Greiling v. United States

93 Ct. Cl. 396, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 102, 1941 WL 4617
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 7, 1941
DocketNo. 43562
StatusPublished

This text of 93 Ct. Cl. 396 (Greiling v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greiling v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 396, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 102, 1941 WL 4617 (cc 1941).

Opinion

Littleton, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

- In the petition by which this suit was brought plaintiffs pray judgment against the defendant for $69,967.46. Their revised claim now pressed is for $49,329.44 made up of the items classified and tabulated in finding 25. Of the total amount sought to be recovered the sum of $41,056.58 (items 1, 3, 4, and 7), represents the amount which plaintiffs seek to recover because of alleged delay resulting in alleged unnecessary costs and expenses caused by the alleged failure of defendant to furnish and deliver to plaintiffs certain structural steel when requested on September 6, 1934. This amount is made up of liquidated damages of $10,858.75 de[434]*434ducted from the amount otherwise due under the contract for delay by reason of plaintiffs’1 failure to complete the contract within the time agreed upon; $19,455.95, alleged unnecessary expense for charter hire and operating costs of a barge; $10,346.88, alleged unnecessary expense in 1935 of reconditioning the crib which was to constitute the foundation for the lighthouse structure; and $395, cost of repairs tc crib. The balance of the claim, in the amount of $8,272.86, is alleged to be due under the contract for work performed thereunder. This portion of the claim is made up of items 2, 5, and 6, listed in finding 25..

With the exception of the last three items of the claim mentioned, the claim is based entirely upon the allegation and contention that the defendant breached the contract by failing to furnish structural steel when requested, thereby causing delay and damages to plaintiffs in the completion of the contract, and that, for these reasons, no amount was deductible under the liquidated damage clauses of the contract and specifications, and that defendant should compensate plaintiffs for damages resulting from alleged unnecessary costs and expenses. From the facts disclosed by the record and upon a proper interpretation of the contract between the parties and the specifications forming a part thereof, we are clearly of opinion that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any amount on or in connection with the first portion of their claim of $41,056.58 above mentioned. Plaintiffs allege and repeatedly emphasize throughout their testimony, and their requested findings and brief, that their plan of operation was to tow the crib to the site, submerge it by the use of crushed and conveyor stone, then erect the structural steel columns and framework thereon and establish within this structural framework a camp site for their force, and construct platforms therein for their materials and concreting equipment for filling the 24 outer pockets around the perimeter of the crib with concrete by the tremie process; that the inability of the defendant, because of the strike, to deliver the structural steel when requested on September 6,1934, disrupted their plan of operation, causing it to be abandoned, and that, as an alleged direct result, they were delayed in the prosecution of the work and relieved of liability for liqui[435]*435dated damages under the contract and were otherwise damaged in the total amount of $41,056.58 as hereinabove mentioned.

While plaintiffs may have intended to pursue this plan of operation, we are of opinion, first, that the contract and specifications agreed upon and entered into by the parties did not contemplate or provide that the work be carried on in this manner so as to relieve- plaintiffs of liability for liquidated damages for delay or to entitle them otherwise to recover, as damages, costs and expenses necessary to be incurred in performing the work called for by the contract; second, that the contract and ¡specifications contemplated and provided that when the crib had been submerged by the weight of the crushed and conveyor stone to be used for that purpose the 25 central pockets of the crib would be filled with crushed stone and the 24 outer pockets would be filled with concrete before installation and erection of the structural grillages, columns, and framework; third, that the contract and specifications did not specify or contemplate that the defendant would deliver the ¡structural steel on any date prior to the complete sinking of the crib in the manner last above mentioned, and the fact that plaintiffs’ contemplated plan of operation may have been temporarily disrupted did not, in view of the contract provisions and the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, relieve plaintiffs of the liquidated damages deducted for delay in completing the contract or render the defendant liable for any portion of the expenses incurred, and necessary to be incurred by plaintiffs, and sought to be recovered. If plaintiff^ suffered any delay and expense because of the steel, the cause for nondelivery was beyond the control and without the fault of defendant. In any event the defendant had a reasonable time after the steel was requested within which to deliver it at the designated point which, if plaintiffs had been entitled under the contract to demand the steel at the time they did, would have been not earlier than September 15, and if the period from that date to November 1 were excluded plaintiffs would nevertheless be liable for the full amount of liquidated damages charged and deducted. The steel was delivered early in December 1934. Fourth, [436]*436that the contract provided that no work would be required thereunder and plaintiffs would not be charged with time during the period November 1,1934, to May 1, 1935, and the evidence fails to show that if plaintiffs had received the structural steel on September 5 or 15, any of the delay of which they complained would have been avoided or that they could have erected the steel with the equipment they had, under the weather conditions obtaining, and filled the 24 outer pockets with concrete in accordance with their contemplated plan of operation without incurring the expense of which they complain, and which they seek to recover as damages; fifth, that plaintiffs’ troubles and difficulties were more directly attributable to the fact that plaintiffs were inexperienced in lighthouse construction work at such an exposed location as was the structure to be built under the contract in suit, that they started out and continued an attempt to carry on the work called for by the contract with inadequate and insufficient equipment and that, after they had received from the contracting officer on August 8, 1934, notice to proceed and speedily prosecute and carry on the work, they lost about 23 days of the most favorable and valuable time of the contract period of 75 days within which they agreed to complete the entire work at the site of the lighthouse structure as called for by the contract. Sixth; that when plaintiffs requested of the supervising engineer, who was the authorized representative of the contracting officer near the site of the work, that they be furnished the structural steel, the contracting officer did not at that time or at any other time agree that the United States was obligated under the contract to furnish the steel at that time, although the contracting officer and his representative were at all times anxious and willing to do everything they could to aid plaintiffs in advancing the work and completing the same within the shortest practicable time. Accordingly, when it was found that due to a strike which probably would not be settled in time for delivery of the structural steel during the period up to November 1, 1934, in which the contract contemplated that the work would be carried on (the contract time for the performance of the whole work as agreed upon expired on [437]

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Bluebook (online)
93 Ct. Cl. 396, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 102, 1941 WL 4617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greiling-v-united-states-cc-1941.