GREGORY GOOTEE VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-3603-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedApril 2, 2019
DocketA-2529-17T2
StatusUnpublished

This text of GREGORY GOOTEE VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-3603-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (GREGORY GOOTEE VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-3603-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GREGORY GOOTEE VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-3603-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2529-17T2

GREGORY GOOTEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF JERSEY CITY,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued January 16, 2019 – Decided April 2, 2019

Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-3603-17.

Gary J. Brascetta argued the cause for appellant (Lowenthal & Abrams, PC, attorneys; Jeffrey F. Parker, on the briefs).

Maura E. Connelly, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Peter J. Baker, Corporation Counsel, attorney; Maura E. Connelly, on the brief).

PER CURIAM In this action arising out of a trip and fall, we consider whether the Notice

of Claim (Notice) presented by plaintiff Gregory Gootee substantially complied

with the requirements of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-

1 to 59:12-3. The trial court found it did not. After reviewing the record in light

of the applicable principles of law, we are satisfied plaintiff substantially

complied with the requirements of the TCA, and we reverse.

In November 2016, plaintiff sustained injuries after tripping and falling

on "poorly repaired" pavement while walking to his car. A month later, plaintiff

served a Notice on defendant City of Jersey City. The letter stated: "[Plaintiff]

tripped and fell due to a hole in the street at approximately the 300 block of

Jersey Avenue, just [s]outh of Jersey Light Railway Station and Jersey City

Medical Center."

Six days later, on December 19, 2016, defendant, through its third party

claims administrator, sent a letter to plaintiff's counsel seeking additional

information about the claim and requesting plaintiff complete an eight page

document entitled "CLAIM FOR DAMAGE AGAINST THE CITY OF JERSEY

CITY." Plaintiff returned the completed forms on January 5, 2017.

In response to questions on defendant's form, plaintiff stated the location

of the accident occurred at the "[e]ast side of Jersey Avenue, between Jersey

A-2529-17T2 2 City Medical Center [and] Railway Station." In answer to the description of the

accident, plaintiff wrote: "[He] was walking to his car which was parked [s]outh

of Jersey Light Railway station when he tripped and fell due to poorly repaired

roadway." The form also asked plaintiff to draw a detailed diagram of the area

of the accident and "[m]ark 'X' at the exact spot of the occurrence." Plaintiff

wrote, "[t]o be provided."

On March 24, 2017, defendant's claims administrator sent plaintiff a letter

denying his claim for damages. The letter stated: "Our investigation reveals that

our insured had no prior notice of any problems or defects with the location of

loss, therefore, we must respectfully deny your claim for damages."

After plaintiff instituted suit, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint

in lieu of filing an answer, for failing to comply with the requirements of the

TCA. Although defendant confirmed investigating the allegations, it argued it

could not undertake a "proper investigation" because plaintiff failed to provide

a sufficiently detailed description of the accident's location. Plaintiff responded

that he substantially complied with the requirements of the TCA both in his

Notice and responses to defendant's personalized claim notice.

In an oral decision of December 1, 2017, the trial judge found plaintiff did

not provide a sufficient description of the accident's location to conform to the

A-2529-17T2 3 notice of claim requirements of the TCA.1 The subsequent motion for

reconsideration was denied on January 19, 2018. This appeal followed.

Although defendant presented its application as a motion in lieu of an

answer, defendant advised it was relying on "matters outside of the pleadings

provided," and therefore the court should consider the motion under the

summary judgment standard. See R. 4:6-2(e).2 We agree.

A court should grant summary judgment if the record establishes there is

"no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). We consider

the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as the non-moving party, and

make all reasonable inferences in his favor. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

Here, as before the trial judge, plaintiff argues he substantially complied

with N.J.S.A. 59:8-4 because the information he gave in the Notice and the

subsequent forms regarding the location of the incident provided defendant with

sufficient information to investigate the allegations and either resolve the claim

1 The memorializing order was dated December 4, 2017. 2 As the trial judge did not refer to either Rule 4:6-2 or Rule 4:46-1 in his determination, it is unclear which standard governed his ruling. A-2529-17T2 4 or prepare a defense. We turn then to the TCA and the notice of claim

requirements.

The TCA provides "broad but not absolute immunity for all public

entities." Jones v. Morey's Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 154 (2017) (quoting

Marcinczyk v. N.J. Police Training Comm'n, 203 N.J. 586, 597 (2010)). The

TCA is intended "to bring uniformity to the law in this State with respect to

sovereign immunity to tort claims enjoyed by public entities." Ibid. (quoting

Tryanowski v. Lodi Bd. of Educ., 274 N.J. Super. 265, 268 (Law Div. 1994)).

The TCA's "guiding principle" is that "immunity from tort liability is the general

rule and liability is the exception." Ibid. (quoting Coyne v. Dep't of Transp.,

182 N.J. 481, 488 (2005)).

"The Act bars civil actions against public entities unless certain

procedures are strictly followed." Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. Super. 204, 213

(App. Div. 2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8-3). A claimant may not bring suit against

a public entity unless the claimant presents the public entity a Notice within

ninety days after the cause of action accrues. N.J.S.A. 59:8-7; N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.

The Notice must provide certain specified information, including the "date,

place and other circumstances of the occurrence . . . which gave rise to the claim

asserted" and a "general description of the injury, damage or loss incurred so far

A-2529-17T2 5 as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim." N.J.S.A. 59:8-4;

see also D.D. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130, 159 (2013).

A public entity may request more information from the claimant through a

personalized notice form. N.J.S.A. 59:8-6.

The notice requirements, however, are "not intended as 'a trap for the

unwary.'" Lebron, 407 N.J. Super. at 215 (quoting Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J.

606, 629 (1999)). The Supreme Court has recognized the notice requirements

are "more properly denominated as a notice of injury or loss." Beauchamp v.

Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 121 (2000). Therefore, "substantial rather than strict

compliance with the notice requirements of the Act may satisfactorily meet the

statute's mandates." Lebron, 407 N.J. Super.

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Lebron v. Sanchez
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GREGORY GOOTEE VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY (L-3603-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gregory-gootee-vs-city-of-jersey-city-l-3603-17-hudson-county-and-njsuperctappdiv-2019.