Greene v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 30, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-3427
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CEDRIC GREENE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03427 (UNA) ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ) FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) CALIFORNIA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), and a motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the

IFP application will be granted, and the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, California, sues the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of California. See Compl. at 1. The complaint is far from a model of clarity,

but Plaintiff appears to raise claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b)(1). See id. at 1, 3. First, Plaintiff takes issue with determinations regarding jurisdiction

and venue rendered by the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit in unidentified proceedings. See id. at 2. More specifically, he

appears dissatisfied that those courts declined to transfer his proceedings to his preferred venue,

and he likens those determinations to a “witch hunt” against him. See id. Second, Plaintiff

expresses his frustration with the Eastern District of California, exclusively rooted in his lack of

success in pursuing litigation in that court and its determination to characterize him as a “vexatious

litigant” on mailings visible to the public, which he alleges constitutes “slander.” See id. at 2-3. He asks this Court to “establish jurisdiction” in this District for his cases, or alternatively, to order

the transfer of his cases to this District. See id. at 4. He also seeks unspecified money damages.

See id. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint.

First, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other federal

courts and their staff, to intervene in their cases or administrative matters, or to direct them to take

certain actions. See United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that

federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot

exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”).

Second, a federal court, its judges, and its staff are immune from suit for damages for

actions taken in the performance of their duties. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Sindram

v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Indeed, courts are absolutely immune for “all

actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence

of all jurisdiction.” Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9 (acknowledging

that a long line of Supreme Court precedents has held that a “judge is immune from a suit for

money damages”); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have

absolute immunity for any actions taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). “The scope of

the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.”

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Further, “a judge will not be deprived of immunity

because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”

Id.; see Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith

or malice.”); see also Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“It is well established

that judicial immunity ‘extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process.’” (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959))); Hester v. Dickerson, 576

F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2008) (absolute judicial immunity extends to clerks of the court).

Third, FTCA claims may only be brought against the United States itself, not against its

components or officers. See Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 125 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Failure

to name the United States as the defendant in an FTCA action requires dismissal for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). Here, Plaintiff has failed to sue the United

States, as required. See id.

Finally, “[c]laims that fall under one of the exceptions to the FTCA must be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under one such exception, the FTCA exempts from its waiver

of sovereign immunity any claim ‘arising out of’ libel or slander.” Edmonds v. United States, 436

F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted) (citing Sloan v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban

Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h)).

As such, Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this case

is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A separate order accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

Date: November 30, 2023 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge