Greene v. Woodlawn Unit School District 209

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided November 15, 2023·No. 3:22-cv-02727·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RACHEL GREENE d/b/a RACHEL ) BOLDT, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 22-cv-2727 vs. ) ) WOODLAWN UNIT SCHOOL ) DISTRICT #209, MARK ) RICHARDSON, MIKE RICHARDSON, and DANNY DEES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER DUGAN, District Judge This matter is before the Court on a discovery dispute raised by the parties. Consistent with this Court’s discovery dispute procedure, the parties met and conferred in an effort to resolve disputed matters without court intervention. Despite their efforts, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. The parties have provided the Court with a Joint Discovery Report detailing the disputed issues. After reviewing the Joint Discovery Report, the Court ORDERS as follows: I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff claims that in 1995, when she was in the Fourth grade at Woodlawn Elementary School, she was sexually abused by Defendants Mark Richardson, Mike Richardson, and Danny Dees. The abuse allegedly continued until approximately 2000, when Plaintiff was 13 years old. Plaintiff also alleges instances of intimidation after she turned 18, and a sexual assault occurring in approximately 2014. Plaintiff does not allege that abuse was ongoing between 2000 and 2014. Plaintiff seeks damages for physical injuries associated with sexual assault and rape, severe emotional distress and depression

which is expected to continue into the future, embarrassment and humiliation, costs of medical treatment both in the past and the future, loss of enjoyment of a normal life as a consequence of her emotional injuries, and loss of ability to engage in the same kinds of normal activities. II. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DISCOVERY A district court has broad discretion in matters relating to discovery. Patterson v.

Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2002). Rule 26 permits the discovery of any “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). When determining the scope of discovery, Rule 26(b)(1) requires consideration of: the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Id. Rule 26(b)(1) also recognizes that information within the scope of discovery does not need to be admissible at trial. Id. “Because the purpose of discovery is to help 'define and clarify the issues,' relevance must be broadly construed.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 2021 WL 3186959, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 28, 2021) (citing Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978) (superseded by statute on other grounds)). Therefore, establishing relevancy is not a high bar, and where “relevance is in doubt, courts should err on the side of permissive discovery.” Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,

229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citation omitted). Indeed, there is a “strong public policy in favor of disclosure of relevant materials,” and a court should consider the “totality of the circumstances,” including “society's interest in furthering the ‘truthseeking function,’ in the particular case before the court.” Patterson, 281 F.3d at 681 (citations omitted). Finally, the burden “rests upon the objecting party to show why a particular discovery request is improper.” Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection

Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 449-50 (N.D. Ill. 2006). III. DISCUSSION A. Overarching Disputes 1. Temporal Scope of Discovery Many of the parties’ discovery disputes stem from a disagreement regarding the

temporal scope of discovery. Defendants’ position is the time period should not be restricted to the time period alleged in the Complaint (1995-2014) but should include the time to the present. Plaintiff contends that the discoverable time period should not extend through the present, but she does not identify a specific time period that would be appropriate. Plaintiff emphasizes that, except for acts of intimidation after she turned 18 and one sexual assault in approximately 2014, the alleged abuse occurred between

approximately 1995 and 2000, and that she does not allege ongoing abuse between 2000 and 2014. The Court agrees with Defendants. Courts have recognized that “extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties is permissible and common in

modern discovery, especially in a case ... involving claims of emotional trauma.” Flores v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 2015 WL 7293510, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015). “[W]hen emotional injuries rise above mere humiliation and embarrassment or when a party specifically seeks damages for a psychological condition, the claim amounts to more than a garden variety emotional distress claim,” and other potential stressors or sources of emotional distress may be explored.” Gonzalez v. Scaletta, 2018 WL 6573227, at

*4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2018) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff is seeking damages for severe and ongoing emotional trauma. As such, Plaintiff’s mental health is legitimately in controversy, and Defendants are entitled to explore stressors in her life that may have contributed to her emotional trauma. This includes stressors outside the time period of the alleged abuse. For instance, Defendants

have identified specific events occurring after 2014, including instances where Plaintiff has alleged that other men repeatedly subjected her to rape, sexual assault, torture, and sex trafficking. If these events did occur, they are relevant to ascertaining the source of Plaintiff’s severe and ongoing mental and emotional injuries, as well as her alleged physical injuries. See Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence of past

sexual activity is often “relevant because [a defendant is] not responsible for any emotional or physical injuries (damages) caused by…sexual activity with other men.” Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court finds that the appropriate time period of inquiry for Defendants’ discovery requests is 1995 to present. 2. Sexual Activity with Individuals Other than Defendants

Information regarding Plaintiff’s sexual activity with individuals other than Defendants may lead to relevant evidence. As noted above, Defendants are not responsible for any emotional or physical injuries caused by others. Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, information regarding Plaintiff’s sexual activity, particularly traumatic sexual activity (whether consensual or nonconsensual) is

potentially relevant to causation and damages. In reaching this decision, the Court is mindful of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 1 and its’ prohibition on the admission of certain evidence relating to the sexual conduct of an alleged victim. Rule 412, however, does not operate to prevent discovery of such information. See FED. R. EVID. 412, Advisory Committee Notes (“The procedures set forth

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Greene v. Woodlawn Unit School District 209, (S.D. Ill. 2023).

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