Greenwood v. Palomar Health

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJuly 2, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-01686
StatusUnknown

This text of Greenwood v. Palomar Health (Greenwood v. Palomar Health) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greenwood v. Palomar Health, (S.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 GARY GREENWOOD, Case No. 3:19-cv-1686-LAB-MSB 12 Plaintiff,

13 vs. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 14 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 PALOMAR HEALTH, et al., JUDGMENT WITHOUT Defendants. PREJUDICE AND SETTING CASE 16 MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 17 RE: JURISDICTION [Dkt. 28]

20 Plaintiff Gary Greenwood brought this action against his former 21 employer, Defendant Palomar Health, asserting one federal claim for wrongful 22 denial of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and six 23 claims under California state law: denial of leave under the California Family 24 Rights Act (“CFRA” claim); racial harassment; failure to prevent racial 25 harassment; retaliation for reporting harassment; discrimination based on race; 26 and retaliation for disclosing a violation of law. Palomar moved for summary 27 judgment on each claim. (Dkt. 28.) But only one of Greenwood’s state law 1 claims appears to be part of the same case or controversy as his lone federal 2 claim, and even that claim likely falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court 3 won’t issue judgment on claims over which it may lack jurisdiction, so the 4 Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Dkt. 28.) 5 As discussed below, the final pretrial conference previously scheduled 6 for July 12, 2021 at 12:30 p.m. is converted to a case management conference 7 to address these jurisdictional issues. The case management conference is set 8 for July 12, 2021 at 11:30 a.m. 9 I. FMLA Doesn’t Authorize a Private Right of Action When Plaintiff 10 is Not Seeking Actual Damages or Injunctive Relief 11 Greenwood doesn’t allege that he suffered any damages in connection 12 with the alleged denial of FMLA leave, nor does he seek equitable relief in 13 connection with that claim. Instead, that claim is offered only as a basis to 14 recover fees and costs. (See Dkt. 4 ¶ 73.)1 15 Under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1), employers may be liable for lost wages, 16 salary, benefits, or other compensation, any actual monetary losses sustained 17 as a direct result of the violation, interest, and liquidated damages based on 18 the amount of actual damages and interest. No liquidated damages are 19 available absent actual damages, and plaintiffs can’t recover emotional 20 damages for an FMLA violation. See id.; Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 21 (liquidated damages under FMLA “equal to the amount of actual damages and 22 interest”); Farrell v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 530 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th 23 Cir. 2008) (no emotional damages available under FMLA). Section 2617 24 authorizes a private right of action only to recover the damages or equitable 25

1 The Amended Complaint’s Prayer for Relief refers to “statutory fines and penalties in all 26 applicable instances, including but not limited to 29 U.S.C. § 2617 et seq.” Those statutes 27 don’t impose statutory fines or penalties beyond the liquidated damages provided in 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). As discussed in this section, liquidated damages are only available if 1 relief prescribed in paragraph [(a)(1)].” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). And while fees 2 and costs are available under paragraph (a)(3) of that statute, they’re only 3 available for actions properly brought under paragraph (a)(2). See 29 U.S.C. 4 § 2617(a)(3) (permitting recovery of fees and costs “in such an action” brought 5 under (a)(2)). 6 Greenwood’s FMLA claim doesn’t seek remedies provided in 29 U.S.C. 7 § 2617(a)(1), and is therefore outside the scope of actions permitted by 8 paragraph (a)(2). This strips the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that 9 claim. See North County Comm’ns Corp. v. California Catalog & Technology, 10 594 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court lacked subject matter 11 jurisdiction over private claim not authorized by statute). 12 II. Greenwood’s Remaining Claims Don’t Appear to Be Part of the 13 Same Case or Controversy and May Predominate over the FMLA 14 Claim 15 Each of Greenwood’s remaining claims arises under California state law. 16 When removing the case from state court, Palomar argued that supplemental 17 jurisdiction was available for those claims, without offering any other 18 jurisdictional basis. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 5-6.) But supplemental jurisdiction isn’t available 19 over state law claims unless they’re “so related to claims in the action within 20 [the Court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 21 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1367(a). In other words, the state claims and federal claims must “derive from 23 a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of America v. 24 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 25 The only potential federal claim in this case, the FMLA claim, is based on 26 allegations that Greenwood’s supervisors failed to offer Greenwood leave in 27 certain instances between November 2018 and January 2019. Greenwood’s 1 They rely instead on allegations that other employees harassed him between 2 2014 and July 2018, that he reported the harassment, and that Palomar 3 terminated his employment because of his reports. There are no apparent ties 4 between the alleged incidents of harassment and Greenwood’s termination, on 5 the one hand, and the failure to offer FMLA/CFRA leave, on the other, so the 6 non-CFRA claims may not be part of the same case or controversy as the 7 FMLA claim. See, e.g., Burton v. Maximus Federal, 2021 WL 1234588, at *6 8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2021) (unemployment benefits claim does not arise from 9 same case or controversy as FMLA claim); Doe v. Dart, 2009 WL 1138093, at 10 *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2009) (no “factual overlap” between FMLA claim and 11 harassment claims). 12 Even if supplemental jurisdiction is available for those claims, it’s not 13 clear that the Court should exercise it. “[I]f it appears that the state issues 14 substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, on the scope of the issues 15 raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,” the Court may 16 decline supplemental jurisdiction. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see also 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1367(c). Greenwood’s harassment and retaliation claims cover a much 18 broader set of circumstances than his federal FMLA claim. While the latter 19 reaches only the content of a handful of conversations spanning a few months, 20 the harassment and retaliation claims relate to events over a four-year period, 21 whether those events established a hostile work environment, and Palomar’s 22 motive for terminating Greenwood. And the issue of Palomar’s motive involves 23 yet another series of incidents relating to Greenwood’s conducts towards other 24 employees and patients.

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Greenwood v. Palomar Health, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greenwood-v-palomar-health-casd-2021.