Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter

614 F. Supp. 2d 934, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83601, 2007 WL 3333335
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedNovember 9, 2007
DocketCause 1:00 CV 0219
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 614 F. Supp. 2d 934 (Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter, 614 F. Supp. 2d 934, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83601, 2007 WL 3333335 (N.D. Ind. 2007).

Opinion

*935 OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Court.

Plaintiffs are riparian landowners along a five-mile portion of the Fawn River that begins at Orland Dam and ends at Greenfield Millpond. 1 The present dispute arose on May 18, 1998, after the Defendants drained a supply pond into the Fawn River and, in the process, flushed sediment from the supply pond into the river. According to the Plaintiffs, the result of this process was to deposit massive amounts of sediment into the Fawn River thereby destroying the aquatic life and altering the aesthetics and water quality of the river.

The Plaintiffs, believing the release of the sediment into the Fawn River to be a malicious and/or retaliatory act by the State, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 asserting claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 In addition, Plaintiffs sued under the Citizen Suit provision of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 alleging that the Defendants illegally deposited dredge and fill materials in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (hereafter “ § 404”) 3 into the Fawn River without a proper permit.

This court originally granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims and Plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit wisely 4 solicited amicus briefs from the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the statutory regulations at issue and their application to the facts of this case. On March 19, 2004, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered a written opinion affirming the judgment of this court on the civil rights claims but reversing and remanding as to the Clean Water Act claim. Greenfield Mills v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934 (7th Cir.2004).

In its Opinion, the Seventh Circuit concluded as a matter of law, that the Defendants were subject to the permitting requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (“ § 404”). Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 949 (“The defendants’ actions of May 19, 1998, therefore, constituted an addition of dredged spoil into the Fawn River and were subject to the permit requirement of § 404.”). The panel further noted, howev *936 er, that the regulations also provide an exclusion from the permitting requirements for the maintenance of dams. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(b). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Defendants were subject to the permitting requirement of § 404, unless they proved that they were subject to an exemption under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(b) and that the defendant’s actions were not “recaptured” under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). 5 The Court then outlined the factual questions to be resolved on remand: (1) Did the Defendants’ activities qualify under the maintenance exemption? In determining the answer to this question, the Seventh Circuit specifically concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether maintenance was the actual purpose of the defendants’ activities rather than a pretext to dredge the pond without a permit. (Id. at 951). The Seventh Circuit also noted that if the jury concluded that maintenance was the actual purpose it would then be required to determine whether the draw-down and discharge of sediment, was reasonably necessary to perform the maintenance. Id. at 952 (“... the maintenance exemption should be construed so that only dredging that is reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance is exempt from the permit requirement .... we believe that the plaintiffs have brought forth sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the dredging of the pond was not reasonably necessary to either the maintenance of the pump or the alleged inspection of the gates.”).

Upon remand to this court, the parties sought, and the court granted, extended discovery and the opportunity to file renewed summary judgment motions, particularly as to whether the activities of May 18, 1998 fell within the exemption. Renewed motions were filed and numerous telephone conferences were conducted by the undersigned relating to the motions. On June 28, 2005, the undersigned granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs after the defendants conceded that their actions of May 18, 1998 were not reasonably necessary to make the repairs to the dam, which, in turn, disqualified the defendants’ actions from meeting the maintenance exemption. See Docket # 208. Accordingly, the undersigned concluded that the defendants were liable to the plaintiffs for any damage to the Fawn River occasioned by the May 18, 1998 event.

Thereafter, the parties embarked on efforts to determine the extent of the damage to the Fawn River, if any, and, assuming some damage was found, the best course for remediating it. To that end, the parties agreed to the appointment of a neutral expert, CH2M Hill and agreed that the defendants would pay the cost of the expert’s assessment pursuant to a rate sheet attached to the stipulation. (Docket # 222). CH2M Hill then began its assessment of the Fawn River.

Not long after the assessment began, Defendants filed a motion opposing the work of CH2M Hill. The thrust of that motion was that the defendants objected to the projected cost of CH2M Hill’s work as well as the methodologies to be employed by the firm. As a result of this motion, on April 18, 2006, the parties filed a stipulated “Modified Order Appointing CH2M Hill to Serve As a Neutral Expert and Procedures” (“Modified Order,” Docket #250). *937 The Modified Order contemplates a three phase plan for remediation with court intervention after each phase is completed. Phase I, the subject of the current motions, required CH2M Hill to determine whether the Fawn River and/or Greenfield Mills Pond are presently damaged from excess sediments, or the effects of excess sediments.

In July 2006, CH2M Hill submitted a proposed Phase I Scope outlining the precise work to be performed. A joint stipulation approving CH2M Hill’s Phase I Scope was filed on August 2, 2006 and approved by the undersigned on August 3, 2006. 6 In September 2006, CH2M Hill submitted a work plan to the parties outlining the field investigation methodologies it would employ.

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Related

Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter
569 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Indiana, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
614 F. Supp. 2d 934, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83601, 2007 WL 3333335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greenfield-mills-inc-v-carter-innd-2007.