Greene v. City of San Francisco

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 16, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-06556
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 QUINCI GREENE, 7 Case No. 25-cv-06556-JCS Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., 10 Defendants. 11

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Quinci Greene, pro se, applied to proceed in forma pauperis and the Court granted 15 his application. See Docket No. 8. The Court now reviews the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint 16 to determine whether it satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because the complaint contains 17 claims that are not sufficiently pled, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the 18 complaint should not be dismissed in part, as set forth below. Plaintiff may file either an amended 19 complaint or a response to this order addressing why his complaint is sufficient, no later than 20 October 14, 2025. 21 II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT1 22 Plaintiff alleges that on September 4, 2024, he was approached by security officers at the 23 San Francisco Public Library who said, “Quinci Greene! You know you are suspended.” Compl., 24 dkt. no. 1 at ECF pp. 14-15. Plaintiff alleges that he told the security officers that he was not 25 suspended and had “documentation saying [he] was not suspended in [his] belongings” but 26 1 Because the factual allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint are generally taken as true in the context 27 of determining whether the complaint states a claim, this section summarizes Plaintiff’s 1 nonetheless walked towards the elevator to leave the building, as ordered by the security officers. 2 Id. at ECF p. 15, 29. According to Plaintiff he had no intention of resisting the orders of the 3 security officers and had left the elevator, accompanied by the security officers to exit the 4 building, when deputies of the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department (“SFSD”) arrived. Id. 5 Plaintiff alleges that the security officers and the deputies then “pushed [him] against the wall and 6 began punching and attacking [him].” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was “forcibly handcuffed and 7 imprisoned” in the library’s security office for over an hour, then was taken to San Francisco 8 County Jail at 850 Bryant Street, where he was “stripped naked,” forced to take a covid test and 9 held for two days without ever being taken before a judge, despite his requests. Id. 10 Plaintiff alleges that between 2021 and September 2024, security officers of the San 11 Francisco Public Library “engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow or 12 alarm or harass” him, alleging in particular: 13 Several times I was forced to leave the library. I was forced to leave the library without being shown a reason why or told anything other 14 than you are not allowed in the library. I did not try to stay in the library on these occasions, I would ask why and would always be told 15 by the [San Francisco Main Library Security] that my only options are to write the library and ask for an appeal of a suspension I had no 16 knowledge about. [In] 2022 I requested an appeal to the suspension. I believed the suspension to be FALSE, DECIETFUL, and VOID OF 17 TRUTH but because I was being harassed every time that I went into the library I decided to appeal and attend the appeal meeting and 18 inquire/ argue the validity of the appeal. [In] 2022 I was told the appeal would be sustained and that I could not enter the library again 19 until July 2024. 20 Compl. at ECF pp. 24-25. A document attached to the Complaint reflects that Plaintiff’s library 21 privileges were suspended based on an incident that occurred at the Excelsior Branch of the public 22 library on September 22, 2022 and that the suspension expired on July 24, 2024. Id. at ECF p. 32. 23 Plaintiff alleges that SFSD “is used by the City and County of San Francisco & San 24 Francisco Main Library to enforce codes/statutes/rules of the library, and to hold/arrest any US 25 Citizen that breaks any of the library’s rules.” Id. at ECF p. 12. 26 Plaintiff names as defendants: 1) the City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”); 2) the 27 San Francisco Main Library; 3) San Francisco Main Library Security; and 4) SFSD. With respect 1 claims against both the entities and the officers involved, as Doe defendants. See id. at ECF pp. 2 11-12 (listing Doe defendants as separate parties). 3 The complaint contains several pages listing statues, constitutional amendments, and other 4 documents in a section entitled “legal claims”. Id. at ECF pp. 12-14. These purported sources of 5 authority are not specifically linked to particular claims and many, such as the “Zodiac 6 Constitution,” are not recognized as legal authority by federal courts. The Complaint also 7 articulates six causes of action, which are asserted against all four defendants: 1) “Extreme 8 negligence,” id. at ECF pp. 16-18; 2) “Invasion of Privacy/False Arrest,” id. at ECF pp. 18-19; 3) 9 “Prolonged Detention/ Overdetention, False Imprisonment,” id. at ECF pp. 19-20; 4) “Assault, 10 Battery, Use of Excessive Force,” id. at ECF p. 21; 5) “Unlawful Search, Unlawful Seizure,” id. 11 at ECF pp. 21-23; and 6) “Emotional Damage/Mental Stress,” id. at ECF pp. 23-24. Each claim 12 includes a long list of statutes, constitutional amendments and other authorities that were 13 purportedly violated, and multiple theories of liability. 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 A. Legal Standards Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6) 16 Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave 17 to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which: 18 (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek 19 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 20 Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). 21 To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff must make “a short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, a claim may be 23 dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 24 see also Diaz v. Int’l Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 25 2007). In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court takes “all allegations of 26 material fact in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non- 27 moving party.” Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 1 inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 2 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “do not 3 necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 4 factual allegations.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 5 quotation marks omitted). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must 6 allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (citing 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 8 Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, courts must “construe the 9 pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 10 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). “A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint 11 unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be cured by 12 amendment.” Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds 13 by statute, as recognized in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Further, 14 when it dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, “the district court must 15 provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the 16 litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Id. (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 17 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant 18 will likely repeat previous errors.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th 19 Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). 20 B. Discussion 21 As a preliminary matter, the Court wishes to make clear to Plaintiff, who has declined the 22 jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), that the Court 23 finds that Plaintiff has pled some valid claims, as explained further below. Thus, even if Plaintiff 24 fails to respond to this Order to Show Cause, or does not cure the defects identified herein, the 25 undersigned will recommend to the district judge that those claims be permitted to go forward. As 26 to the claims that are inadequately pled, however, the undersigned will recommend dismissal 27 unless Plaintiff files an amended complaint that cures the defects the Court has identified or a 1 C. Rule 8 2 The Court’s review of the complaint in this case has been made difficult by Plaintiff’s 3 failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead of 4 “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” the complaint is 5 lengthy, convoluted and cites a multitude of legal authorities, making it impossible to determine, 6 except in a very approximate sense, the legal or factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims. It is beyond 7 the scope of this review to address each of the many statutes, constitutional provisions and other 8 documents cited in each claim. Instead, the Court will review what it understands to be the gist of 9 Plaintiff’s claims. To the extent that the Court may have misconstrued Plaintiff’s claims or omitted 10 claims he seeks to assert, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that is in compliance with Rule 11 8 to clarify what claims he is asserting and the legal and factual basis for those claims. 12 D. Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 14 1983 based on violation of his First Amendment rights to practice his religion and to access the 15 library, see Compl. at ECF pp. 17, 25, and his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from excessive 16 force, false arrest and delayed presentation to a judge following his warrantless arrest. 17 1. Proper Defendants Under Section 1983 18 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 19 law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 20 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The term “person” under 21 section 1983 encompasses state and local officials sued in their individual capacities, private 22 individuals and entities that acted under color of state law, and local governmental entities but 23 does not include municipal departments. Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 760 24 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Thus, CCSF is a proper defendant as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, but the 25 San Francisco Public Library and its security office are not. Sanders v. San Francisco Pub. Libr., 26 No. 23-CV-00211-JSW, 2023 WL 5723695, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2023) (holding that San 27 Francisco Public Library is an unincorporated municipal department and therefore may not be 1 City and County of San Francisco.). Likewise, SFSD, as a municipal department, is not a proper 2 defendant on Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. See Garcia, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (holding that 3 city police department and county sheriff’s department were not “persons” under Section 1983). 4 As to the SFSD officers named as Doe defendants, these individuals are “persons” under 5 Section 1983 so long as they are sued in their individual capacities. See Bowman v. Anderson, No. 6 CR-F-04-5389 OWW DLB, 2005 WL 8176402, at *3 n. 1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2005) (citing 7 Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th. 820, 826 (2004)). The use of “Doe Defendants” is 8 generally disfavored in federal court because, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible to serve 9 a summons and pleading on an anonymous defendant. Menefee v. Tigard Police Dep't, No. 3:20- 10 CV-01497-AC, 2020 WL 6547640, at *2 n. 1 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2020). “Nonetheless, the use of Doe 11 Defendants may be necessary when a plaintiff cannot discover the identity of the defendant before 12 filing the operative pleading.” Id. Given the early stage of the case and the likelihood that 13 Plaintiff will be able to determine the identity of the sheriff’s deputies involved in his arrest 14 through discovery, it is recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed, at least until some 15 discovery has occurred, against the sheriff’s deputies as Doe defendants. 16 Likewise, because discovery will likely allow for the determination of the identities of the 17 library security officers involved in detaining Plaintiff, it is recommended that Plaintiff be 18 permitted to proceed against them as Doe defendants as well. Further, while the facts alleged in 19 the complaint are insufficient to determine whether these individuals are employed by the County, 20 they can be sued as state actors on the basis that they are alleged to have acted jointly with the 21 sheriff’s deputies as to both the use of excess force and Plaintiff’s detention and arrest. See 22 Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) (private individual may be liable under § 1983 23 under joint action test where there was “substantial degree of cooperation” between private party 24 and state official). In particular, there was a “substantial degree of cooperation” between the 25 security officers and SFSD as Plaintiff alleges that the sheriff’s department provides security for 26 the San Francisco Public Library, that the library security officers called SFSD for back-up, that 27 the security officers and the deputies together used excessive force on him, and that Plaintiff was 1 id. 2 In sum, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail to state a claim against SFSD, the San Francisco 3 Main Library and the San Francisco Main Library Security Office because they are not proper 4 defendants under Section 1983. As to the remaining Defendants (CCSF and the Doe Defendants), 5 the Court addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims below. 6 2. First Amendment Claims 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “used a group of armed guards to unlawfully stop, assault, 8 and hold me, Quinci Greene Hostage, a private person who committed no crime—prohibiting me 9 from moving and traveling and honoring my religious faith [Islamism]. . . .” Compl. at ECF p. 17. 10 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 11 religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. It is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams, No. 24-4101, 2025 WL 2385151, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 13 2025). Where an individual is in custody, this right is “violated where a defendant burdens the 14 practice of a prisoner’s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his 15 faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Dunbar v. 16 Coffman, No. 24-CV-08898-AMO (PR), 2025 WL 1696557, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2025) 17 (citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997)). “To reach the level of a 18 constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of religion must be more than an 19 inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is 20 central to religious doctrine.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 21 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts showing that Defendants interfered with 22 his right to practice his religion. Therefore, he fails to state a claim under the First Amendment’s 23 free exercise clause against any defendant. 24 Plaintiff also alleges that he was “deprived” of his ability “to use the ‘free and public 25 library.’” Compl. at ECF p. 25. The First Amendment’s protection of the “ ‘right to receive 26 information and ideas’ has been held to encompass ‘the right to some level of access to a public 27 library.’ ” Van Den Heuvel v. Dorothy, No. 221CV2176TLNCKDPS, 2022 WL 95237, at *3 (E.D. 1 1255 (3d Cir. 1992)). In Van Den Heuval, the court explained: 2 “Most courts addressing this issue have relied on Kreimer to hold that a public library is ‘a limited public forum.’ ” Grant-Davis v. Bd. of 3 Trustees of Charleston Cty. Pub. Libr., No. 2:15-CV-2676-PMD- MGB, 2017 WL 9360875, at *19 (D.S.C. May 24, 2017) (compiling 4 cases). “As a limited public forum, the Library is obligated only to permit the public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature 5 of the Library and consistent with the government's intent in designating the Library as a public forum.” Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1261 6 (recognizing library's purpose “to aid in the acquisition of knowledge through reading, writing and quiet contemplation”). Thus, a library's 7 enforcement of a rule against (for example) harassing others or noisy activities likely does not violate the First Amendment, provided it is 8 applied reasonably. See id. at 1263 (applying “reasonableness” standard and noting that “[p]rohibiting disruptive behavior is perhaps 9 the clearest and most direct way to achieve maximum library use.”); Grant-Davis, 2017 WL 9360875, at *22-23 (dismissing First 10 Amendment claim where plaintiff was denied access to library for having violated its rules prohibiting “loud unreasonable, and or 11 disturbing actions” and “[t]hreatening behavior toward another person, either verbally or physically”); Brinkmeier v. City of Freeport, 12 No. 93 C 20039, 1993 WL 248201, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1993) (“[A] rule which prohibits disruptive behavior in a public library is at least 13 conceptually inoffensive to the First Amendment.”). 14 Id. 15 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was doing nothing disruptive or offensive when he was told 16 by security guards to leave the library, and that the suspension of his library privileges had already 17 expired, as he told the officers. At the pleading stage, the Court takes these allegations to be true 18 and finds that Plaintiff has raised a plausible inference that his exclusion from the library was 19 unreasonable. Accordingly, he has stated a claim for violation of his First Amendment right to 20 access the library against the Doe defendant library security officers who ordered him to leave the 21 library. As discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the 22 County on these grounds because he has not satisfied the requirements of Monell. 23 3. Fourth Amendment Claims 24 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 25 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Velazquez v. 26 City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). The Fourth 27 Amendment further requires that the force used by law enforcement to carry out a seizure must be 1 397 (1989). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the security officers and sheriff’s deputies assaulted 2 and arrested him even though the suspension of his library privileges had expired and he was 3 complying with the instructions of the security officers to leave the building. These allegations 4 are sufficient to support his Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest and excessive force claims against 5 the Doe defendants. As discussed further below, however, these Fourth Amendment claims fail 6 against CCSF under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 7 (1978). 8 Plaintiff also alleges that his Constitutional rights were violated based on his alleged two- 9 day detention without being presented to a judge for a probable cause determination. “In Gerstein 10 v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a 11 prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended detention following 12 a warrantless arrest.” Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on 13 other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court 14 subsequently explained that “judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest 15 will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” Cnty. of Riverside 16 v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Nonetheless, a delay of less than 48 hours may be 17 unconstitutional where a plaintiff can prove “that his or her probable cause determination was 18 delayed unreasonably.” Id. “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of 19 gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested 20 individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id. 21 Here, the only named Defendant to which such an unreasonable delay claim might apply 22 appears to be CCSF as there are no allegations suggesting that any of the other defendants who are 23 proper defendants under Section 1983 had a role in holding Plaintiff at the jail or preventing him 24 from being taken promptly to appear before a judge. (As discussed above, SFSD is not a proper 25 defendant on a Section 1983 claim.) Again, however, CCSF may only be held liable under 26 Section 1983 for Plaintiff’s two-day detention if it was following an established policy or 27 procedure, as discussed below, which Plaintiff has not alleged here. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 1 for a probable cause hearing. 2 4. Monell Claims 3 The Supreme Court has long held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 4 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents,” but instead only for injuries caused by “a 5 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 6 may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 7 (1978). Thus, to adequately plead a Section 1983 claim against a governmental entity,” a “plaintiff 8 must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the 9 municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's 10 constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional 11 violation.’ ” Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 12 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). 13 A plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability under section 1983 may do so by 14 demonstrating: 1) that a municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional violation 15 “pursuant to a formal governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom which constitutes 16 the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity;” 2) that the individual who 17 committed the constitutional violation was an official with “final policy-making authority and that 18 the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official government policy;” or 3) that “an 19 official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or 20 action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). 21 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose Monell liability against CCSF based on the 22 constitutional violations discussed above, he must allege specific facts showing that the 23 constitutional violations were the result of an official policy. Conclusory allegations that the 24 violations were the result of failure to train or supervise officers is insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 25 U.S. at 678. Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was asked to leave the library “several” times 26 between 2021 and 2024 is not sufficient to plausibly allege a custom or policy that was the moving 27 force behind any of the alleged constitutional violations. See Compl. at ECF p. 24. While this 1 violated, it contains no details of the circumstances of the evictions, including whether his library 2 privileges were suspended at the time and the reasons for any suspensions. Therefore, these 3 allegations are insufficient to plead that Plaintiff was denied access to the library pursuant to a 4 formal governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom. 5 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a viable Section 1983 claim against 6 CCSF. 7 E. State Law Claims 8 Plaintiff also appears to assert state law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of 9 emotional distress (“IIED”), Assault and Battery, Intrusion into Private Affairs and False 10 Imprisonment. These claims are insufficiently alleged because Plaintiff has not satisfied the 11 claims presentation requirements under California’s Government Tort Claims Act. In particular, 12 before bringing a suit against a public entity, the Tort Claims Act requires the timely presentation 13 of a written claim and a rejection in whole or part. Cal. Gov. Code section 905. Likewise, under 14 Cal. Gov’t Code section 950.2, “ ‘a cause of action against a public employee . . . for injury 15 resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred’ 16 unless a timely claim has been filed against the employing public entity.” Fowler v. Howell, 42 17 Cal. App. 4th 1746, 1750–51 (1996). Further, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating either 18 compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act requirement or an excuse for noncompliance in 19 order to state a claim. State of California v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234 (2004). Plaintiff has 20 not alleged either in his complaint. Therefore, his state law claims fail to state a claim as 21 currently pled. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this case should not be dismissed, in part, 24 for the reasons discussed above. Plaintiff may respond by filing either an amended complaint that 25 addresses the deficiencies discussed above or a response that addresses why his current complaint 26 is sufficient. Plaintiff’s response shall be filed by October 14, 2025. If Plaintiff does not file a 27 response by that date, the case will be reassigned to a United States district judge with a 1 Any amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order 2 and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended 3 complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, any amended complaint may not 4 || incorporate claims or allegations of Plaintiff’s original complaint by reference, but instead must 5 include all of the facts and claims Plaintiff wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to 6 sue. 7 Plaintiff, who is not represented by counsel, is encouraged to consult with the Federal Pro 8 || Bono Project’s Legal Help Center in either of the Oakland or San Francisco federal courthouses 9 for assistance. The San Francisco Legal Help Center office is located in Room 2796 on the 15th 10 floor at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102. The Oakland office is located in 11 Room 470 S on the 4th floor at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Appointments, which are 12 || currently being conducted by telephone or video-conference, can be made by calling (415) 782- 5 13 8982 or emailing federalprobonoproject @ sfbar.org. Lawyers at the Legal Help Center can 14 || provide basic assistance to parties representing themselves but cannot provide legal representation. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

= 17 Dated: September 16, 2025 LZ CZ J PH C. SPERO 19 nited States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28