Greensboro Life Insurance v. Knight

76 S.E. 623, 160 N.C. 592, 1912 N.C. LEXIS 213

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 11, 1912
• Status: Published

Opinion

Clakk:, 0. J.

Tbis was an action begun before a justice of tbe peace for tbe recovery on a note of $133.38 for tbe first premium on an insurance policy for $2,000. Tbe defendant refused to pay tbe note, upon tbe ground tbat tbe execution of tbe note bad been secured by false and fraudulent representations of tbe plaintiff made at tbe time tbe note was executed and delivered. Tbe whole case turned upon tbat point and tbe jury found tbe facts witb tbe defendant.. Upon tbis proposition, there was testimony on both sides, and being an issue of fact, it is not necessary to state tbe evidence upon which tbe jury acted.

Tbe first exception was because tbe defendant was allowed to state what representations were made to him by tbe insurance agent, and cannot be sustained. Tbe rule tbat parol agreements are merged in a written contract is not applicable where tbe allegations and issue are tbat tbe written contract was procured by false and fraudulent representations. Gwaltney v. Assurance Society, 132 N. C., 928, and cases there cited.

Exception 2 was abandoned and Exception 3 was because tbe witness was allowed to state what Maurer, tbe insurance agent, said in bis testimony at tbe trial before .a. justice of tbe peace relative to tbe character and kind of insurance be had written for other parties in tbe county at tbe time be solicited tbis insurance. Tbis was competent, because tbe evidence showed tbat tbe agent bad only attempted to write one kind of policy, and they all were of tbe same kind as tbat of the defendant. If error, it was harmless, for Mourer testified to same purport at tbis trial.

All tbe other exceptions are practically to admission of testimony of tbe seventeen witnesses who testified, in corroboration and to show tbe intent of tbe insurance agent in making tbe false representations to tbe plaintiff, tbat be made tbe same representations to them. Tbe court so told tbe jury at tbe time be admitted tbe testimony, and also in bis charge. He charged them tbat such evidence was competent for tbat purpose only, if they found tbat tbe agent did make false representation, and tbat tbe jury could consider tbe evidence as to tbe transactions and conversations of tbe agent witb these other parties in tbat way, and for no other purpose.

Evidence of a collateral offense of tbe same character and tending to prove guilty knowledge of the party, when that is an essential element of the crime, is admissible. S. v. Graham, 121 N. C., 627; S. v. Jeffreys, 117 N. C., 727. These conversations and transactions were made by the same agent about the same kind of policies, about the same time; were representations of the same character, and made to thirty-eight different parties, to the same purport.

Such evidence is admissible in criminal actions and a fortiori it is admissible in civil actions. Brink v. Blade, 77 N. C., 59.

Upon an examination of all the exceptions, we find

No error.