Greer v. Stitt

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 10, 2020
Docket6:20-cv-00221
StatusUnknown

This text of Greer v. Stitt (Greer v. Stitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greer v. Stitt, (E.D. Okla. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TRAVIS LEMARR GREER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 20-221-JFH-SPS ) KEVIN STITT and SCOTT CROW, ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Travis L. Greer (“Plaintiff”) is a pro se prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who is incarcerated at William S. Key Correctional Center in Fort Supply, Oklahoma. He has filed a civil rights complaint under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations occurring in Oklahoma prisons (Dkt. No. 1). The defendants are Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt and DOC Director Scott Crow (“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges the state of Oklahoma, through the defendants, has failed to comply with the rulings in Battles [sic] v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), which required a lowering of the prison population and adequate medical care for prisoners. He also claims it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for any prisoner to be subject to a COVID-19 infection. Screening/Dismissal Standards

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well- pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the

cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007).

A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could 2 be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which

the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s Allegations

Under the “Nature of Case” in the complaint, Plaintiff refers to the Battles v. Anderson case from this Court, which concerned Oklahoma prison conditions (Dkt. No. 1 at 6). The actual name of the case was Battle v. Anderson, No. CIV 72-095 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 2001), and it later was renamed Williams v. Saffle. Plaintiff asks the Court to analyze his claims under that decision and to require Defendants to comply with the Williams orders. That case, however, has been closed for all purposes, and all injunctions have been dissolved. See Williams, No. CIV 72-095 (Jan. 30, 2001) (Dkt. No. 1852). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot rely on the Williams injunctions to support his claims. The Court Clerk is 3 directed to send Plaintiff a copy of the relevant order (Dkt. 1852) from Williams.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

The defendants . . . are directly responsible for protecting the public from a possible outbreak of a [sic] infectious disease outbreak reslulting [sic] from the overcrowding inside Oklahoma Department of Corrections. They are also responsible for protecting the inmate populations and the employees of the state agency. The defendants are additionally required to provide medical care adequate to the 8th Amendment proscription to cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants are equally required to follow medical guidelines set fourth [sic] by the federal government and the CDC in the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. The failure of the defendants to comply with the rulings of Battles v. Anderson have resulted in overcrowding that places the plaintiff in substantial risk for serious infectious disease. The defendants can not gaurentee [sic] in any effective resonable [sic] manner that they can meet with these obligations in sight af the highly infectious nature of the COVID-10 contagion. These failures resulting from the failure to comply with the mandate in Battles v. Anderson amount to a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the loss of life potential caused by overcrowding is a deprivation of the 14th Amendment.

(Dkt. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff also claims that Mack Alford Correctional Center, where he previously was housed, failed to create and submit a plan for the pandemic. Id. at 13.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
United States v. John F. Grismore
546 F.2d 844 (Tenth Circuit, 1976)
United States v. Loran L. Taylor
569 F.2d 448 (Seventh Circuit, 1978)
Battle v. Anderson
376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Oklahoma, 1974)
Oxendine v. Williams
509 F.2d 1405 (Fourth Circuit, 1975)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Greer v. Stitt, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greer-v-stitt-oked-2020.