. Griepsma failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the

excessive force and medical claims he presents in his brief, and he failed to raise a

3 25-2353 genuine dispute of material fact on whether administrative remedies were

effectively unavailable to him. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Ross v. Blake,

578 U.S. 632, 642–44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust available

administrative remedies before bringing an action and describing limited

circumstances in which administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006) (explaining that exhaustion requires compliance

with prison deadlines and other procedural rules).

4. We do not consider Griepsma’s claim that he was detained without a

signed court order prior to his criminal trial. This argument was not presented to

the district court, and we ordinarily do not consider claims that are raised for first

time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Additionally, Griepsma failed to meaningfully develop this issue. See United

States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court may

refuse to consider undeveloped issues). For the same reasons, we do not consider

Griepsma’s conclusory assertion regarding the lack of medical care “before

transport to DOC.”

5. Griepsma summarily asserts that his appointed counsel was

ineffective “for trial prep and trial.” But Griepsma was not entitled to counsel in

this § 1983 action and therefore has “no right to effective assistance.” Nicholson v.

Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).

4 25-2353 AFFIRMED.

5 25-2353