IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2021-IA-00456-SCT
GREENVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
v.
YOLANDA THOMAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/08/2021 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BENNIE LE NARD RICHARD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LISA M. ROSS DORIAN E. TURNER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DORIAN E. TURNER ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LISA M. ROSS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 12/08/2022 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This appeal comes before the Court on interlocutory appeal involving statutory
interpretation. The Greenville Public School District (“GPSD”) challenges the sufficiency
of the bond amount that Yolanda Thomas posted to perfect her appeal pursuant to the
requirements of Mississippi Code Section 37-9-113 (Rev. 2019). GPSD argues that,
pursuant to Section 37-9-113, Thomas is required to post bond in an amount equal to the full
cost of the hearing transcript. The chancellor ruled that, based on the language of Section
37-9-113 and Mississippi Code Section 37-9-111 (Rev. 2019), Thomas’s $200 bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal in the Washington County Chancery Court. This Court
affirms the chancellor’s decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. GPSD opted not to renew the employment of middle-school principal Yolanda
Thomas. Thomas unsuccessfully contested nonrenewal through the statutory process, which
included a hearing before the school board. See Miss. Code Ann.§ 37-9-109 to -111 (Rev.
2019).
¶3. Following the hearing on June 9, 2020, GPSD and Thomas’s counsel discussed the
bond amount required by Section 37-9-113(2) necessary to perfect an appeal of GPSD’s
decision to nonrenew Thomas’s employment. GPSD argued that Thomas had to post bond
in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of the hearing transcript, which totaled $7,717.90.
Thomas disagreed. The parties could not come to an agreement as to what would be a
sufficient bond amount.
¶4. On July 20, 2020, Thomas filed a timely notice of appeal from the school board’s
decision, along with a $200 cash appeal bond, in the Chancery Court of Washington County.
Thomas subsequently filed a motion in which she sought a ruling from the chancellor that,
pursuant to Section 37-9-113, her $200 cash bond perfected the appeal. GPSD filed a
Response in Opposition, along with a Motion to File Correct Bond, or Alternatively, Dismiss
Appeal. As summarized by the chancery court, GPSD maintained “that the clear language
of [Section] 37-9-113(2) and [Section] 37-9-111(4) establishes that the correct amount of the
appeal bond in this nonrenewal appeal is the cost of preparing the hearing transcript, which
2 in this case is $7,717.90.” GPSD argued that the appeal should “be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction if [Thomas did] not file an appeal bond in said amount.”
¶5. After a hearing, the chancellor entered an order holding that Thomas’s $200 appeal
bond was adequate to perfect her appeal. The chancellor found that the cost of preparing the
transcript was not per se included in the cost of the appeal bond. The chancellor reasoned
that
In light of the legislature’s contrasting word choice in applicable statutes (“cost of appeal” vs. “court costs”) and the absence of stare decisis on the narrow issue presented, the Court exercises its discretion in favor of access to the courts. . . . the Court intends to allow a case-by-case assessment of what is a reasonable appeal bond (where the parties cannot agree) which will include but is not limited to, the financial ability of the appellant, the expense of the transcript, other known costs of appeal and/or court costs, and/or any other relevant factors.”
(Footnote omitted.) This Court granted the school district’s request for interlocutory appeal
to address this issue.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether the chancellor erred in his interpretation of the statutory requirements for the cost of a judicial appeal under Section 37-9-113.
II. Whether the chancellor erred by determining that $200 was a sufficient bond amount in this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. This Court employs a de novo standard of review for questions of law, jurisdictional
questions and issues of statutory interpretation. Aladdin Constr. Co. v. John Hancock Life
Ins. Co., 914 So. 2d 169, 174 (Miss. 2005); Finn v. State, 978 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Miss.
2008).
3 DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancellor erred in his interpretation of the statutory requirements for the cost of a judicial appeal under Section 37-9- 113.
¶7. Section 37-9-111(4) states that “[t]he board shall cause to be made stenographic notes
of the proceedings. In the event of a judicial appeal of the board’s decision, the entire
expense of the transcript and notes shall be assessed as court costs.” Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-
111(4) (Rev. 2019).
¶8. Section 37-9-113 allows an employee aggrieved by a final decision of a school board
to appeal the decision of the board. It states in relevant part that
An appeal may be taken by such employee to the chancery court of the judicial district in which the school district is located, by filing a petition with the clerk of that court and executing and filing bond payable to the school board with sufficient sureties, in the penalty of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), conditioned upon the payment of all of the costs of appeal, within twenty (20) days of the receipt of the final decision of the board.
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-113(2) (Rev. 2019).
¶9. GPSD contends that it is a “bedrock principal” of Mississippi statutes that the
appellant must prepay appeal costs, which it claims is equivalent to the cost of the transcript.
To support its argument, GPSD relies on language from Section 37-9-113(2) that provides
for bond conditioned upon the payment of all costs of appeal. We decline to adopt this
interpretation of the statute because the statute plainly does not require Thomas to prepay all
costs of appeal. Miss. State & Sch. Emps.’ Life & Health Plan v. KCC, Inc., 108 So. 3d
932, 936 (Miss. 2013) (“When the language used by the legislature is plain and
unambiguous. . . and where the statute conveys a clear and definite meaning. . . the Court will
4 have no occasion to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation.” (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. Ethics Comm’n v. Grisham, 957 So. 2d
997, 1001 (Miss. 2007))). Thomas’s right to appeal was created by the legislature and is
governed by the specific language of the statute. Section 37-9-113(2) merely allows for a
bond in an amount that is “conditioned” on the “payment of all of the costs of appeal[.]” The
very definition of the word condition refers to a future event. Condition, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A future and uncertain event on which the existence or extent
of an obligation or liability depends[.]”). This Court finds that GPSD’s suggested
interpretation of Section 37-9-113(2), which would require Thomas’s payment of the cost of
appeal prior to or at the time of posting bond, is incorrect. GPSD does not point to any other
statutory language that would plainly require Thomas to prepay all court costs or costs of
appeal.
¶10. GPSD argues that a $200 bond is insufficient to perfect an appeal when the cost of the
transcript is more than $200. GPSD relies on Shope v. Winklemann to support its argument
that “[n]ot only is the payment of costs a requirement; it is jurisdictional.” Shope v.
Winkelmann, 328 So. 3d 641, 644 (Miss. 2021) (citing Belmont Holding, LLC v. Davis
Monuments, LLC, 253 So. 3d 323, 328 (Miss. 2018)). Thomas argues that Shope is not
applicable to this Court’s review because this Court has never held that all costs of appeal
must be paid before a chancery court has jurisdiction to review a school board’s decision.
¶11. Shope is distinguishable from the present case because it addressed a different type
of appeal under different rules. Id. at 643-44. Shope was an appeal from a county court to
5 a circuit court in a medical malpractice case controlled by the Mississippi Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Mississippi Code Section 11-51-29 (Rev. 2019). Thomas appeals a decision
of a school board for nonrenewal of her employment, perfection of which is controlled by
Section 37-9-113. The Court in Shope did not consider the statutes at issue in this case.
¶12. Thomas relies on the procedural history of Board of Trustees of Hattiesburg
Municipal Separate School District v. Gates, to support her argument that the assessment
of costs occurs “at the end of the proceedings - not prior to the chancellor’s review of the
school board’s decision.” See Bd. of Trs. of Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Gates,
467 So. 2d 216, 217 (Miss. 1985). Thomas argues that if this Court had jurisdiction in Gates,
in which Peggy Gates only paid the costs of the transcript of the school board’s nonrenewal
decision after being ordered to do so when she lost her appeal, then the chancellor in the
present case must have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case. Id. at 217. GPSD
argues that Thomas’s reliance on Gates is erroneous because the issue of whether the cost
of the transcript is included in the amount of the bond sufficient to perfect an appeal under
Section 37-9-113 was not before the Court in Gates.
¶13. Gates, however, is relevant to the present case because it stands for the proposition
that the court assesses court costs at the conclusion of the proceedings. See id. The cost of
the transcript, per Section 37-9-111(4), only becomes a court cost in the event a judicial
appeal is taken. Until Thomas appealed GPSD’s decision to the chancery court, GPSD was
responsible for the costs of any transcript prepared. GPSD’s interpretation of Section 37-9-
113 would have this Court find that the mere act of filing an appeal automatically requires
6 prepayment of court costs by Thomas. This is contrary to caselaw that finds that the
assessment of court costs is within the discretion of the chancellor and generally is assessed
against the losing party at the end of the proceedings. Fant v. Standard Oil Co., 247 So. 2d
132, 133-34 (Miss. 1971) (“it is said that the costs in an equity suit does not follow the result
of the case as a matter of right but are awarded according to what, in the sound discretion of
the court, is deemed fair and just under all the circumstances of the case.” (citing Griffith,
Mississippi Chancery Practice §628 (2d ed. 1950)); Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v.
Rowell, 819 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“as a general rule, the costs of court
should be assessed against the losing party”). The plain language of the statute does not
outline a different procedure, and we decline to accept GPSD’s interpretation of the statute.
¶14. Neither Gates nor Shope are directly on point; however, neither is necessary to resolve
the issues of this case. “[C]ourts have a duty to give statutes a practical application
consistent with their wording, unless such application is inconsistent with the obvious intent
of the legislature.” Grisham, 957 So. 2d at 1001 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Marx v. Broom, 632 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Miss. 1994)). This Court
finds that while $200 is the default amount of the bond, the “not less than” language in the
statute clearly gives the chancellor discretionary authority to raise the amount of the bond.
§ 37-9-113(2). Nevertheless, the statute does not require the chancellor to set the bond in an
amount equal to the actual costs of appeal or the cost of a transcript because the “payment
of all of the costs of appeal” is merely a “condition” of the bond. § 37-9-113(2). This Court
finds that the chancellor correctly reconciled Section 37-9-111(4) with Section 37-9-113(2).
7 It was within the legislature’s prerogative to classify the hearing transcript as part of the cost
of the bond if it had so desired, but the legislature instead designated it as a court cost. § 37-
9-111(4). Generally, the “assessment of court costs is within the chancellor’s sound
discretion[.]” Rowell, 819 So. 2d at 1285.
II. Whether the chancellor erred by determining that $200 was a sufficient bond amount in this appeal.
¶15. “This Court will not disturb the chancellor’s opinion when supported by substantial
evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Rankin v. Rankin, 323 So. 3d 1073,
1077 (Miss. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holloman v. Holloman, 691
So. 2d 897, 898 (Miss. 1996)). While the cost of the transcript was arguably expensive, we
cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion by determining that the statutory
minimum was sufficient to perfect the appeal. The chancellor noted that he would consider
relevant factors such as financial ability, cost of the transcript, court costs and costs of
appeal. Nevertheless, the chancellor determined that $200 was sufficient and reserved the
right to assess to Thomas the entire cost of the transcript and other costs if she was not
successful in her appeal. This Court finds that the chancellor did not abuse its discretion by
making this determination because the legislature, in Section 37-9-113(2), used language that
authorized the chancellor to exercise discretionary authority in determining the bond amount,
so long as that bond is “not less than $200[.]” We affirm the chancellor’s decision that, in
the instance the parties cannot agree, the court may consider relevant factors, such as the
financial ability of the appellant, the expense of the transcript, other known costs of appeal
8 and/or court costs and/or any other relevant factors and may set a reasonable bond amount.
Thomas posted sufficient bond to confer jurisdiction on the chancery court and to perfect
her appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶16. The minimum required bond amount for an appeal under Section 37-9-113 is $200.
This Court finds that the legislature, through Section 37-9-113(2), has given the chancellor
discretionary authority to raise the required bond to a reasonable amount for appeals of
employees of the school district aggrieved by final employment decisions. This Court further
finds that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by setting the bond in this case at $200,
because the chancellor also has discretion to allow the bond to remain at the $200 statutory
minimum. We affirm the chancellor’s ruling that Thomas posted sufficient bond to perfect
her appeal, and we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶17. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. KING, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
ISHEE, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
¶18. I agree with the majority that the chancellor committed no error by finding that the
$200 cash bond was sufficient. I would, however, hold that the chancellor has no authority
to require a bond in a penalty greater than required by the statute, which is $200.
¶19. Section 37-9-113(2) allows an employee aggrieved by her nonrenewal to appeal from
the decision of the school board by filing a petition and bond with the chancery clerk within
9 twenty days of the school board’s decision. The bond must be “in the penalty of not less than
Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), conditioned upon the payment of all of the costs of appeal.”
Id.
¶20. Section 37-9-113(2) states that the bond shall be “in the penalty of not less than
[$200].” The “penalty” of a bond is “[t]he sum of money which the obligor of a bond
undertakes to pay . . . .” Penalty, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Thus, other than
the somewhat archaic language, the statute could not be more clear that the amount required
is “not less than [$200].” Thomas posted a cash bond in the amount of $200, which is “not
less than $200.”
¶21. In Dodd v. City of Jackson, 238 Miss. 372, 118 So. 2d 319, 332 (1960), this Court
addressed a similar statute:
Now an appeal from a decree with regard to the creation of a municipal corporation is governed by Section 3374-08, Code of 1942, Rec., which is as follows: “Any person interested in or aggrieved by the decree of the chancellor, and who was a party to the proceedings in the chancery court, may prosecute an appeal therefrom to the supreme court within ten (10) days from the date of such decree by furnishing an appeal bond in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) with two good and sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay all costs of the appeal in event the decree is affirmed. Such appeal bond shall be subject to the approval of the chancery clerk and shall operate as a supersedeas. If the decree of the chancellor be affirmed by the supreme court, then such decree shall go into effect after the passage of ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment thereon, and the party or parties prosecuting such appeal and the sureties on their appeal bond shall be adjudged to pay all costs of such appeal.”
Just as in Section 37-9-113(2), which is at issue in today’s case, the bond in Dodd was
“conditioned to pay all costs of the appeal.” Dodd, 238 Miss. 372, 118 So. 2d at 332. But
10 this Court rejected the argument that the appeal bond in the amount specified by the statute
was insufficient to perfect the appeal because it could not cover all the costs of the appeal:
It may be that the legislature deemed that proceedings of this kind are matters of such public importance that great liberality should be extended in appeals in such cases. It can be seen that rank injustice might occur in the arbitrary inclusion of the property of a small taxpayer, and that he would be deterred from an appeal out of fear that he would lose all of his property on account of a large cost bill. It may be that the legislature did not foresee that costs might soar to such astronomical figures. Be that as it may, the statutes give an interested party the right to appeal on his furnishing a good bond in the sum of $500, and to have such bond operate as a supersedeas. This Court cannot, by judicial construction, repeal them.
The chancellor had no authority to require bonds in excess of $500.
¶22. GPSD points out that in many other appeals, a rule or statute such as Mississippi Code
Section 11-51-29 (Rev. 2019) requires an appellant to prepay costs. This is undoubtedly true
as a general proposition, but the rules and statutes cited are inapposite to this specific appeal;
the statute governing appeals from nonrenewal by a school board specifies a bond of “not
less than [$200],” but it does not require the prepayment of costs. See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-
9-113(2). The chancellor likewise often has discretion in setting appeal bonds, but that is
when the chancery court is the court being appealed from; in today’s case, the chancery court
is acting as an appellate court, and the appeal bond at issue is to be filed with the chancery
clerk to perfect the appeal to the chancery court from the school board.
¶23. I acknowledge that the words not less than in the statute suggest a higher bond may
potentially be required, but neither GPSD nor the majority can point to any authority
permitting the chancellor to set the bond. Section 37-9-113(2) required Thomas to post a
11 bond with the chancery clerk in an amount “not less than [$200]” within twenty days of the
board’s decision, and that is all. The fact that the statute states the bond must be “not less
than [$200]” does not imply any authority of the chancery court to require more than the
statute does. To begin with, it is procedurally impossible—the chancery court obtains
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal by the would-be appellant’s posting of the bond with
the chancery clerk within twenty days of the school board’s decision; the chancellor has no
opportunity to set amount of the bond.
¶24. Second, the Mississippi Code is riddled with statutes employing the words “not less
than” to set a requirement, without any suggestion that a court or governing authority has the
power to require more than the statute does. For example, Mississippi Code Section 85-7-
432 (Rev. 2021) (emphasis added) states that performance bonds for construction contracts
“shall be . . . in an amount not less than the amount of the contract.” A contractor could offer
a higher bond, but could a court rely on the words “not less than,” by themselves, to find a
contractor violated Section 85-7-432 because the court thought he should have offered a
bond of 125 percent of the contract? Likewise, Mississippi Code Section 37-151-5(j) (Rev.
2014) (emphasis added) defines a minimum school term to require “scheduled classroom
instruction for not less than sixty-three percent (63%) of the instructional day.” Could a
court rely on the words “not less than,” by themselves, to find that a school failed to satisfy
Section 37-151-5(j) because the court found 70 percent of the day to be reasonable?
Mississippi Code Section 83-47-25(2)(b) (Rev. 2011) requires the commissioner of insurance
to approve a plan and procedure for a corporation to become a stock insurance corporation
12 if, among other things, the plan or procedure “is subject to approval by vote of not less than
three-fourths . . . of the corporation’s current members voting.” And so forth and so on.
¶25. The words “not less than” are also repeatedly used in the Mississippi Code with
respect to bond requirements, again without any suggestion that those words empower a court
or governing authority to require more. For example, Mississippi Code Section 57-32-3
(Rev. 2014) requires members of the South Mississippi Industrial Council to make “a surety
bond in an amount not less than ten thousand dollars . . . indemnifying the council against
malfeasance or misfeasance in office.” Mississippi Code Section 17-3-25 (Rev. 2012)
similarly requires members of a convention bureau board to post bonds “in an amount not
less than Fifty Thousand Dollars.” There are others.
¶26. Simply put, neither GPSD nor the majority can point to any authority permitting the
chancery court to increase the appeal bond beyond the minimum required by Section 37-9-
113(2). The ultimate “assessment of court costs is [usually] within the chancellor’s sound
discretion . . . .” Leaf River Prods., Inc. v. Rowell, 819 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. Ct. App.
2002). But the appeal bond is a jurisdictional prerequisite in an amount set by the
Legislature. A court cannot deprive a litigant “of [her] right of appeal by . . . demanding an
appeal bond in a greater penalty than that authorized by the statute.” Redus v. Gamble, 85
Miss. 165, 37 So. 1010, 1010 (1905).
¶27. For those reasons, I concur in part and in result.