Gregory Conley v. City of Dallas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 19, 2020
Docket05-19-01471-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Gregory Conley v. City of Dallas (Gregory Conley v. City of Dallas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gregory Conley v. City of Dallas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

DISMISS and Opinion Filed March 19, 2020

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01471-CV

GREGORY CONLEY, Appellant V. CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-17139

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Molberg, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Carlyle The underlying suit in this appeal was filed by the City of Dallas against New

Start Foundation of Dallas, Inc. for alleged city and fire code violations on certain

real property owned by New Start. The trial court appointed a receiver over the

property and subsequently authorized the receiver to proceed with a contract for the

sale of the property. By this appeal, George Conley challenges the order authorizing

the receiver to proceed with the sale.

Because Mr. Conley was not a party to the trial court proceedings and did not

appear aggrieved by the order, we questioned his standing to appeal and requested jurisdictional briefing.1 See In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 723

(Tex. 2006) (“Generally, only parties of record may appeal a trial court’s

judgment.”); McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. 2001)

(“[S]tanding requires that the controversy adversely affect the party seeking

review.”); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.

1993) (“Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

In his letter brief, Mr. Conley asserts “his interest is adversely affected” by

the order, asks this court to “readdress” the trial proceedings, and, citing the

“Original Proceedings” section of the appellate rules, claims to be a “real party in

interest.” Later, Mr. Conley requests relief as “appellant” and “appellant – relator.”

Mr. Conley does not state how he has any interest that is affected and nothing in the

record supports an assertion that he does.

He suggests he possesses third-party standing, which the law defines as

standing “to recover under a contract that is clearly intended for their direct benefit.”

See Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). In support, Mr.

Conley articulates a definition of a different concept, incorrectly stating that third-

party standing is “Standing held by someone claiming to protect the rights of other

[to include one’s self by virtue of equity for interest base on principle investment].”

1 We also questioned whether the order was appealable. See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 & n.13 (Tex. 1992) (appeal may be taken from final judgment disposing of all issues and parties or interlocutory orders authorized by rule or statute). The parties do not address whether the order is appealable in their letter briefs. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction based on Conley’s lack of standing, we decline to address the issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. –2– He follows this incorrect statement with “Specific Detail,” which includes basic

details about the bankruptcy of New Start’s registered agent, a person who also

appears to have intervened pro se in the trial court. Mr. Conley has failed to articulate

a basis for third-party standing. See Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 589.

Our jurisdiction, appellate or original, must be invoked by a party with

standing. See Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 443; In re Baker, 404 S.W.3d 575,

577 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding). Because Mr. Conley

lacks standing, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(a).

/Cory L. Carlyle/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE

191471F.P05

–3– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

GREGORY CONLEY, Appellant On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-19-01471-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-17139. Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle, CITY OF DALLAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Molberg participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.

We ORDER that appellee City of Dallas recover its costs, if any, of this appeal from appellant Gregory Conley.

Judgment entered this day of March 19, 2020.

–4–

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Related

In Re Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
184 S.W.3d 718 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board
852 S.W.2d 440 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
McAllen Medical Center, Inc. v. Cortez
66 S.W.3d 227 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Stine v. Stewart
80 S.W.3d 586 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps
842 S.W.2d 266 (Texas Supreme Court, 1992)
in Re James A. Baker
404 S.W.3d 575 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)

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