Grenfell v. Lackawanna County

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA RICHARD GRENFELL, : Plaintiff, : V. 3:18-CV-1657 (JUDGE MARIANI) LACKAWANNA COUNTY, et al., : Defendants. : ORDER AND NOW, THIS 27TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2019, upon de novo review of Chief Magistrate Judge Susan Schwab’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 9), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The R&R (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED for the reasons set forth therein. 2. Defendants’ Partial Objections to the R&R (Doc. 10), which are limited to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation, Monell, and civil conspiracy claims set forth in Counts IV — VI of Plaintiffs Complaint are OVERRULED.’

' Defendants object that the “[p]laintiff's complaint fails to allege that the individual Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's allegedly protected conduct, namely, his ‘meeting with attorney Matthew Comerford.” (Doc. 10, J 3). Defendants rely on Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d. 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2012), arguing that Ambrose held that “a plaintiff must present evidence of a defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's claimed protected activity in support of a claim that such protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff.” (Defs’. Br. in Supp. of Partial Objs., Doc. 11 at 4). Ambrose, however, presents a case where, following a jury verdict for a police officer who claimed he was suspended in retaliation for his aid and/or support of a fellow officer's lawsuit against the Township, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court denial of the Township's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that “there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Ambrose’s affidavit was a substantial or motivating factor in his suspension’, as well as “no direct evidence

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count | is GRANTED and Count | of Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WIITH PREJUDICE. b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Il is GRANTED and Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend within 21 days from the date of this Order.

c. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III is GRANTED and Count Ill of Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. d. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI is DENIED. 4. This action is REMANDED to Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab for further pretrial proceedings in accordance with this Court's August 22, 2018 Order (Doc. 2).

OAS ba “+ \ Robert D. Mariani United States District Judge

that the Commissioners were aware of the affidavit when they voted to suspend him,” and further holding that “temporal proximity’ is not sufficient to establish their awareness by circumstantial evidence.” Ambrose, 303 F.3d. at 496. The present case before this Court is at the pleading stage and the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that under the /gbal-Twombly standard, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544-555 (2007), Plaintiff Grenfell has sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliation.