Green v. Kijakazi

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: May 6, 2025
• Docket: 3:21-cv-02098
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 LILLIAN G., Case No.: 21-cv-2098-AGS 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) FEES (ECF 22) 5 v. 6 Carolyn COLVIN, 7 Defendant. 8 9 Plaintiff’s counsel moves for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2). Counsel 10 requests “$15,000,” offset by an order to credit plaintiff “for the EAJA fees previously paid 11 in the amount of $5,572.00.” (ECF 22, at 1–2.) This request represents approximately 19 12 percent of plaintiff’s past-due benefits, which total “$80,188.20.” (ECF 22, at 4–5.) 13 Plaintiff has not objected. The government does not oppose. (See ECF 23, at 4.) 14 “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant,” “the court may 15 determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in 16 excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b); see also 17 42 U.S.C. § 1382(d)(2)(A) (incorporating § 406(b)’s procedures). In evaluating an 18 attorney-fee request, courts “must respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 19 arrangements,” “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing for 20 reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 21 omitted). “Within the 25 percent boundary,” “the attorney for the successful claimant must 22 show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 23 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Factors the court may consider in evaluating the reasonableness 24 of the attorney-fee award are: “(1) the character of the representation; (2) the results 25 achieved; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits 26 are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 27 attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non- 28 1 contingent cases.” Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728-W-MSB, 2021 WL 2662309, at *1 2 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2021). 3 Plaintiff assented in her contingency agreement to a fee of “25% of the past due 4 benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the 5 court.” (ECF 22-1, at 1 (boldface removed).) This bargained-for percentage is 6 presumptively valid. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807–08. Counsel invested her resources 7 on contingency and achieved remand for her client. (See ECF 22-4, at 1–2.) On remand, 8 plaintiff secured a favorable decision and was granted past-due disability benefits of 9 “$80,188.20.” (ECF 22, at 9.) There is no evidence of dilatory conduct or undue delay. 10 Indeed, counsel expended only 22.15 hours of attorney time and 3.2 hours of paralegal time 11 to achieve these results, which is reasonable. (See ECF 22-4, at 1–2); see also Patterson v. 12 Apfel, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding “33.75 hours spent by 13 plaintiff’s counsel” to fall “within the approved range” for fees after surveying “several 14 dozen cases in which attorney’s fees were awarded in social security cases”). This case was 15 voluntarily remanded, but only after the Administrative Record was filed, plaintiff’s 16 counsel digested its 2600+ pages, and counsel filed plaintiff’s opening brief. (See ECF 11, 17 12, 14.) 18 Counsel’s effective hourly rate for the representation was $591.72. (See ECF 28-5.) 19 This rate is not unreasonable compared to, and does not grossly exceed, fees that courts 20 have approved. See, e.g., Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 21 (collecting cases, twenty years ago, that approved fees between roughly $200 and $700 an 22 hour); Christopher R. B. v. Colvin, No. 8:23-CV-00249-BFM, 2025 WL 26796, at *2 (C.D. 23 Cal. Jan. 3, 2025) (noting that an “$876” an hour “rate is well within the rates that the Ninth 24 Circuit and courts in this District have approved”). And counsel preemptively reduced her 25 fee to just below 19 percent of the total past-due award, instead of requesting the full 26 agreed-to 25 percent. 27 When a valid attorney-client fee arrangement exists, the fee statute is not meant to 28 displace that agreement, but to act as a check on the reasonableness of fees. See Gisbrecht, 1 U.S. at 793. Since Gisbrecht, “district courts generally have been deferential to the 2 terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto 3 ||hourly rates may exceed those for non[-]contingency-fee arrangements.” Hearn □□□ 4 || Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The Court concludes that “the 5 ||requested fees” are reasonable. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 6 Counsel’s unopposed request for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) is GRANTED. 7 ||Counsel is entitled to $15,000 out of plaintiffs past-due benefits. Counsel must reimburse 8 || plaintiff the $5,572.00 EAJA fees already paid. (See ECF 22, at 1); see also Gisbrecht, 535 9 at 796 (noting that, when section 406(b) fees are awarded, “the claimant’s attorney 10 || must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller [EAJA] fee’). 11 Dated: May 6, 2025 12 A 13 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28