Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 18, 2020
Docket3:19-cv-00680
StatusUnknown

This text of Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. (Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., (W.D.N.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-00680-FDW-DSC BRIAN GREEN,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Joinder and Consolidation. (Doc. No. 17). Plaintiff submitted an Opposition Motion (Doc. No. 22), to which Defendant replied. (Doc. No. 26). Defendant’s Motion is now ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion for Joinder and Consolidation is hereby GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Pro se Plaintiff Brian Green (“Plaintiff or “Mr. Green”) filed the instant suit against Defendant Midland Credit Management (“Defendant” or “Midland”) on December 12, 2019. (Doc. No. 1). He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on May 8, 2020. (Doc. No. 4). As set forth in the Amended Complaint, Mr. Green alleges Defendant violated both the North Carolina Debt Collection Act (“NCDCA”) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) when Defendant allegedly contacted him in attempts to “collect a consumer debt.” (Doc. No. 4, p. 4). Defendant filed the instant Motion for Joinder and Consolidation on September 28, 2020. (Doc. No. 17). Defendant asks this Court to order joinder of Kim Green (“Mrs. Green” or “Kim Green”) as a party to this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, and to order consolidation of Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00681-GCM, with this case, No. 3:19-cv-680-FDW-DSC, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. (Doc. No. 18). II. JOINDER Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) outlines the circumstances in which a person must be joined as a necessary party to a case. “A person who is subject to service of process and whose

joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party” if either: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)-(B). The determination of joinder pursuant to Rule 19 is a “practical” inquiry and is left to the “sound discretion of the trial court.” McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 950 (4th Cir. 2020) (quotation and citation omitted). The ultimate question a court must ask is “whether a party is necessary to [the] proceeding because of its relationship to the matter under consideration.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 1999). If a party is determined to be necessary, “it will be ordered into the action.” Id. Defendant argues Kim Green is a necessary party and must be joined pursuant to Rule 19. (Doc. No. 18, p. 4). Mr. Green argues against joining Kim Green under Rule 19 based on Bodnar v. Jackson, No. 1:14-cv-120, 2014 WL 5426392 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2014), where the court declined to join a third party pursuant to Rule 19 and Rule 20. Id. at *2. The Court finds Bodnar distinguishable because there, the party to be joined did not meet the criteria outlined in Rule 19. Id. Here, the Court finds Kim Green is a necessary party under Rule 19. Here, the threshold requirements for joinder under Rule 19 are met because Kim Green is subject to service of process and her joinder will not deprive this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction as evidenced by her filing a parallel suit in this District on the same day Mr. Green commenced the instant action. Compare (No. 3:19-cv-00681-GCM, Doc. No. 1) with (No. 3:19- cv-00680-FDW-DSC, Doc. No. 1). As for the secondary requirements, failing to join Kim Green would likely leave Defendant Midland subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or inconsistent obligations because of Mrs. Green’s relationship to the instant case.

The Court first notes Kim Green and Brian Green are husband and wife, a fact which Mr. Green does not contest. (Doc. No. 18, p. 5). Indeed, Mrs. Green’s relationship to and interest in the instant case is so substantial such that both her and Mr. Green’s Amended Complaints allege violations of the same laws for the exact same alleged conduct. Each Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA and the NCDCA when Defendant called Brian Green’s cell phone between 2:59 PM and 3:09 PM on December 2, 2019 to collect a debt allegedly due from Mrs. Green. Compare (No. 3:19-cv-00681-GCM, Doc. No. 5, p. 3) with (No. 3:19-cv-00680-FDW-DSC, Doc. No. 4, p. 4). Ultimately, Mrs. Green is substantially related to the instant case because it is premised on allegations of Defendant attempting to collect Mrs. Green’s alleged debt from her husband.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Kim Green is a necessary party to this action and ORDERS her joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Because joinder is appropriate under Rule 19, the Court declines to address whether joinder is appropriate under Rule 20. III. CONSOLIDATION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that a court may consolidate separate actions that “involve a common question of law or fact.” Courts have broad discretion in determining whether to consolidate. A/S Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Const. Co., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Cir. 1977). In determining whether to consolidate, courts assess “‘whether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion” of consolidation would be outweighed “by the risk of inconsistent adjudications . . ., the burden on parties, witnesses, and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple—trail alternatives.” Campbell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 882 F.3d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Arnold v. E. Airlines, 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982)).

Defendant also argues for consolidation of Kim Green’s parallel suit, No. 3:19-cv-00681- GCM, with Mr. Green’s suit, No. 3:19-cv-00680-FDW-DSC. (Doc. No. 18, p. 6). Mr. Green opposes consolidation because Tinsley v. Streich, 143 F.Supp. 3d 450 (W.D.Va. 2015) is “not distinguishable on the facts or on the law under Rule 42.” (Doc. No. 22, p. 6). Although the Tinsley court undertook a “common question of law or fact” analysis, it did so in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20

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Green v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-midland-credit-management-inc-ncwd-2020.