Gregory Lynn Colbert v. V. Reyes, et al.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 21, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-08542·Unknown

Opinion

GREGORY LYNN COLBERT, F70955, Case No. 25-cv-08542-SK (PR)

Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v.

V. REYES, et al., Defendant(s).

Plaintiff Gregory Lynn Colbert, a state prisoner at the California Health Care Facility (CHCF) in Stockton, California, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that on May 26, 2025, while he at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) in Soledad, California, he was “physically assaulted” by SVSP correctional sergeants D. Garcia and L. Garcia and correctional officers V. Reyes and I. Lopez “while [he] was cuffed up with his hands behind his back.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 4. Plaintiff specifically alleges that the officers “slapped me in my face and slam[med] me down to the ground and started beating me up hitting me all over my body and face . . . and kicked me in my left and right [side].” Id. at 6. Plaintiff suffered a “fractured nose and bruised ribs [and] swelling [to] both side[s] of the face.” Id. A. Standard of Review Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Legal Claims Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The latter violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See id. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations that SVSP correctional sergeants D. Garcia and L. Garcia and correctional officers V. Reyes and I. Lopez physically assaulted him by slapping and slamming him to the ground and then hitting and kicking him, while he was cuffed up with his hands behind his back, appear to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against the four named defendants and will be ordered served upon them. See id. For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, 1. The following defendant(s) shall be served: a. D. Garcia, Correctional Sergeant (SVSP); b. L. Garcia, Correctional Sergeant (SVSP); c. V. Reyes, Correctional Officer (SVSP); and d. I. Lopez, Correctional Officer (SVSP). Service on the listed defendant(s) shall proceed under the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service pilot program for civil rights cases from prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the clerk is directed to serve on CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint, this order of service, the magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form and a summons. The clerk shall serve by mail a copy of this order on the plaintiff. No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR shall provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or could not be reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver and of the notice of assignment of prisoner case to a magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form to the California Attorney General’s Office, which, within 21 days, shall file with the court a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service and, within 28 days thereafter, shall file a magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form as to the defendant(s) who waived service. Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the clerk shall prepare for each defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a USM-285 Form. The clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 form and copies of this order, summons, operative complaint and notice of assignment of prisoner case to a magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form for service upon each defendant who has not waived service. The clerk also shall provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver. 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows: a. No later than 90 days from the date of this order, defendants shall serve and file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary judgment must be supported by adequate factual documentation and must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies (where such a motion, rather than a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, is appropriate) must be accompanied by a similar notice. Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012); Woods, 684 F.3d at 935 (notice requirement set out in Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), must be served concurrently with motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies). If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment or other dispositive motion, they shall so inform the court prior to the date their motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be served promptly on plaintiff. b. Plaintiff must serve and file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the dispositive motion not more than 28 days after the motion is served and filed. c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Gregory Lynn Colbert v. V. Reyes, et al., (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Gregory Lynn Colbert v. V. Reyes, et al. (Gregory Lynn Colbert v. V. Reyes, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Donald Stratton v. Julie Buck
697 F.3d 1004 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Wyatt v. Terhune
315 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)