Gregg v. Commonwealth
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider whether a specific type of criminal record may be expunged under Code § 19.2-392.2. Here, disposition of a drug charge was in accordance with a statute that permitted the court, upon a first oifender’s plea of guilty, to refrain from entering a judgment of guilt, to place the accused on probation, and ultimately to discharge the person and dismiss the proceeding against him.
In June of 1975, Watson W. Gregg was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in violation of former Code § 54-524.101:2. At the September 1975 trial in the General District Court of Northumberland County, defendant pled guilty and was placed on probation pursuant to former Code § 54-524.101:3. 1 Thereafter, the charge was dismissed in March of 1976, the judge noting on the warrant: “Dismissed on first offense. . . .”
*506 In June of 1983, Gregg initiated the present proceeding in the Circuit Court of Northumberland County. Relying on Code § 19.2-392.2 (hereinafter, the expungement statute), 2 he petitioned the court to expunge the police and court records relevant to the prior charge. The Commonwealth opposed Gregg’s request.
After a hearing, the trial court ruled against Gregg and dismissed the petition. The court decided that the former charge “is not a proper charge to be expunged. . . We conclude the trial court was correct.
*507 “The purpose for which a statute is enacted is of primary importance in its interpretation or construction.” Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 364, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952). The several statutes dealing with expungement of criminal records are codified in Chapter 23.1 of Title 19.2. The first statute of the chapter, Code § 19.2-392.1, contains the following statement of policy: “The General Assembly finds that arrest records can be a hindrance to an innocent citizen’s ability to obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit. This chapter is intended to protect the innocent persons who are arrested from unwarranted damage which may occur as a result of being arrested.”
Gregg argues that because the charge against him was “dismissed” under the first offender statute, he qualifies as one who was “otherwise dismissed” under subparagraph (A)(2) of the ex-pungement statute. Moreover, Gregg says, he is to be considered legally “innocent” within the meaning of the statutory policy statement because the charge against him was dismissed. Thus, he contends, the trial court erred in deciding he is not a member of the class of persons protected by the expungement statute. We disagree.
The expungement statute applies to innocent persons, not to those who are guilty. Under the first offender statute, probation and ultimate dismissal is conditioned on a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt. In the present case, the accused pled guilty. One who is “guilty” cannot occupy the status of “innocent” so as to qualify under the expungement statute as a person whose charge has been “otherwise dismissed.”
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be
Affirmed.
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316 S.E.2d 741 (Gregg v. Commonwealth) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.