Greyhound Corp. v. United States

332 F. Supp. 44, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6299, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14722
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 5, 1971
DocketCiv. Nos. 42084, 44758, 48613, 47518, C-70-330
StatusPublished

This text of 332 F. Supp. 44 (Greyhound Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 44, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6299, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14722 (N.D. Cal. 1971).

Opinion

ORDER APPROVING PLAINTIFFS’ FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ETC.

HARRIS, District Judge.

The above captioned consolidated suits are brought by the Greyhound Corporation and Greyhound Lines, Inc. under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6416 and 6421 for the refund of diesel fuel excise taxes paid under 26 U.S.C. § 4041, for part of the year 1957 and each of the years 1958 through 1965.

Plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact portray the factual background accurate[45]*45ly and in minute detail. The uncontradicted evidence presented at the trial and under the Partial Agreed Statement of Facts and Specification of Remaining Issues of Fact tends to establish practically all of the relevant facts.

The unresolved issue, therefore, is whether Greyhound’s two types of scheduled passenger service, consisting of mainline service and local service, are to be treated separately for the purposes of the 60% test governing the excise tax refund as Greyhound contends, or whether Greyhound’s scheduled passenger service, including both mainline service and local service, is to be treated as a unit as the Government contends.

The following succinct statement referring specifically to the 60% test clarifies the basic issue:

The 60% test issue arises under § 6421(b) (2) in the following manner: For any calendar quarter, a local transit system qualifies for the refund only if it collects a sufficient amount of “commuter fare revenue.” Whether the amount of commuter fare revenue is sufficient is determined by a fraction which must equal at least 60% for Greyhound to be entitled to a refund. The numerator of the fraction is “commuter fare revenue.” The parties agree on the numerator of the fraction. Commuter fare revenue is defined precisely in § 6421(d) (2) and is not in issue in this case, the parties having stipulated that Greyhound’s commuter fare revenue set forth in Agreed Statement, Paragraph 20, for Fourth Quarter/1963 is commuter fare revenue within this statutory definition. Agreed Statement, Paragraph 21.
However, the parties do not agree on the denominator of the fraction. Greyhound contends that the denominator is the revenue from the local transit operations of Greyhound. The United States contends that the denominator is the revenue from the local transit operations and intercity operations of Greyhound.
Under § 6421(b) (2), if the fraction is less than 60% no refund is due; if the fraction is 60% or more, a refund measured by the fraction is due. In the present case, there is no substantial dispute that if the 60% test means that commuter fare revenue must be at least 60% of revenue from Greyhound’s local transit operations, as Greyhound contends, then a refund in the amount claimed by Greyhound is due; and, on the other hand, the parties agree that if the 60% test means that commuter fare revenue must be 60% of revenue from all of Greyhound’s operations, both local and intercity, as the United States contends, no refund whatsoever is due Greyhound. Agreed Statement, Paragraph 29. The pertinent computations for Fourth Quarter/1963 are set forth in Agreed Statement, Paragraphs 25-27. (Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief, p. 4, 1.14 to and incl. p. 5, 1.14)

It is manifest from the testimony adduced at trial and the Partial Agreed Statement of Facts and the elaborate briefs filed by the respective parties, that Greyhound operates two separate types of service, mainline and local. Public Service Coordinated Transport v. United States, 367 F.2d 417, 177 Ct.Cl. 337 (1966); see also, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9 “Local Operations.” The detailed testimony of the several trial witnesses produced by plaintiffs make it abundantly clear that Greyhound’s local service meets the criteria in Exhibit 9.

Plaintiffs have successfully met and sustained the burden of proof in the clear and convincing exposition of fact and the delineation of legal principles as applicable.

The United States vigorously contends that Greyhound is nevertheless a single, unified and integrated transportation system. However, there is no persuasive evidence, either oral or documentary, to support this contention.

County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412, 78 S.Ct. 880, 2 L.Ed.2d 879 (1958), is demonstrative that the Supreme Court does not consider Grey[46]*46hound’s local operations to be part of a single bus system.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as lodged with this Court are, and each of them is, approved.

The entry of the proposed judgments is subject to the agreement of the parties that the necessary computation of the amounts will be settled by the parties prior to the entry of any judgment.

Accordingly, the entry of appropriate judgments is deferred pending determination of principal and interest.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above entitled consolidated actions came on regularly for trial on the 13th and 16th of November, 1970, before the Court without a jury, the Honorable George B. Harris presiding. Plaintiffs were represented by Gordon M. Weber and John B. Lowry of the firm of MeCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen and defendant was represented by James L. Browning, Jr., Esq. through Martin A. Schainbaum, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney.

Evidence, both oral and documentary, was introduced on behalf of the respective parties and the consolidated causes were submitted for decision upon the filing of post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on behalf of the respective parties.

In conformity with Rule 52 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the order regularly made and entered on the 5th day of February, 1971, approving plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court has made the following findings of fact, all of which have been either agreed to by counsel for the respective parties or proved by testimony submitted at the trial of the above entitled cause and exhibits which have been made part of the record.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Civil Nos. 42084, 44758, 48613, 47518 and C-70-330 are suits brought by The Greyhound Corporation and Greyhound Lines, Inc. under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6416 and 6421 for the refund of diesel fuel excise taxes paid under 26 U.S.C. § 4041 for part of the year 1957 and each of the years 1958 through 1965. (AS ¶ 1, 2.) 1

2. The Plaintiff in Civil Nos. 42084, 44758 and 48613 (for the years 1957 through 1963) is The Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation. (AS ¶ 2; Tr. P 19 L 24.)

3.

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Related

County of Marin v. United States
356 U.S. 412 (Supreme Court, 1958)
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States
365 U.S. 753 (Supreme Court, 1961)

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Bluebook (online)
332 F. Supp. 44, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6299, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14722, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greyhound-corp-v-united-states-cand-1971.