AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 5, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00831-CV
GREGORY EUGENE NORMAN, Appellant V. BRITTNEY LASHEA NORMAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1-22-1285
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Reichek Pro se appellant Gregory Eugene Norman appeals an agreed decree of divorce.
In two issues, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the
trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community property. We affirm.
Background
Appellant (Husband) and Brittney LaShea Norman (Wife) married in March
2019. Husband filed for divorce in October 2022, and Wife filed a counterpetition.
The case was set for trial before the court on March 15, 2023. On March 9, Wife
filed a pro se motion for continuance, stating she needed time to pay her attorney and prepare her case. At trial on March 15, Husband was represented by counsel.
Wife did not have an attorney.
Husband testified the parties reached an informal settlement agreement
regarding the community property and he was going to read the terms into the record.
During his testimony about the agreement, Husband told the judge he wanted a trial.
At that point, the judge granted Wife’s request for a continuance and told her to get
an attorney. Husband indicated he settled with Wife to avoid a continuance. She
was still living with him in his separate property house. Husband wanted to go
forward with the “deal,” which required her to move out in three days.
After a break to make sure “everyone [was] on the same page,” Husband
continued to testify about the parties’ agreement. Husband agreed to borrow against
the equity in his house to pay Wife $97,000 within 45 days. The sum would be
secured by an owelty lien until paid. Husband would keep 100% of his retirement
account, which had grown by over $100,000 during the marriage, and an IRA. A car
the parties purchased during the marriage would be awarded to Wife, and she would
be responsible for the remaining debt on the car. In addition, Husband would pay
Wife $4,000 by 5:00 p.m. that day (March 15), and she would vacate his house on
March 18. Each party would keep their personal property.
Husband said he wanted to go forward with the agreement rather than wait for
a trial and incur additional attorney’s fees. Husband did not believe the agreement
was a just and right division of the marital estate, but he entered into it to resolve the
–2– divorce that day. The judge informed Husband that he was “absolutely entitled to a
trial” and that his “back [was] not up against the wall” because he had other choices.
Husband asked the court to approve the agreement.
On questions from Husband’s counsel, Wife confirmed the terms of the
parties’ agreement and asked the court to grant the divorce.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court orally approved the parties’
agreement and stated the divorce would be granted when he signed the final decree.
He asked Husband’s counsel to put the agreement into writing and submit it to the
court.
In the time between the trial and the signing of a judgment, Husband’s counsel
moved to withdraw and the trial court granted the motion. Also, Husband wrote to
the judge asking for a different division of the community property. Then, on June
22, 2023, Husband filed a motion for new trial asking the trial judge to set aside the
judgment due to duress. He asserted Wife made false accusations against him on the
morning of trial and threatened him with felony assault charges if she did not get her
desired outcome.
Four months after trial, on July 21, 2023, the trial court signed the final decree
of divorce. The decree recites the trial court found that to resolve all divorce issues
on March 15, 2023, without further delay or expense, the parties entered into a final
agreement that was read into the record, agreed to by the parties, and approved by
the court. The court granted the divorce and divided the community estate in
–3– accordance with the parties’ agreement. Husband’s motion for new trial was
overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.1
Applicable Law
To promote amicable settlement of disputes in a suit for divorce, the spouses
may enter into a written agreement concerning the division of the property and the
liabilities of the spouses. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(a). The agreement may be
revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce unless the agreement is binding
under another rule of law. Id.; see Pohla v. Pohla, No. 09-09-00023-CV, 2010 WL
877555, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the
trial court finds that the terms of the written agreement are just and right, those terms
are binding on the court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(b). If the court approves the
agreement, the court may set forth the agreement in full or incorporate the agreement
by reference in the final decree. Id. An oral agreement that is read into the record
in open court satisfies the family code’s requirement of a written agreement.
McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (discussing section 3.631, the predecessor to section 7.006); Zavala v.
Zavala, No. 14-06-0081-CV, 2007 WL 1558732, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] May 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). A marital property settlement agreement
1 This Court dismissed a previous appeal for want for jurisdiction because Husband filed a notice of appeal before the judgment was signed. Norman v. Norman, No. 05-23-00345-CV, 2023 WL 4101433 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). –4– incorporated into a final divorce decree is governed by the law of contracts.
McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984).
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). It would be inappropriate for an appellate court to
attempt to redraft and articulate what it believes an appellant intended to raise as
error on appeal. Berardinelli v. Pickels, No. 05-12-01390-CV, 2014 WL 6560029,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). We are not required to
make arguments for pro se litigants. $4,310 in U.S. Currency v. State, 133 S.W.3d
828, 829 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).
In addition, the appellate record consists of the clerk’s record and, if necessary
to the appeal, the reporter’s record. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1. Husband’s brief contains
a great deal of information that is outside the record. Attached to the brief is an
appendix that contains items, such as text messages and photographs, which were
not offered or admitted into evidence at trial. Husband often cites to the appendix
as support for statements in the body of his brief. This Court cannot consider
documents in an appendix that are not formally included in the record on appeal.
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AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 5, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00831-CV
GREGORY EUGENE NORMAN, Appellant V. BRITTNEY LASHEA NORMAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1-22-1285
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Reichek Pro se appellant Gregory Eugene Norman appeals an agreed decree of divorce.
In two issues, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the
trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community property. We affirm.
Background
Appellant (Husband) and Brittney LaShea Norman (Wife) married in March
2019. Husband filed for divorce in October 2022, and Wife filed a counterpetition.
The case was set for trial before the court on March 15, 2023. On March 9, Wife
filed a pro se motion for continuance, stating she needed time to pay her attorney and prepare her case. At trial on March 15, Husband was represented by counsel.
Wife did not have an attorney.
Husband testified the parties reached an informal settlement agreement
regarding the community property and he was going to read the terms into the record.
During his testimony about the agreement, Husband told the judge he wanted a trial.
At that point, the judge granted Wife’s request for a continuance and told her to get
an attorney. Husband indicated he settled with Wife to avoid a continuance. She
was still living with him in his separate property house. Husband wanted to go
forward with the “deal,” which required her to move out in three days.
After a break to make sure “everyone [was] on the same page,” Husband
continued to testify about the parties’ agreement. Husband agreed to borrow against
the equity in his house to pay Wife $97,000 within 45 days. The sum would be
secured by an owelty lien until paid. Husband would keep 100% of his retirement
account, which had grown by over $100,000 during the marriage, and an IRA. A car
the parties purchased during the marriage would be awarded to Wife, and she would
be responsible for the remaining debt on the car. In addition, Husband would pay
Wife $4,000 by 5:00 p.m. that day (March 15), and she would vacate his house on
March 18. Each party would keep their personal property.
Husband said he wanted to go forward with the agreement rather than wait for
a trial and incur additional attorney’s fees. Husband did not believe the agreement
was a just and right division of the marital estate, but he entered into it to resolve the
–2– divorce that day. The judge informed Husband that he was “absolutely entitled to a
trial” and that his “back [was] not up against the wall” because he had other choices.
Husband asked the court to approve the agreement.
On questions from Husband’s counsel, Wife confirmed the terms of the
parties’ agreement and asked the court to grant the divorce.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court orally approved the parties’
agreement and stated the divorce would be granted when he signed the final decree.
He asked Husband’s counsel to put the agreement into writing and submit it to the
court.
In the time between the trial and the signing of a judgment, Husband’s counsel
moved to withdraw and the trial court granted the motion. Also, Husband wrote to
the judge asking for a different division of the community property. Then, on June
22, 2023, Husband filed a motion for new trial asking the trial judge to set aside the
judgment due to duress. He asserted Wife made false accusations against him on the
morning of trial and threatened him with felony assault charges if she did not get her
desired outcome.
Four months after trial, on July 21, 2023, the trial court signed the final decree
of divorce. The decree recites the trial court found that to resolve all divorce issues
on March 15, 2023, without further delay or expense, the parties entered into a final
agreement that was read into the record, agreed to by the parties, and approved by
the court. The court granted the divorce and divided the community estate in
–3– accordance with the parties’ agreement. Husband’s motion for new trial was
overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.1
Applicable Law
To promote amicable settlement of disputes in a suit for divorce, the spouses
may enter into a written agreement concerning the division of the property and the
liabilities of the spouses. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(a). The agreement may be
revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce unless the agreement is binding
under another rule of law. Id.; see Pohla v. Pohla, No. 09-09-00023-CV, 2010 WL
877555, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the
trial court finds that the terms of the written agreement are just and right, those terms
are binding on the court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006(b). If the court approves the
agreement, the court may set forth the agreement in full or incorporate the agreement
by reference in the final decree. Id. An oral agreement that is read into the record
in open court satisfies the family code’s requirement of a written agreement.
McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (discussing section 3.631, the predecessor to section 7.006); Zavala v.
Zavala, No. 14-06-0081-CV, 2007 WL 1558732, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] May 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). A marital property settlement agreement
1 This Court dismissed a previous appeal for want for jurisdiction because Husband filed a notice of appeal before the judgment was signed. Norman v. Norman, No. 05-23-00345-CV, 2023 WL 4101433 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). –4– incorporated into a final divorce decree is governed by the law of contracts.
McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984).
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). It would be inappropriate for an appellate court to
attempt to redraft and articulate what it believes an appellant intended to raise as
error on appeal. Berardinelli v. Pickels, No. 05-12-01390-CV, 2014 WL 6560029,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). We are not required to
make arguments for pro se litigants. $4,310 in U.S. Currency v. State, 133 S.W.3d
828, 829 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.).
In addition, the appellate record consists of the clerk’s record and, if necessary
to the appeal, the reporter’s record. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1. Husband’s brief contains
a great deal of information that is outside the record. Attached to the brief is an
appendix that contains items, such as text messages and photographs, which were
not offered or admitted into evidence at trial. Husband often cites to the appendix
as support for statements in the body of his brief. This Court cannot consider
documents in an appendix that are not formally included in the record on appeal.
Burke v. Ins. Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,
pet. denied).
–5– Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his first issue, Husband contends he received ineffective assistance of
counsel from the attorney who represented him at trial. As a general rule, the
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel does not extend to civil cases. In re
Marriage of Johnson, No. 05-20-00517-CV, 2022 WL 123106, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). While there are exceptions, divorce
proceedings are not one of them. Id. at *6 n.8. We overrule Husband’s first issue.
Division of the Community Estate
In his second issue, Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in
dividing the community property. He argues Wife got a disproportionate share, the
value of which exceeded the value of the community estate. He also asserts it was
unjust and unreasonable to require him to obtain a loan against his separate property
to generate cash to pay her.
In making his argument, Husband does not address the fact that the trial court
did not determine how to divide the community estate or determine that he should
take out a loan to pay Wife. The trial court rendered judgment on terms contained
in the parties’ settlement agreement as read into the record at the prove-up hearing.
Husband does not contend the property division in the divorce decree differs from
the settlement agreement. See Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006)
(consent judgment must be in strict compliance with terms of settlement agreement);
Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
–6– pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Although Husband’s motion for new trial alleged he was under
duress when he consented to the settlement agreement, he does not raise an issue
about the trial court’s failure to grant his motion. See Boufaissal v. Boufaissal, 251
S.W.3d 160, 162 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Nor does he make any
argument about repudiation of the settlement agreement. See Swaab, 282 S.W.3d at
529. His argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in awarding a
disproportionate share of the community estate to Wife and in requiring him to
obtain a loan. Because the trial court did not determine the terms of the parties’
marital property settlement agreement, the issue Husband presents is not a valid
basis for reversal of the agreed decree. See Suday v. Suday, No. 04-19-00832-CV,
2020 WL 6928447, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (complaint about trial court’s failure to divide certain property failed where
parties reached agreement about property division and court did not divide property
at all). We overrule Husband’s second issue.
Finally, Husband asks this Court to sanction Wife for perjury. He contends
she made false statements in her motion for continuance and during trial about her
financial status and legal representation that affected the court’s willingness to grant
a continuance. Husband has not cited any law for the proposition that an appellate
court has authority to impose sanctions for perjury in the trial court. Further, there
is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Wife committed perjury. To show the
–7– falsity of Wife’s statements, Husband cites to documents in his appendix that are
outside the record. We deny his request for sanctions.
We affirm the final decree of divorce.
/Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK 230831F.P05 JUSTICE
–8– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GREGORY EUGENE NORMAN, On Appeal from the 382nd Judicial Appellant District Court, Rockwall County, Texas No. 05-23-00831-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 1-22-1285. Opinion delivered by Justice BRITTNEY LASHEA NORMAN, Reichek. Justices Goldstein and Appellee Garcia participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee BRITTNEY LASHEA NORMAN recover her costs of this appeal from appellant GREGORY EUGENE NORMAN.
Judgment entered this 5th day of June 2024.
–9–