Gregory Price v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 12, 2023
DocketDC-0752-22-0192-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gregory Price v. Department of Defense (Gregory Price v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gregory Price v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GREGORY PRICE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-22-0192-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: December 12, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Justin Prato , Esquire, San Diego, California, for the appellant.

Stephen Coutant , Esquire, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant's petition for review and MITIGATE the penalty to a 5-day suspension. ¶2 On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in deferring to the deciding official’s penalty determination, which relied on a prior 7-day suspension, imposed by a different employing agency, that has since been

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

removed from the appellant’s record pursuant to a settlement agreement in a separate proceeding. 2 ¶3 We agree. The Board’s policy is to not consider prior discipline that has been overturned at the time of Board review. See Jones v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 7 (2009) (citing U.S. Postal Service v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001) (citing Jones v. Department of the Air Force, 24 M.S.P.R. 429, 431 (1984))); see also Norris v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 675 F.3d 1349, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that, in assessing whether the penalty was reasonable, the Board must consider new, post -removal mitigation evidence that was not available to the agency). For example, in Franklin v. Department of Justice, 71 M.S.P.R. 583 (1996), the agency had already removed the appellant when the Board issued a decision reversing his previous demotion and suspension. Id. at 587 n.1. The administrative judge in the removal appeal mitigated the penalty to a 30-day suspension, and on review, the Board found that the administrative judge had properly considered the appellant’s lack of prior discipline as a mitigating factor. Id. at 593. In Lopez v. Department of Justice, 55 M.S.P.R. 644 (1992), the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the appellant’s 30-day suspension, relying in part on the appellant’s prior disciplinary record, which at that time included a 14-day suspension. Five years later, the agency cancelled the 14-day suspension after an agency complaint officer determined that it was the result of “retaliation discrimination,” and the appellant promptly filed a petition for review. The Board found good cause for the untimely filing, granted the appellant’s petition, and reduced the 30-day suspension to 15 days based on the modified record. Id. at 646-47; see Rush v. Department of the Air Force, 69 M.S.P.R. 416 (1996) (following the initial decision sustaining the appellant’s removal, the agency complied with an

2 The appellant does not dispute the charge on review. We have considered the appellant’s contention that the agency denied him due process by allegedly relying on uncharged conduct, but we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not establish that defense. 3

arbitration decision cancelling a 2-week suspension it had relied on as an aggravating factor; the Board found good cause for the untimely filing of the appellant’s petition for review but concluded the removal penalty was still reasonable absent consideration of the cancelled prior discipline); cf. Lindo v. U.S. Postal Service, 909 F.2d 1494 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (nonprecedential) (remanding for the Board to reassess the removal penalty in light of two arbitrator decisions, issued during the pendency of the appeal, which reversed a prior 7-day suspension and reduced a prior 14-day suspension to a 7-day suspension). Accordingly, we review the agency’s penalty determination based on the modified record. 3 In this case, the agency has already indicated the maximum penalty it would have imposed had it not considered the appellant’s disciplinary record as an aggravating factor. At the hearing, the deciding official explicitly testified that he would not have removed the appellant in the absence of his prior discipline. Hearing Recording, May 12, 2022 (testimony of deciding official). He explained that under the agency’s table of penalties, removal is within the range of penalties for a second offense of Failure to Comply with Instructions, whereas a first offense warrants at most a 5-day suspension. Id.; see Initial Appeal File, Tab 6 at 112, Tab 8 at 83-84. Given the deciding official’s testimony on this point, it is unnecessary to determine the maximum reasonable penalty for the sustained misconduct. Cf. Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges, the Board may mitigate to the maximum reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated either in its final decision or during proceedings before the Board that it desires that a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer charges.”). Rather, in deference to the deciding official’s construal of the charge and his clearly expressed intent to abide by the agency’s table of penalties, we

3 We do not reach the question of whether it would have otherwise been appropriate for the deciding official to consider discipline imposed by a different employing agency. 4

mitigate the penalty to a 5-day suspension, which we find to be within the bounds of reasonableness. ¶4 We ORDER the agency to replace the removal action with a 5-day suspension. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. ¶5 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. ¶6 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. §

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