Gregorio Mendoza Cervantes v. William Barr
This text of Gregorio Mendoza Cervantes v. William Barr (Gregorio Mendoza Cervantes v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 30 2019 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORIO MENDOZA CERVANTES; No. 16-71678 TERESA BIRRUETA VALLADARES; ANGEL GABRIEL MENDOZA Agency Nos. A202-153-716 BIRRUETA, A202-153-717 A202-153-718 Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 10, 2019 Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER, CALLAHAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
decision dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision for lack
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. of jurisdiction. Petitioners appealed the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to reopen
expedited removal proceedings. We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
“We determine our own jurisdiction de novo.” Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452,
455 (9th Cir. 2016). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) and our decision in
Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452 (9th Cir. 2016), we generally lack jurisdiction to
review direct challenges to credible fear determinations in expedited removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Petitioners fail to provide us with a
sufficient basis for statutory jurisdiction to review BIA’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction of an appeal of a motion to reopen. See Pena, 815 F.3d 452; Sarmadi
v. INS, 121 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1997). (We do have jurisdiction to review “a
colorable constitutional claim,” see Pena, 815 F.3d at 456, but Petitioners do not
raise a colorable constitutional claim here.) Although short, the IJ’s decision
stating that “[a] full fair hearing was conducted” adequately explained the IJ’s
reasoning and addressed Petitioners’ arguments that a new hearing was needed to
allow Birrueta to testify and to allow Mendoza and Birrueta to present additional
evidence. See also Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2018)
(noting that in “[i]n expedited proceedings (such as [the related reasonable fear
proceedings]), IJs do not have the ability nor are they required to provide detailed
decisions outlining all the claims raised by the [applicant].”). Because Petitioners
2 fail to provide us with a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, we dismiss the petition.1
In so holding, we do not address whether Petitioners can bring a habeas petition
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2019).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
1 We note that the BIA fails to adequately explain why the BIA lacks jurisdiction. An appeal from an IJ’s denial of a motion to reopen differs from a direct appeal of an IJ’s negative credible fear finding.
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