Greene v. Demoss

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedAugust 13, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-00578
StatusUnknown

This text of Greene v. Demoss (Greene v. Demoss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greene v. Demoss, (W.D. La. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION TAYLA GREENE CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00578

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

DAKOTA DEMOSS, ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

The issue before this Court is whether a Protective Order, in the form of a gag order, should be implemented prohibiting Plaintiff Tayla Greene (“Tayla”) and her attorneys and associates of her attorneys’ law firm from making extrajudicial statements. Pending here is a Motion for Protective Order [Doc. No. 76] filed by Defendant Darby Hollingsworth (“Hollingsworth”), in her capacity as Tutrix for her minor son, G.H. Memoranda in Support of Hollingsworth’s Motion for Protective Order have been filed by Defendants Kory York (“York”) [Doc. No. 82], Dakota Demoss (“Demoss”) [Doc. No. 83], John Clary (“Clary”), Floyd McElroy (“McElroy”), and John Peters (“Peters”) [Doc. No. 84]. On August 4, 2021, the Associated Press (“AP”) filed a Motion to Intervene [Doc. No. 85] in this proceeding for the limited purpose of opposing the Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order. An Order allowing the intervention was signed on August 10, 2021 [Doc. No. 89]. An Opposition [Doc. No. 87] was filed by Tayla, Individually and as Administrator of the Ronald Greene Estate on August 5, 2021. A Reply [Doc. No. 91] was filed by Hollingsworth on August 12, 2021. For the reasons set forth herein, Hollingsworth’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND On May 6, 2020, Tayla filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] as a result of the death of her father, Ronald Greene (“Ronald”), which occurred on or about May 10, 2019. Tayla alleges that Defendant DeMoss, who was a Trooper for the Louisiana State Police, attempted to stop Ronald as a result of a traffic violation. Ronald did not stop, which resulted in a high-speed chase that went from Monroe, Louisiana into Union Parish, Louisiana. Ronald crashed his vehicle, and other Defendants, Peters, Clary, McElroy, Chris Hollingsworth1 (“C. Hollingsworth”), York, and Christopher Harpin (“Harpin”) arrived on the scene.

DeMoss, Peters, Clary, McElroy, C. Hollingsworth, and York are alleged to be law enforcement officers with the Louisiana State Police. Harpin is alleged to be a deputy law enforcement officer with the Union Parish Sheriff’s Office. Tayla alleges that after the crash, Ronald surrendered, but that Defendants used lethal force against him, resulting in his death. Defendants maintain that Ronald’s death was caused by crash-related blunt force chest trauma that resulted in a fractured sternum and ruptured aorta. Defendants further maintain they were required to use force to restrain Ronald for their own personal safety and for the safety of the public. Therefore, the central issue in this case is the cause of Ronald’s death. The in-custody death of Ronald has generated extensive media coverage. Hollingsworth alleges that Tayla’s attorneys have seized every opportunity to use the extensive media coverage to disparage the character, reputation, and credibility of the Defendants. Hollingsworth seeks a gag order in this case prohibiting Tayla and her attorneys, and associates, from making disparaging and provocative public statements about the character, reputations, and credibility of the other parties

1 Chris Hollingsworth, the husband of Darby Hollingsworth, died in an automobile accident on September 22, 2020. 2 in this litigation. Hollingsworth alleges that such extrajudicial statements by Tayla’s attorneys and associates will undermine the Defendants’ right to a fair trial. The AP filed an Opposition, [Doc. No. 90], stating the gag order is unnecessary for the attorneys, who are bound by Rule 3.6 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Alternatively, the AP maintains the request is overbroad, and requests that if a gag order is issued, it be narrowly drawn. Tayla filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 87] to the Motion for Protective Order, arguing that the public has benefited from this publicity due to the investigation of this incident having been reopened, and that a gag order violates their First

Amendment right of free speech. Additionally, Tayla’s attorneys maintain they are not violating Rule 3.6 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct because Rule 3.6(b)(6) allows an attorney to state “a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved where there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.” II. LAW AND ANALYSIS The theory of our judicial system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open Court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by “impartial” jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). Cases are too often tried in newspapers before they are tried in court, and the cast of characters in the newspaper trial too often differs greatly from the real persons who appear at the 3 trial in court, and who may have to suffer its distorted consequences. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 363 (1946) (Frankfurter, J. Concurring). This is just a sample of U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing the right to an impartial jury and the danger of extrajudicial statements influencing the jury. These cases were decided long before the internet, Twitter, Facebook, You-Tube, twenty-four-hour cable news stations and the many ways that now exist to influence the jury venire with extrajudicial statements. It is now more important than ever to safeguard the right to a fair trial. In U.S. v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit set the standard for regulating attorneys and

parties with a gag order. The Court held that a gag order of the attorneys and the parties does not violate the parties and attorneys First Amendment right of free speech if the extrajudicial commentary by those individuals would present a “substantial likelihood” of prejudicing the Court’s ability to conduct a fair trial. In adopting the “substantial likelihood” test, the Fifth Circuit used the test found in ABA Model Rule 3.6, which is also incorporated in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. A. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice Defendants ask this Court to impose a gag order on Tayla and her attorneys prohibiting extrajudicial comments about the Defendants which disparages the character, reputation, and credibility of the Defendants in this proceeding and/or which will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the Defendants’ right to a fair trial. This case will be tried by a jury in the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division. The jury venire will be drawn from the parishes of Ouachita, Lincoln, Caldwell, East Carroll, Franklin, Jackson, Madison, Morehouse, Richland, Tensas, Union, and West Carroll.

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Related

Bridges v. California
314 U.S. 252 (Supreme Court, 1941)
Pennekamp v. Florida
328 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Sheppard v. Maxwell
384 U.S. 333 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Smith v. Goguen
415 U.S. 566 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Procunier v. Martinez
416 U.S. 396 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale
443 U.S. 368 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.
501 U.S. 1030 (Supreme Court, 1991)
United States v. Noriega
917 F.2d 1543 (Eleventh Circuit, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
Greene v. Demoss, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greene-v-demoss-lawd-2021.