Green v. United States

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 6, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00632
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 COREY BERNARD GREEN, Case No.: 18-CR-2249-AJB Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 12 MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, v. 13 OR CORRECT SENTENCE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 14 Respondent. 15 (Doc. No. 61) 16 Petitioner Corey Bernard Green (“Green”) moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Section 17 2255”) to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance 18 of counsel (“Section 2255 Petition”). (Doc. No. 61.) The United States opposes the Section 19 2255 Petition. An evidentiary hearing was held by the Court on May 19, 2021. (Doc. No. 20 118.) For the reasons discussed in detail below, the Court DENIES Green’s Section 2255 21 Petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 A Complaint was filed against Green on March 14, 2018, for the knowing and 24 intentional distribution of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, which resulted in 25 death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 1.) On April 10, 26 2018, Green was arrested, and Federal Defenders was appointed as counsel. (Doc. No. 9.) 27 On April 11, 2018, Elizabeth M. Barros of Federal Defenders filed a notice of appearance 28 in the matter. (Doc. No. 13.) On May 8, 2018, Green waived prosecution by Indictment, 1 and an Information was filed against Green for the knowing and intentional distribution of 2 a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, which resulted in death, in violation of 21 3 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 18.) That same day, Green was arraigned, 4 and entered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 20.) Then, on May 25, 2018, Caitlin E. Howard 5 with Federal Defenders appeared as co-counsel for Green. (Doc. No. 22.) On October 31, 6 2018, a Superseding Information was filed against Green for knowingly and intentionally 7 distributing a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 8 (a)(1). (Doc. No. 31.) Importantly, the Superseding Information removed the charge under 9 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) for the knowing and intentional distribution of a mixture and 10 substance containing fentanyl, resulting in death. (Id.) The same day, Green tendered a 11 guilty plea on Count 1 of the Superseding Information. (Doc. Nos. 33–36.) As a result, on 12 April 5, 2019, Green was sentenced to 151 months in custody. (Doc. No. 49.) Green filed 13 a Section 2255 Petition on March 31, 2020. (Doc. No. 61.) An evidentiary hearing was 14 held on May 19, 2021, in which Green was represented by counsel. (Doc. No. 118.) This 15 order follows. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under Section 2255, a petitioner is entitled to relief if the sentence (1) was imposed 18 in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (2) was given by a court 19 without jurisdiction to do so, (3) was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by 20 law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. 21 Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). To warrant relief, a movant must 22 demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude that had a substantial and 23 injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 24 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Relief is warranted only where a movant has shown “a 25 fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. 26 United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). 27 Here, Green alleges his sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment 28 right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 1 (1984); United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2006). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 Green brings a Section 2255 Petition centered solely on a single claim of ineffective 4 assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 61.) Specifically, Green alleges his counsel was ineffective 5 during the plea negotiation process when counsel “coerced” him into taking a plea, and 6 provided erroneous advice based on an inaccurate interpretation of the facts relevant to 7 Green’s criminal case. (Id. at 4.) 8 The Supreme Court has held “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies 9 to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 10 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985). In a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner 11 must meet the Strickland test by showing that (1) under an objective standard, “counsel’s 12 assistance was not within the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases” 13 and (2) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice because of this incompetence. See Lambert 14 v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2004). “Unless a defendant makes both 15 showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the 16 adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 17 1. First Strickland Prong—Deficient Performance 18 The Court will first address the “deficient performance” Strickland prong. Green’s 19 primary argument regarding his counsel’s purported deficient performance is that he was 20 coerced into accepting the plea deal. (Doc. No. 61 at 19.) Specifically, Green avers his 21 counsel advised him to accept the plea, or else face the possibility that he would never be 22 released from prison. (Id.) Furthermore, Green argues that counsel erroneously interpreted 23 the slang term “China” to mean fentanyl instead of heroin. (Id.) 24 With respect to the first Strickland factor, “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains 25 of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s 26 representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 27 687–88. This involves proving “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” by “showing 28 that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 1 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also 2 Iaea v. Sunnn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). Counsel’s performance is deficient when 3 it is unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 4 criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 5 must be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689. There is a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s 6 conduct and strategy falls “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 7 Id. To establish that his counsel’s conduct was unconstitutionally substandard, a Section 8 2255 petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his counsel 9 acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable. United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 10 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ferreira–Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th 11 Cir. 1996) (“Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong 12 presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 13 representation.”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 2001). It is the 14 petitioner’s burden to provide the Court with sufficient evidence from which the Court can 15 conclude his counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. 16 Green’s contention that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea is unsupported by 17 the evidence and fails for several reasons. A guilty plea is coerced where a defendant is 18 “induced by promises or threats which deprive [the plea] of the nature of a voluntary act.” 19 Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 Green appears to claim that he was pressured into taking the plea deal because (1) counsel 21 advised Green he could be facing life in prison, and (2) the term “China” was 22 misinterpreted by counsel to mean fentanyl instead of heroin. (Doc. No. 61 at 19.) At the 23 evidentiary hearing, Green also departed from his original claims in his Section 2255 24 Petition by adding that he did not receive adequate discovery for review before deciding to 25 enter his guilty plea. (Doc. No. 121 at 2:4–6.) The Court will address each argument in 26 turn. 27 // 28 // 1 a) Green’s Claim That He Was Coerced Into Accepting the 2 Plea Agreement 3 First, Green asserts that he was essentially “threatened” and “coerced” into accepting 4 the Plea Agreement because counsel advised Green to plead guilty or else he would “not 5 ever get out of prison.” (Doc. No. 61 at 19.) The evidence shows the contrary. First, at the 6 evidentiary hearing, the question was posed to Ms. Barros: “Did you tell Mr. Green that if 7 he went to trial, there was a good chance he would spend the rest of his life in prison?” In 8 response to this question, Ms. Barros answered “[n]o.” (Doc. No. 121 at 6:5–7.) In 9 weighing Green’s evidence and Ms. Barros’s testimony, the Court notes that Green’s self- 10 serving statements at the evidentiary hearing were directly contradictory to Green’s earlier 11 statements in open court during his Plea Hearing. For example, Green testified at the 12 evidentiary hearing that he was pressured into taking the plea deal, (Id. at 2:13–17), while 13 at the prior Plea Hearing, Green declared, under oath, that he was not threatened or coerced 14 by anyone into pleading guilty. (Doc. No. 73 at 8.) By contrast, Ms. Barros’s testimony 15 was not impeached at the evidentiary hearing. Thus, on balance, the Court accepts Ms. 16 Barros’s unimpeached testimony that she did not threaten or coerce Green into entering a 17 guilty plea. (Doc. No. 121 at 5:7–11) (answering “no” to the questions of “when you sat 18 down to review the plea agreement with him, did you make any threats to him?” and “[d]id 19 you in any way coerce him into accepting this plea?”). 20 Moreover, the Court is also mindful that the charge in the initial Information, for the 21 knowing and intentional distribution of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, which 22 resulted in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), carried a 23 mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years with a possibility of life in prison. Therefore, 24 any statement by counsel regarding the length of the possible sentence would not indicate 25 a threat or deficient performance. Rather, advising and counseling clients as to the possible 26 sentence of an offense is required of any competent criminal defense attorney. Here, not 27 only did counsel adequately advise Green as to the law regarding his possible sentence, but 28 counsel was also able to negotiate a Plea Agreement that removed the twenty-year 1 mandatory minimum attached to the distribution of fentanyl, resulting in death count. This 2 result does not demonstrate incompetence but instead vigorous and effective advocacy on 3 Green’s behalf. 4 b) Green’s Claim That Counsel Erroneously Interpreted the 5 Term “China” 6 Second, Green contends that he would not have accepted the Plea Agreement if his 7 attorneys did not erroneously advise him that the term “China” meant a substance 8 containing fentanyl. (Doc. No. 61 at 19.) This argument is also lacking in merit and does 9 not show deficient performance. At the evidentiary hearing, Green testified that he had 10 reviewed the Complaint against him, which included a definition of “China.” (Doc. No. 11 121 at 2:22–3:1.) The definition in the Complaint explained that the Government 12 understood “China” to mean a “street slang for a pure form of heroin containing fentanyl.” 13 (Doc. No. 1 at 4 n.i.) This definition in the Complaint is at odds with Green’s claim in his 14 Section 2255 Petition regarding the definition of “China.” Green now claims that he 15 understood “China” to mean heroin. Yet, there is no meaningful evidence in the record that 16 establishes Green challenged this definition during the plea negotiation process after 17 reviewing the Complaint, or that Green insisted upon proceeding to trial based on this fact. 18 Furthermore, as revealed during the evidentiary hearing, Green’s counsel conducted 19 an extensive investigation, which spanned the length of six months in an effort to pursue 20 every last lead on Green’s behalf. (Id. at 5:17–24.) In fact, Ms. Barros testified that at 21 minimum, 140 total hours were spent on Green’s criminal case. (Id. at 4:9–13.) Also telling, 22 the record reflects that defense counsel reviewed all available discovery, probed into 23 possible third-party culpability, requested more information from the Government when 24 they believed the evidence incomplete, and waited for the autopsy and toxicology reports 25 before the Plea Agreement was entered into. (Id.) Indeed, these six months provided both 26 counsel and Green ample time to fully understand, and agree, on the term “China.” What’s 27 more, it was not until after it was confirmed that there were traces of heroin in the 28 decedent’s urine that counsel made the determination that a guilty plea was the appropriate 1 manner of proceeding. (Id. at 5:17–24.) Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence 2 suggesting shortcomings of Green’s counsel with regard to the term “China.” To the 3 contrary, the evidence shows that counsel zealously represented Green at every stage of 4 the proceedings. Based on the evidence that was present, defense counsel had a reasonable 5 basis to believe that Green would not prevail at trial. 6 c) Green’s Claim That He Was Denied the Opportunity to 7 Review Discovery 8 Third, Green alleged for the first time at the evidentiary hearing that he did not 9 receive physical copies of discovery in his case. Particularly, Green states that it was not 10 until after he received his case file upon the conclusion of the case that he became aware 11 of discovery he had not had time to review. (Id. at 3:20–4:3.) As a preliminary matter, the 12 Court need not consider new allegations or arguments not included in Green’s Section 2255 13 Petition. See Alvarado v. FedEx Corp., No. C 04–00098 SI, 2006 WL 644875, at *1 (N.D. 14 Cal. Mar. 13, 2006). But even if it did, the Court does not find that counsels’ decision to 15 withhold physical copies of the discovery from Green unreasonable. Indeed, counsel was 16 ordered by the Court to keep custody of the physical copies of discovery. (Doc. No. 121 at 17 2:5–7.) Thus, the fact that counsel did not provide Green physical copies of discovery did 18 not make counsel’s actions deficient. It is not unusual for counsel to decline to provide 19 defendants copies of discovery especially if the requested documents come under the 20 purview of a protective order. See Thomas v. United States, No. CR120052302PHXDGC, 21 2021 WL 2105611, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 25, 2021) (noting that the court had ordered that 22 all discovery pertaining to a certain issue remain in the custody of defense counsel). 23 Furthermore, Green does not point to any specific evidence that he claims he did not 24 have access to. No argument is made that counsel failed to properly notify Green of 25 exculpatory discovery. In fact, Ms. Barros testified at the evidentiary hearing that all 26 discovery was summarized to Green in prison. (Doc. No. 121 at 4:22–5:1.) (“[A]ll of the 27 printed . . . discovery I would have taken to the jail, and I would have reviewed with Mr. 28 Green. The media discovery . . . I would have either summarized for Mr. Green or printed 1 excerpts of.”). And as for any media evidence, counsel made arrangements to bring a laptop 2 computer into the detention facility in which Green was housed so that Green can access 3 the digital discovery. (Id. at 6:19–24.) Contrary to Green’s assertions, the testimony shows 4 that Ms. Barros was meticulous in spending time with Green in reviewing the discovery 5 that was available. Thus, the Court finds no shortcomings as it relates to counsel’s actions 6 regarding discovery. 7 d) Green Voluntarily, Knowingly, and Intelligently Entered 8 into the Plea Agreement 9 Finally, Green points to no evidence demonstrating that his agreement to enter into 10 the plea was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. While Green asserts that counsel 11 coerced him to plead guilty, he provides no explanation as to how such coercion was 12 accomplished. He does not describe any actual threats made by counsel or other conduct 13 that would support his conclusory statement that he was coerced. Given the lengthy and 14 detailed plea colloquy conducted by Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford, which expressly 15 included a question as to whether Green had any complaint or dissatisfaction with the legal 16 services he had received, (Doc. No. 73 at 8), and Green’s failure to claim any type of 17 coercion at the time of the plea, this aspect of Green’s claim is deficient on its face. Indeed, 18 the Court specifically asked Green during his Plea Hearing whether his plea was the result 19 of any threats: 20 THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the services that your lawyer has provided to you? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Did anyone threaten you to get you to plead guilty today? THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Anybody promise you anything other than what is set forth in 24 these two documents in exchange for your guilty plea? THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: And considering the consequences you face, do you still wish 26 to enter a guilty plea before me this morning? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 27

28 (Doc. No. 73 at 8–9.) 1 The only evidence that Green brings forth as to his attorneys’ alleged coercion is his 2 own self-serving testimony. There is a significant amount of contrary evidence in the 3 record. The transcript of the colloquy shows that the Court carefully explained the rights 4 that Green was agreeing to waive, and that Green understood the nature of the waiver. (Id. 5 at 3–4 (advising Green of his constitutional rights, including the right to persist in a plea of 6 not guilty, the right to a speedy and public trial or the right to be tried by a judge, the right 7 to an attorney, and the right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses)). 8 Further, at his Plea Hearing, Green affirmed specifically that he had reviewed his 9 Plea Agreement with his counsel, and that he had no further questions about it: 10 THE COURT: And do your initials and signature indicate that you reviewed both documents in their entirety, including the provisions on waiver of appeal 11 and collateral attack, set forth in the plea agreement, that you discussed them 12 with your lawyer and that you understood them before signing them? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Do you have any questions about either document? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Not at this time, no.

15 (Doc. No. 73 at 10.) 16

17 There is a “strong presumption” of truthfulness afforded to “solemn declarations 18 made in open court.” Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986). Given Green’s 19 clear and unequivocal statements during his Plea Hearing, the Court finds that Green’s 20 allegations in his Section 2255 Petition directly contradict his statements in open court. See 21 Kingsbury v. United States, 783 F. App’x 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 668 (2019) 22 (“Defendant failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly 23 feeling pressured to plead guilty by his attorney. . . . [D]efendant’s prior sworn statements 24 directly contradicted the allegations presented in the motion to vacate conviction petition”). 25 At the evidentiary hearing, Green called into question his ability to enter into a plea 26 knowingly and intelligently. Green highlights that even defense counsel decided to order a 27 psychological evaluation during the criminal prosecution of his case. (Doc. No. 121 at 7:3– 28 9.) But the fact that defense counsel ordered a psychological evaluation on Green during 1 his criminal proceeding is unremarkable. For example, defense counsel could have ordered 2 a psychological evaluation for a multitude of reasons, including to determine possible 3 avenues of mitigation, or for use for sentencing purposes. The Court also notes that despite 4 the psychological evaluation, there was no finding of incompetence precluding Green from 5 proceeding with the case. This was affirmed by Green’s own testimony where he testified 6 that around April 4, 2019, he was in a “good state of mind.” (Id. at 3:9–13.) 7 In light of the substantial record on this issue, the Court finds Green’s claim that he 8 was coerced into signing the Plea Agreement to be without merit. See Doe v. Woodford, 9 508 F.3d 563, 572 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have no doubt that the decision to plead guilty is 10 a difficult one for many Petitioners, but the fact that one struggles with the decision, and 11 might later even come to regret it, does not render it coerced.”). Green has not provided 12 any evidence or further argument to rebut any of these facts. Under the first Strickland 13 prong, counsel’s assistance was well within the range of competence demanded of counsel 14 in criminal cases. There is no evidence otherwise. As such, the Court concludes that this 15 ground does not constitute an adequate basis to find counsel ineffective. 16 2. Second Strickland Prong—Prejudice 17 Although the Court concludes Green has not demonstrated that counsel was 18 ineffective, the Court will nevertheless briefly address the “prejudice” Strickland factor. 19 As to this factor, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show 20 that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 21 pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58–59. With 22 regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, the probability of prejudice may 23 not be based merely upon conjecture or speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 24 1246 (2002) (Kennedy, J. concurrence) (regarding speculation as having no place in a 25 Strickland analysis). 26 Green claims that “absent counsel’s erroneous advice, the outcome of the process 27 would have been different.” (Doc. No. 61 at 20.) Specifically, Green contends there was 28 “sufficient evidence” to hold Green accountable for “the crime of the use of [a] 1 communication facility in committing a drug offense (phone count)” along with a 2 distribution of heroin count. (Id.) Green points out that these counts would have carried a 3 lighter sentence than the sentence that was imposed on Green. However, Green does not 4 adequately explain how counsel’s actions deprived him of the ability to be charged with a 5 “phone count.” There is simply no evidence that the United States was ever going to 6 prosecute Green under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) for the “phone count.” The decision to charge 7 defendants with specific crimes rests with the United States—not defense counsel. As such, 8 the Court holds that this basis does not allow for a finding of prejudice. 9 Next, Green argues for the first time at the evidentiary hearing that he was denied 10 his right to trial. (Doc. No. 121.) Green contends he was prejudiced because but for his 11 attorneys’ errors, he would have not pled guilty. (Id.) But the Court does not find that there 12 is sufficient prejudice because the law for distribution offenses only requires that the 13 Government prove that Green understood the substance he was distributing to be fentanyl 14 or some other prohibited substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1). Assuming that the Court 15 accepted Green’s contention that he did not know that the substance he sold was fentanyl, 16 Green nevertheless admitted on multiple occasions to selling heroin, a controlled 17 substance. (Doc. No. 48-1.) Therefore, regardless of whether Green understood that the 18 substance he sold was heroin or fentanyl, Green would be criminally liable for the 19 distribution of an illicit drug. And as noted above, it was not until defense counsel 20 confirmed that there were traces of heroin in the decedent’s urine that counsel made the 21 determination that a guilty plea was the appropriate manner of proceeding. The evidence 22 is also crystal clear that Green accepted responsibility—before and after sentencing—to 23 the distribution of a controlled substance. (See Doc. No. 39 at 4.) Accordingly, the Court 24 does not find that Green suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s litigation strategy. 25 In sum, Green requests the Court vacate and set aside his guilty plea and sentence, 26 and set this case for trial because he is innocent of the charged offense. However, his 27 requested relief is not within the confines of, or contemplated by, Section 2255. This matter 28 is not a direct appeal, and factual innocence is not at issue for the purpose of this Section 1 Petition. 2 CONCLUSION 3 After careful consideration of the record, this Court finds that there is no evidence 4 supporting Green’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel beyond his own self-serving 5 statements. The only evidence supporting Green’s claims is his own post-hoc statements 6 || which directly contradict his in-court statements. Nothing in the record shows that Green’s 7 ||representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Because the record 8 ||refutes Green’s allegations and otherwise precludes habeas relief, Petitioner’s motion is 9 || DENIED. (Doc. No. 61.) 10 In addition, the Court denies Green a certificate of appealability. A petitioner is 11 |/required to obtain a certificate of appealability in order to appeal a decision denying a 12 || motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the 13 || petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and 14 reasonable jurists could debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, 15 |/or that the issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. 16 || Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Green has not made the necessary 17 showing. A certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED. 18 Finally, in light of this Court’s conclusion, the Court sets a status hearing of July 19, 19 || 2021 at 9:00 AM to further address custodial and other remaining issues. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: July 6, 2021 © g 23 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 12