Gregory Brown v. Cheryl Strange

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 20, 2026
• Docket: 23-35145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY TYREE BROWN, No. 23-35145

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:22-cv-05094-TOR

v. MEMORANDUM* CHERYL STRANGE, Secretary of Corrections; STEPHEN SINCLAIR, in their individual and official capacities; SCOTT J. RUSSEL, Deputy Secretary of Corrections; JEFFREY A. UTTECHT, Warden, in their individual and official capacities; SCOTT SVOBODA, in their individual and official capacities; KEVIN WALKER, in their individual and official capacities; L W ADAMS, in their individual and official capacities; DANIELLE OYEN, in their individual and official capacities; JENER COELR, in their individual and official capacities; DONALD HOLBROOK, in their individual and official capacities; RONALD FREDRICK, in their individual and official capacities; DALE CALDWELL, in their individual and official capacities; R RIVERA, in their individual and official capacities; JAMES ROGERS, in their individual and official capacities; CAROLINE ROOP, in their individual and official capacities; CINDY DAVENPORT, in their individual and official capacities;

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. DAVE WILLIAMS, in their individual and official capacities; ROMERO, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; HUIST, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; SLUSSER, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; McCARTHY, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; DUVALL, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; YEATER, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; TUNGENARD, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; MITCHELL, Corrections Officer, in their individual and official capacities; PIERCE, LTI,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before: CALLAHAN, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Gregory Tyree Brown appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

constitutional claims arising from the confiscation of personal property in prison.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 23-35145 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

To the extent Brown alleged a due process claim challenging the disciplinary

action taken against him, the district court properly dismissed Brown’s claim

because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was deprived of a

protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)

(explaining that a prisoner has no protected liberty interest unless the sanction

imposed extends the length of his sentence or imposes an “atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).

To the extent that Brown alleged constitutional claims challenging

defendants’ failures to process his grievances, the district court properly dismissed

Brown’s claims because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a

specific grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.

2003).

Dismissal of Brown’s First Amendment claims and remaining Fourteenth

Amendment due process claims was premature because the allegations that Brown

was deprived of noncontraband property in connection with unconstitutional prison

policies, liberally construed, are “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file

3 23-35145 an answer.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1116; see also Prison Legal News v. Ryan, 39

F.4th 1121, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting forth standard for analyzing First

Amendment restrictions in the prison context); Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053,

1057-58 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard for analyzing due process claims for

deprivation of property, including whether a predeprivation hearing is required,

and explaining that “where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing

before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a

postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). We reverse the judgment in part and remand for further

proceedings on these claims only.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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