Grey v. Morris & Cummings Dredging Co.

55 A. 59, 64 N.J. Eq. 555, 19 Dickinson 555, 1903 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 98
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 16, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 55 A. 59 (Grey v. Morris & Cummings Dredging Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grey v. Morris & Cummings Dredging Co., 55 A. 59, 64 N.J. Eq. 555, 19 Dickinson 555, 1903 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 98 (N.J. Ct. App. 1903).

Opinion

Emeby, Y. 0.

The attorney-general, on behalf of the state, files this information for the purpose of annulling a lease of the state’s lands under water in Few York bay, made to the defendant by the [556]*556riparian cpmmissioners under the Riparian acts. The application for the grant or lease made by the defendant, dated April 11th, 1881, covered a shore front of about two thousand five hundred feet, the whole of which was alleged to belong to the defendant in fee and to be in its possession. Upon this application a grant was made by the riparian commissioners on April 30th, 1881, for the lands under water in front of the whole lands, of which defendant claimed to be shore owner. The lease was perpetual, for the annual rental of $4,233.00 for the entire lands, with a purchase-price of $64,080, as compensation for conveyance, free from rent. The lease recites defendant’s ownership of the shore in front of which the leased lands lay and the application for a lease to it as shore owner under the Riparian acts. It contained covenants on the part of the state not to give any grant or license to any other person or corporation affecting the lands leased. This proviso, however, followed the covenants and concluded the terms of the lease:

“jProvided also nevertheless, that if the said party of the second part is not the owner of the lands adjoining the lands under water hereby conveyed, then and in that' case this conveyance and lease, so far as the same binds the state and all covenants herein on the part of the state, shall be void.”

The information alleges that as to a shore front of about two hundred and forty feet of shore, in front of which lands under water were included in this grant, the defendant was not the shore owner, but that one Joseph W. Hancox, under whom relator -claims, was the shore owner, and that the grant or lease was made to defendant, without notice to Hancox, as required by the Riparian acts. Hancox conveyed the tract claimed to be on the shore front to the relator on September 1st, 1882, and this information, on its relation, was filed on October 11th, 1899. The information alleges that Hancox was the owner of this portion of the shore, in front of which the lands were leased; that the defendant had no right or title or interest therein; that its representation in the application that it was the owner of all the shore lands was not true, and that the defendant, with full knowledge of the facts as to ownership, suppressed them. The [557]*557grant is alleged to be void and a cloud upon the title to the lands under water included therein; and the information prays a decree that the lease may be declared null and void and the cloud on the státe’s title to the lands therein described may be removed. The information appears to claim the avoidance of the entire grant, and not merely of the portion in front of the lands claimed to belong to relator. Ho allegation is made in the information as to the payments of rents under the lease, neither is there any tender or offer to return any portion of the rents received. The answer denies Hancox’s ownership of the shore front, as claimed by the relator, and asserts its own title as shore owner, at the time of the lease, to the entire shore in front of which the lands under water were leased. It sets up, also;, the payment by defendant to the state of over $78,000 as rentals for the property, and the expenditure by defendant of large sums of money in filling in the lands under water. The knowledge of Hancox and of the relator, for many years, that the riparian lease in front of the lands claimed by relator had been made to defendant, and that defendant was paying the rentals and the expense of filling in the lands, is further set up as an estoppel or bar against questioning the lease. As to the right of Hancox or relator, as shore owners, the defendant further sets up that in the deed to Clement D. Hancox, the predecessor of Joseph Hancox in title, conveying to him on July 1st, 1863, the tract of land which relator claims to bound on the shore, it was agreed between the grantee, Clement D. Hancox, and his grantor, George W. Howe, who then owned all the shore front subsequently acquired by the defendant, that the grantor reserved to himself and his legal representatives the water rights in front of said lands in Hew York bay, and the right to dock out and reclaim the same, as far as they might desire, to their own use, benefit and behoof forever. These water rights, it is alleged, have been expressly reserved in all of the subsequent deeds and mortgages of the lands conveyed to Clement D. Hancox, and were reserved in the conveyance to relator. Defendant claims to have succeeded to-all of Howe’s rights, and that at the time of Howe’s conveyance-to Hancox, on July 1st, 1863, the line of the shore did not reach the tract conveyed.

[558]*558Three questions were argued at the hearing, and are to be considered—first, whether this court has jurisdiction to annul the grant in a proceeding of this character; second, whether the relator’s predecessors in title were the owners of the shore front, as claimed, either in 1863, at-the time of the original severance of the title to the riparian lands, by the deed from Howe to Clement D. Hancox, or at the time of the riparian grant in 1881, and third, the effect of the reservation of water rights to the grantor Howe upon the lease in question. Hpon these points I reach the following conclusions:

First. The question of jurisdiction in equity to annul grants of this character, alleged by the state to have been obtained by a person not shore owner and by a willful suppression of facts or false representation, is discussed and decided by Chancellor Magie in Attorney-General, ex rel. City of Elizabeth, v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 16 Dick. Ch. Rep. 259 (1901). The jurisdiction is maintained, and the only further observation to be made is that, in the present ease, there is the additional circumstance that, by the proviso, the lease is expressly declared to be void, as against the state, if the lessee is not the owner of the lands adjoining the lands under water. This proviso concludes defendant as to the materiality of the representation of ownership, and as to the right of the state to' avoid the lease by reason of its falsity. If the method or proceeding selected by the state to carry into effect its right of avoiding the lease is a bill in equity to annul the lease, the state may, under this method, be subject to the application of equitable rules applicable to private suitors, as to the terms upon which relief may be granted, including repayment of rentals or other disbursements, but these equities, if they exist, are matters for adjustment by final decree, and do not touch the question of jurisdiction. Attorney-General v. Central Railroad Co., supra. A bill or information in equity by the state to annul a grant or patent is a proceeding more favorable to the grantee than an annulment of the grant by the making by the state of a subsequent grant to another, in the exercise of its claim, and is the usual method followed in such cases in the American courts, where the state itself contests in legal proceed[559]*559ings the right to annul the grant. United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525; United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154; People v. Colgate, 67 N. Y. 512; 22 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. (1st. ed.) 67.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
55 A. 59, 64 N.J. Eq. 555, 19 Dickinson 555, 1903 N.J. Ch. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grey-v-morris-cummings-dredging-co-njch-1903.