Greene v. Equifax Information Services, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 SADE GREENE, Case No. 2:21-CV-466 JCM (DJA)

8 Plaintiff(s), AMENDED ORDER

9 v.

10 EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC,

11 Defendant(s).

12 13 Presently before the court is defendant Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc.1 (“DESC”)’s 14 second motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 53). Plaintiff Sade Greene (“Greene”) responded. (ECF No. 55). DESC replied. (ECF No. 58). 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This action arises from an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., commonly known 17 as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). On August 10, 2022, this court granted DESC’s first 18 motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Greene’s claims without prejudice and with 19 leave to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 50). Greene timely filed an amended complaint on 20 August 30, 2022. (ECF No. 51). 21 In late 2020, Greene disputed her credit report with Equifax, a credit reporting agency 22 (“CRA”), because a line on her credit report stated that a debt was “charged off” rather than “paid 23 in full.” (Id.). According to Greene, Equifax then notified DESC—which furnished the allegedly incorrect information—of the dispute. (Id.). Greene alleges that DESC failed to conduct a timely 24 investigation of the dispute and continued to report false and inaccurate information to Equifax, 25 which caused “damage for the loss of credit, loss of the ability to purchase and benefit from credit, 26 27 28 1 DESC is erroneously named as Dominion Energy, Inc., in this matter; DESC owns the account at issue. 1 and the mental and emotional pain, anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment of potential credit 2 denials.” (Id.). 3 Greene brings two causes of action against DESC: willful violation of the FCRA and negligent violation of the FCRA. (Id.). DESC again moves for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF 4 No. 53) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is proper if “taking 7 all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 8 law.” Gregg v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation 9 omitted). A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. That is, 10 the court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light 11 most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 Courts have discretion to grant leave to amend in conjunction with 12(c) motions. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 237 F.3d 13 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Under Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” grant leave to 14 amend “when justice so requires,” and absent “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 15 part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments . . . undue prejudice to the 16 opposing party . . . futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 17 The court should grant leave to amend “even if no request to amend the pleading was made.” 18 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Under the FCRA, a consumer may sue a “furnisher of information” and recover damages 21 if the furnisher willfully or negligently violated FCRA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o; see Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 503 (9th Cir. 2017). While not defined by the FCRA, courts define a 22 “furnisher of information” as “an entity which transmits information concerning a particular debt 23 owed by a particular consumer to consumer reporting agencies such as Equifax, Experian, MCCA, 24 and Trans Union.” Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 702, 704 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 25 Thus, the FCRA provides a statutory cause of action for Greene to pursue claims against DESC as 26 a furnisher. 27 To adequately plead a FCRA violation, plaintiff must allege with sufficient detail that the 28 information that the furnisher reported was inaccurate or misleading. See, e.g., Carvalho v. 1 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010). It follows that if the information 2 reported is accurate and not misleading, it constitutes a complete defense. 3 Greene alleges that DESC reported an account as a “charge-off” when in fact it has been paid and closed. (ECF No. 51). The parties do not dispute that the account was charged off nor 4 do they dispute that it was eventually paid in full and closed. Greene specifically contends that it 5 should not be reported as charged off when it was subsequently paid, and DESC contends that the 6 charge-off indication is historical data permissible on credit reports. (ECF Nos. 55, 58). 7 The reported information is not inaccurate nor misleading. Though the account payment 8 status is listed as “Charge-off,” the report includes an account status of “Closed,” a balance of 9 “$0,” and a comment that the account is a “PAID CHARGE OFF.” (ECF No. 43-1). Greene 10 argues that technically accurate information can still be materially misleading if it can be expected 11 to adversely affect credit decisions. (ECF No. 55 (citing Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 890)). While true, 12 the court declines to extend this rule so far as to find that any information that adversely affects credit decisions is materially misleading. 13 Viewing the information holistically, there is no plausible interpretation of the information 14 that DESC furnished other than that Greene’s account was charged off at some point, and it has 15 since been paid in full. (See ECF No. 43-1); cf. Barrow v. TransUnion, LLC, 2021 WL 1424681, 16 at *5 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 13, 2021) (denying a Rule 12(c) motion because there were multiple 17 plausible meanings of the plaintiff’s credit report when considered in its entirety). 18 The potential of the reported information to adversely affect Greene’s credit does not 19 warrant a finding that it is misleading. Greene argues that because automated processes and 20 artificial intelligence are used to analyze credit reports, the line indicating the payment status as a 21 charge-off adversely affects her credit score. (ECF No. 55). Regardless of the accuracy of this assertion, it is insufficient to hold DESC liable for any adverse effect to Greene’s credit when the 22 information it reported is accurate and not misleading. The allegations in the complaint fail to 23 demonstrate that DESC reported information that is inaccurate or misleading, and judgment on the 24 pleadings is proper. 25 This court has granted Greene leave to amend once, and there are no amendments that she 26 could make that would satisfy the inaccuracy element of a FCRA violation. Thus, the court does 27 not grant leave to amend. 28 . . . 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that DESC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 53) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 4 IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that the prior order (ECF No. 59) was filed in error, and is 5 hereby VACATED. 6 The clerk of the court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant and close 7 this case. 8 DATED August 10, 2023. 9 __________________________________________ 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28