Gregory Russell v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 27, 2006
Docket06-05-00219-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Gregory Russell v. State (Gregory Russell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gregory Russell v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion



In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana



______________________________



No. 06-05-00219-CR



GREGORY LEE RUSSELL, Appellant



V.



THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 115th Judicial District Court

Upshur County, Texas

Trial Court No. 13,613





Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter



MEMORANDUM OPINION



Gregory Lee Russell appeals from his conviction by a jury for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of methamphetamine. The jury assessed punishment at seventy-eight years' confinement, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. (1) Russell contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because it did not show that he was the person operating the "lab" discovered in what he describes as his "former" residence--thus, no evidence that he possessed, with intent to deliver, any controlled substance.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In our review of the evidence for factual sufficiency, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the jury's verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the great weight and preponderance of the evidence is contrary to the verdict. Id.; see Watson v. State, No. PD-0469-03, 2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2040 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2006); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The evidence shows that Stephanie Smith called police because a man had been outside the house yelling for Russell. Smith was alone at the house at the time, and apparently became frightened and called police. Once in the house, the officers saw what they believed to be a methamphetamine "lab." They then called for additional officers. After all the officers arrived, Russell and Crystal Keller (Russell's girlfriend or common-law wife) drove up to the house after returning from shopping at Wal-Mart, and Russell was arrested. Officers searched the car and found several items that were described as used to make methamphetamine. Keller gave consent to search the house. Inside the house, officers found a substantial amount of methamphetamine and equipment for manufacturing the drug.

Officers described the entire house as a "lab," with vessels and containers in every room of the house. The house had a very strong and distinct chemical odor. The chemist testified that over 2,900 grams of substances containing methamphetamine were delivered to her for testing. Keller testified for the State (under full immunity) that she had been living with Russell since 1998, that they were living there on the day of the arrest, and that Russell was the only person who had anything to do with the "lab."

Keller acknowledged the methamphetamine substances were Russell's:

Q. . . . Crystal, you know what methamphetamine is, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was in the house, wasn't it?
Q. And it was Greg's.

Keller also testified that some of the bedroom doors were locked and only Greg could enter those rooms.

Keller's testimony, read as a whole, states that they were in the process of moving from the house (where they had lived for two years), that it was to be rented to another person, and that they had not lived exclusively in that house for two or two and a half weeks, although they still had personal belongings there. Keller testified that they had slept in the house for at least two nights immediately preceding the arrest, that all of their belongings were still in the house, and that they were in the process of borrowing a truck and trailer to move their property.

Russell concedes that the evidence demonstrates that a methamphetamine "lab" had been operating in the house, but denies that the evidence shows it was his. The evidence shows there was a large amount of methamphetamine in the house. It shows a "lab" was set up in the house to make methamphetamine. As pointed out by counsel, Keller testified that "we" stayed at the house two nights before the arrest, but she did not identify specifically whether she was referring to Russell or Smith. However, immediately thereafter, Keller indicated she and Russell had left the house to go to Wal-Mart just before the arrest. Keller also testified she had "no idea" whether the equipment was in the house when they began moving out two or three weeks earlier.

The issue in this case is whether the State provided sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude the contraband was possessed by Russell. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to prove that a particular person possesses contraband, we look to the evidence of the contraband itself and to all of the evidence surrounding that contraband that can be said to link the defendant to the contraband.

The "affirmative links rule" is designed to protect the innocent bystander from conviction based solely on fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs. This rule simply restates the common-sense notion that a person--such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend--may jointly possess property like a house, but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that house. Thus, the rule that "[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband." Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

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Related

Watson v. State
204 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Poindexter v. State
153 S.W.3d 402 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Lassaint v. State
79 S.W.3d 736 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Johnson v. State
23 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Gilbert v. State
874 S.W.2d 290 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Kyte v. State
944 S.W.2d 29 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
King v. State
895 S.W.2d 701 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Clewis v. State
922 S.W.2d 126 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1996)

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Gregory Russell v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gregory-russell-v-state-texapp-2006.