Gregory Franklin v. L. Scribner

471 F. App'x 803

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 15, 2012
• Docket: 10-56657
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Gregory Allen Franklin, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with the denial of outdoor exercise and special shoes for his foot condition when he was required to leave his cell during a cell search. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Franklin’s outdoor exercise claim because Franklin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants acted with deliberate indifference when they temporarily restricted access to outdoor exercise during an emergency lockdown. See Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1980) (temporary deprivation of outdoor exercise in response to a genuine emergency did not violate Eighth Amendment); see also Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (9th Cir.2011) (explaining that it is not clearly established “precisely how, according to the Constitution, or when a prison facility housing problem inmates must return to normal operations, including outside exercise, during and after a state of emergency called in response to a major riot, here one in which inmates attempted to murder staff’); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (9th Cir.2010) (prison officials entitled to qualified immunity on denial of outdoor exercise claim because a reasonable officer could have believed that restricting outdoor exercise during prison security lockdown was constitutional).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Franklin’s special shoe claim because Franklin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Bass acted with deliberate indifference when he sought clarification on the soft sole shoe ban and was specifically ordered to enforce the ban despite Franklin’s medical authorization to wear soft sole shoes. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 844-45, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (explaining the subjective prong of deliberate indifference and noting that even if a prison official knew of a substantial risk, he is not liable if he responded reasonably to the risk).

Franklin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

*** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).