IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0310 Filed June 18, 2025
GREGORY EARL JORDAN, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Melissa Anderson-Seeber, Judge.
Gregory Jordan appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
James S. Blackburn, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and
Badding, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Gregory Jordan appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR) following his 2011 convictions for possession with
intent to deliver (cocaine), failure to affix a drug tax stamp, disarming a police
officer, and interference with official acts. Jordan claims his trial counsel was
ineffective by “fail[ing] to call a material witness requested by Jordan” and “fail[ing]
to subpoena a mental health professional with sufficient time for the mental health
professional to prepare and effectively testify.” Because Jordan did not establish
prejudice, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In the ruling affirming Jordan’s convictions on direct appeal, our court set
forth the facts and procedural history below:
Gregory Jordan was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine base) with intent to deliver, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, disarming a peace officer, and interference with official acts causing bodily injury. . . . Jordan filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his pocket. After a hearing, the district court determined a Waterloo police officer had obtained Jordan’s consent to conduct a pat-down search. During the pat-down search the officer felt a hard lump in Jordan’s jacket pocket, which the officer believed was a rock of crack cocaine. The officer attempted to arrest Jordan for public intoxication, but Jordan fled the scene. Officers quickly apprehended Jordan and arrested him. In a search incident to arrest, the officers found a large rock of crack cocaine in Jordan’s pocket. The court denied the motion to suppress. .... . . . When he was arrested Jordan had 2.07 grams of crack cocaine, $210 in cash, a cell phone, and notebooks with names and numbers of people involved in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. Officer Matthew McGeogh testified the crack cocaine could have been broken down into about twenty dosage units, and was “a large, very, very large rock for someone to buy it to ingest.” Officer McGeogh testified, “You never see anyone that’s a crack user to 3
have this much on them.” He noted Jordan did not have a crack pipe, or any other means to ingest crack cocaine, on him. Officer Adam Galbraith testified the rock of 2.07 grams of crack cocaine could have been split into between twenty to forty dosage units. He also testified the size of the rock of crack cocaine was not consistent with personal use.
State v. Jordan, No. 12-0212, 2014 WL 3749335, at *1, *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 30,
2014). This court rejected Jordan’s challenges to the court’s suppression ruling,
the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-trial
violation, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. See id.
at *2–3.
Jordan filed a PCR application, raising various claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 Following the PCR trial, at which only Jordan testified, the
district court denied the application. Jordan appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of errors at law.” Brooks v.
State, 975 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “However, when the applicant
asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo.” Ledezma v. State,
626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). Accordingly, “we review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo.” Id.
III. Discussion
Jordan raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on appeal. First,
he challenges his trial counsel’s failure to call witness David Ford, Jordan’s cousin,
to testify at trial. According to Jordan, “[a]n issue of importance in the trial was
1 Although Jordan’s PCR application alleged claims under two separate criminal
cases, his claims before the PCR court and on appeal relate only to this case. 4
whether Jordan possessed the drugs as a drug user or whether, as charged,
Jordan possessed the drugs to sell or distribute them.” Jordan claims he went to
Ford’s house and “was smoking” before his confrontation with police that led to his
arrest. Jordan argued that Ford “would have testified that Jordan had been using
drugs in his presence the day of his arrest and Ford would say that Jordan was a
drug user and not a drug seller as the [S]tate charged.” Jordan acknowledged trial
counsel used another witness, Laquita Bass, to testify that she observed Jordan
smoking crack cocaine that day, but Jordan believed Ford would be a more
credible witness because “he was a veteran,” while Bass was in prison at the time
of trial.
Jordan also claims his trial counsel was ineffective by subpoenaing his
mental-health counselor, Helen Kemp, one day before trial. Kemp was to provide
testimony to support Jordan’s diminished-responsibility defense. Jordan claims
Kemp “was unprepared to testify” because she “did not have the opportunity to
review her file prior to trial.” Yet Jordan acknowledged Kemp “was familiar with
me. She knew that I was the type of person that if I presented a story, I wouldn’t
be lying or anything like that, that she could contribute to that fact because she’s
known me.” He also agreed Kemp testified “about some of the mental issues” he
had.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Jordan must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and (2) if
counsel had acted differently, there would have been a reasonable probability of a
different outcome at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694
(1984). “If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without 5
deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at
142. In other words, can Jordan prove that, had Ford testified and Kemp been
subpoenaed earlier, there would be a reasonable probability of a different outcome
below? See Uranga v. State, No. 24-0196, 2025 WL 1324125, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 7, 2025).
Preliminarily, we observe Jordan does not address the prejudice prong of
Strickland in his appellate brief. Moreover, he presented no evidence to the PCR
court, aside from his own testimony, to support his claims. On this record, we
could summarily reject his claims. See Johnson v. State, No. 24-0190, 2025 WL
855675, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). That said, assuming without deciding
that his claims are properly before us, we elect to briefly consider them.
Jordan agreed his criminal defense had “two strategies”: “one was that the
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0310 Filed June 18, 2025
GREGORY EARL JORDAN, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Melissa Anderson-Seeber, Judge.
Gregory Jordan appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
James S. Blackburn, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and
Badding, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Gregory Jordan appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR) following his 2011 convictions for possession with
intent to deliver (cocaine), failure to affix a drug tax stamp, disarming a police
officer, and interference with official acts. Jordan claims his trial counsel was
ineffective by “fail[ing] to call a material witness requested by Jordan” and “fail[ing]
to subpoena a mental health professional with sufficient time for the mental health
professional to prepare and effectively testify.” Because Jordan did not establish
prejudice, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In the ruling affirming Jordan’s convictions on direct appeal, our court set
forth the facts and procedural history below:
Gregory Jordan was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine base) with intent to deliver, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, disarming a peace officer, and interference with official acts causing bodily injury. . . . Jordan filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his pocket. After a hearing, the district court determined a Waterloo police officer had obtained Jordan’s consent to conduct a pat-down search. During the pat-down search the officer felt a hard lump in Jordan’s jacket pocket, which the officer believed was a rock of crack cocaine. The officer attempted to arrest Jordan for public intoxication, but Jordan fled the scene. Officers quickly apprehended Jordan and arrested him. In a search incident to arrest, the officers found a large rock of crack cocaine in Jordan’s pocket. The court denied the motion to suppress. .... . . . When he was arrested Jordan had 2.07 grams of crack cocaine, $210 in cash, a cell phone, and notebooks with names and numbers of people involved in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. Officer Matthew McGeogh testified the crack cocaine could have been broken down into about twenty dosage units, and was “a large, very, very large rock for someone to buy it to ingest.” Officer McGeogh testified, “You never see anyone that’s a crack user to 3
have this much on them.” He noted Jordan did not have a crack pipe, or any other means to ingest crack cocaine, on him. Officer Adam Galbraith testified the rock of 2.07 grams of crack cocaine could have been split into between twenty to forty dosage units. He also testified the size of the rock of crack cocaine was not consistent with personal use.
State v. Jordan, No. 12-0212, 2014 WL 3749335, at *1, *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 30,
2014). This court rejected Jordan’s challenges to the court’s suppression ruling,
the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy-trial
violation, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. See id.
at *2–3.
Jordan filed a PCR application, raising various claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 Following the PCR trial, at which only Jordan testified, the
district court denied the application. Jordan appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of errors at law.” Brooks v.
State, 975 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “However, when the applicant
asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo.” Ledezma v. State,
626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). Accordingly, “we review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo.” Id.
III. Discussion
Jordan raises two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on appeal. First,
he challenges his trial counsel’s failure to call witness David Ford, Jordan’s cousin,
to testify at trial. According to Jordan, “[a]n issue of importance in the trial was
1 Although Jordan’s PCR application alleged claims under two separate criminal
cases, his claims before the PCR court and on appeal relate only to this case. 4
whether Jordan possessed the drugs as a drug user or whether, as charged,
Jordan possessed the drugs to sell or distribute them.” Jordan claims he went to
Ford’s house and “was smoking” before his confrontation with police that led to his
arrest. Jordan argued that Ford “would have testified that Jordan had been using
drugs in his presence the day of his arrest and Ford would say that Jordan was a
drug user and not a drug seller as the [S]tate charged.” Jordan acknowledged trial
counsel used another witness, Laquita Bass, to testify that she observed Jordan
smoking crack cocaine that day, but Jordan believed Ford would be a more
credible witness because “he was a veteran,” while Bass was in prison at the time
of trial.
Jordan also claims his trial counsel was ineffective by subpoenaing his
mental-health counselor, Helen Kemp, one day before trial. Kemp was to provide
testimony to support Jordan’s diminished-responsibility defense. Jordan claims
Kemp “was unprepared to testify” because she “did not have the opportunity to
review her file prior to trial.” Yet Jordan acknowledged Kemp “was familiar with
me. She knew that I was the type of person that if I presented a story, I wouldn’t
be lying or anything like that, that she could contribute to that fact because she’s
known me.” He also agreed Kemp testified “about some of the mental issues” he
had.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Jordan must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and (2) if
counsel had acted differently, there would have been a reasonable probability of a
different outcome at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694
(1984). “If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without 5
deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at
142. In other words, can Jordan prove that, had Ford testified and Kemp been
subpoenaed earlier, there would be a reasonable probability of a different outcome
below? See Uranga v. State, No. 24-0196, 2025 WL 1324125, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 7, 2025).
Preliminarily, we observe Jordan does not address the prejudice prong of
Strickland in his appellate brief. Moreover, he presented no evidence to the PCR
court, aside from his own testimony, to support his claims. On this record, we
could summarily reject his claims. See Johnson v. State, No. 24-0190, 2025 WL
855675, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025). That said, assuming without deciding
that his claims are properly before us, we elect to briefly consider them.
Jordan agreed his criminal defense had “two strategies”: “one was that the
crack cocaine was for [his] personal use, and, two, a diminished responsibility
defense.” Relating to the first, Jordan did not dispute that at the time of his arrest,
along with 2.07 grams of cocaine, he “had notebooks with addresses and phone
numbers on his person” and a cell phone, but he “didn’t have any methods for
injection of crack cocaine.” He also agreed that “[h]aving Mr. Ford testify would
have been a second individual saying kind of the same thing that Ms. Bass already
had said.”
Relating to the second, the PCR court found that defense counsel “did
present a mental health defense for the jury to consider.” The court noted, “[I]n
[Kemp’s] testimony, the jury was told that Jordan did suffer from mental health
disorders and was eligible to be part of a specialty dual-diagnosis mental health
program with the Department of Correctional Services. Kemp also testified that 6
Jordan had been in mental health treatment for a long time.” And Jordan agreed
the jury was provided an instruction on diminished responsibility.
Under these facts and circumstances, we find any alleged deficiency by
counsel did not affect the outcome of trial. Accordingly, Jordan’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims fail. We affirm the court’s denial of his PCR
application.
AFFIRMED.